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Preface
Natalie Obergruber prepared this study while she was working at the ifo Center for the Eco-
nomics of Education. The study was completed in March 2018 and accepted as doctoral thesis
by theDepartment of Economics at theUniversity ofMunich. It consists of four distinct empirical
analyses – two on the determinants of education and two on the determinants of occupational
choice. For both choices, individual and institutional determinants are investigated. The econo-
metric analyses are based on panel data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS),
historical census data of the Statistical Oice of the German Empire, historicalmaps and studies
from Sering 1897, Verein für Socialpolitik 1883, Grossherzogliches Ministerium des Inneren
1883, Miaskowski 1882-1884, Fick 1895, and Kra 1930 which are combined with modern
data from the German Statistical Oice and the BBSR. This study analyses which individual
and institutional factors (causally) influence individuals in their educational career and in
their choice for an occupation. Chapter 2 explores consequences of parental separation for
cognitive skill development of children. In the year before parental separation occurs children
are negatively aected in their cognitive skill development. Chapter 3 investigates the con-
sequences of an institutional reform in the German school system which awards high track
school drop outs with lower track school degrees if they accomplished 9th grade. Aer the
reform students are less likely to switch between schools and tracks and surprisingly are more
likely to successfully finish the high-track school and enter university. Chapter 4 predicts the
choice ofmath-intensive occupations by school grades. School grades are aected by students’
ability and tastes andmay furthermore contain pure signals of achievement (based on rank in
class). We find that the strong association between grades andmath intensity of occupations is
completely explained by individuals’ dierences in tastes. Chapter 5 shows that occupational
choice is influenced by the distribution of land, a store of wealth in an agricultural society. We
find that areas with more equally distributed land started to industrialize earlier particularly in
innovative manufacturing.
Keywords: dierence-in-dierences, economic inequality, industrialization, panel
data, NEPS
JEL-Codes: I21, I24, I28, J12, J13, J24, N13, N33, O33, O47
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1 Introduction
SinceWorldWar II, average education levels have increased hand in handwith returns to educa-
tion see e.g., Autor (2014); Jones and Romer (2010); Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998). The growth
in demand for skilled workers therefore necessarily exceeded the growth in supply. Tinbergen
(1974, 1975) was the first to link the excess demand for skilled workers to recent technological
change. The process of technological change oers many opportunities for individuals but
also poses a challenge to policymakers who should ensure that people are well-prepared to
take-up these opportunities.
The main characteristic of the ongoing technological change are improvements in productivity
and decline in real prices of information and communication technologies (Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011). New technologies substitute labor-intensive, well-defined, and codifiable tasks -
routine tasks - by capital which are mainly performed bymedium skilled workers. Complemen-
tary, non-routine tasks are largely performed by high skilled workers. However, manual tasks
are partly non-routine as well when they ask for situational adaptability, visual and language
recognition, and face-to-face interactions. These tasks are for example concentrated in the
service sector and can be performed by low skilled workers (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). The
’routinization’ hypothesis predicts the substitution of labor in routine tasks by technology and
therefore an erosion ofmedium skilled occupations in favor of high and low skilled occupations.
This is in line with employment data (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Over the past two decades
employment shares in high skill/high wage and low skill/lowwage occupations increasedwhile
medium skill/mediumwage occupations lost on average 8 percent of their employment share
in the US and the EU until 2010.1 As real wage levels in high skilled occupations are far higher
than in low skilled occupations, the observed job polarization increases inequality in real wages
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Although the exact consequences of income inequality are still
unclear, there is some evidence that it harms the institutional quality of democracies (Kotschy
and Sunde, 2017; Jung and Sunde, 2014).
The described consequences of technological change challenge policymakers in several per-
spectives: how can the increased demand for high skilledworkers be supplied? How should the
education system particularly in the area which trains people for medium skilled occupations
deal with the worse future employment perspectives in these occupations? How can real wage
1 Job polarization and increasing real wage inequality are not US specific but hold for most industrialized
countries (Goos and Manning, 2009; Atkinson, 2008; Katz and Autor, 1999).
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inequality be ameliorated? Tackling these issues will particularly ask for reforms and interven-
tions in the education system. The aims would include increases in average skill levels, more
flexibility in the vocational education system, and incentives to chose innovative occupations
in sustainable branches. Tailoring such educational policies require a solid understanding of
individual and institutional determinants of education and occupational choice.
This thesis provides insights into these determinants and consists of two parts: The first inves-
tigates determinants of education outcomes and the second determinants of occupational
choice - both once from an individual and once from an institutional perspective. The first part
deals on the individual levelwith studentswho are disadvantageddue to changes in their family
background. On the institutional level, the first part investigates the consequences of a reform
which reduced the risk of dropping out without any school degree. The second part of this
thesis deals with the influence of individual characteristics on the decision for specializing in a
(medium skilled) occupation. Then, it investigates how an institution which influences wealth
distribution historically changed occupational choice and in the long-run improved adaption
of people to technological change. This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.1 discusses
the literature on determinants of education with a focus on family background and institu-
tions. Section 1.2 gives an overview of the literature on determinants of occupational choice.
Section 1.3 introduces the chapters of this thesis in more detail and section 1.4 discusses the
conclusions and recommendations which can be drawn from this thesis.
1.1 Determinants of education
In line with a typical economics production function Hanushek (1970, 1979) conceptualized
the process of education in the education production function. The idea is that di erent inputs
determine the level of education an individual achieves - measured in cognitive skills. Recent
formalizations distinguish four separate determinants (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011):
Yi = f(Fi, Ri, Ii, Ai).(1.1)
The outcome of the educational production process Yi of individual i is a function of individual
characteristics and family background (Fi), school resources (Ri), institutional features of the
school system (Ii), and individual ability Ai. The literature investigates the influence of the
four defined determinants separately. Individuals’ ability Ai and family background Fi are
o!en taken as given and rigorously controlled for. However, early-childhood interventions,
mentoring pro-grams, or financial support of disadvantaged families are policies to reduce
negative influences of family background e.g., Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006);
Kosse, Deckers, Schildberg-Hörisch, and Falk (2016). The majority of the literature deals with
the influence of school resourcesRi and institutional features Ii because these determinants
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are particularly relevant for policy recommendations. From a policy perspective changes
in school resources, o en interpreted as spending per student, are more easily introduced
compared to changes in institutional features of the school system. Concretely, more spending
per student can lead to more or better teachers per student and to more or better equipment
like books, computers, school excursions, etc. While many studies show that quantitative
increases in spending like decreases in class size hardly increase educational outcomes of
children (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011), Jackson, Johnson, and Persico (2016) show long-
run positive e!ects of increased spending. Overall, the e!ects might depend on how the
increased spending is used. If spending increases the quality of school inputs e.g. the quality
of teachers, there is strong evidence that this will have strong and long-run positive e!ects on
student outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, and Rocko!, 2014a, 2014b). Institutions are so far mainly
investigated in an international perspective as school systemsmainly vary on a national level.
Internationally comparable tests like PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment)
and TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) o!er the opportunity to
compare students fromdi!erent school systemswithin the same testing and survey framework.
Woessmann (2016) provides and overview of these analyses. Conclusions from the findings,
however, rely on the assumption that the introduction of the same institutional feature has
the same e!ect in each country regardless of other national institutional features and cultural
factors - the issues all cross-country studies face (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). The
remaining section discusses family background and institutional features as determinants of
education in detail.
1.1.1 Family background
Family background explains about 50 percent of the variation in years of schooling (Bjoerklund
and Salvanes, 2011). In estimating education production functions like equation 1.1 proxy
variables for family background are highly statistically and economically significant (Hanushek
and Woessmann, 2011). A number of di!erent family characteristics approximate family back-
ground: number of books at home, parents’ job classification, parents’ working status, parents’
education level, household income, and the relationship status of the parents see e.g., Kalil,
Mogstad, Rege, and Votruba (2016); Hanushek and Woessmann (2011); Schuetz, Ursprung,
and Woessmann (2008); Woessmann (2008). As family background is also related to other
inputs - particularly school resources - it is a source of potential bias in identifying any e!ect on
education production. The relation comes from parents selecting their children into specific
schools or schools selecting children by their family background. At least controlling for family
back-ground is therefore crucial to any study estimating an education production function.
However, considering equal opportunities of students, the influence of family background on
education production is also a research field on its own. The aim is to ameliorate negative
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family influences. As a first step in that direction it is necessary to determine howmuch of the
observed influence is driven by nurture i.e. arises by social contact as this is the potential reach
of interventions. Bjoerklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006) show for adopted children in Sweden
that the e ect of biological parents and adoptive parents on the transmission of education and
income has almost the samemagnitude and adds up to the parents’ e ect on transmission
for children born and raised by their biological parents. These results suggest that about
50 percent of the family background e ect can be targeted by interventions. Experimental
early-childhood interventions show very positive e ects on school careers of children from
disadvantaged backgrounds see for an overview Cunha et al. (2006). The e ects are even
positive and significant for the very long-run as Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev, and Yavitz
(2010) show for 40-year old participants of the Perry Preschool experiment. Chapter 2 adds to
the literature which aims to understand the mechanism how family background influences
education production by investigating the timing, causality, and potential mechanisms of the
e ect of parental separation on cognitive skill development of children.
1.1.2 Institutions
Institutions which summarize all structural characteristics of the school system provide in-
centives for education and shape individual behavior (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). The
challenge for identification of institutional e ects is that institutionsmainly vary on thenational
level. International achievement tests like PISA and TIMSS provide the opportunity to evalu-
ate in repeated cross-sections the influence of specific institutional features on educational
outcomes of children. These international comparisons allow to identify long-term general
equilibrium e ects instead of short-term e ects of recent reforms. The disadvantage of interna-
tional data are that they are repeated cross-sections. It is not possible to follow students over
their school career and into the labor market. Therefore, identifying the incentives provided
by a school system for educational choices is harder. For such analyses panel data which fol-
lows students over time would allowmore detailed analyses. Such data are for administrative
reasons rather available on the national level. Population data from Scandinavian countries
for example follow cohorts throughout their school and labor market career. In these settings
causal short-run e ects of reforms on treated cohorts can be identified. Good examples for such
identification strategies are (Meghir and Palme, 2005; Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Kerr, 2009)
who study the introduction of tracking reforms in Norway and Finland and exploit the di erent
timing of the reforms in di erent parts of the country. They find that equality of opportunities is
increased if tracking is reduced. In chapter 3 we apply a similar approach exploiting a reform in
Germany as natural experiment whichwas introduced in the 11West-German states at di erent
points in time from 1965 on with retrospective spell data on school and labor market careers.
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1.2 Determinants of occupational choice
Theoretically, occupational choice is seen as the last step in a sequence of binary decisions
on education — first general education and later occupation-specific or specialized education
(Altonji, Arcidiacono, and Maurel, 2016; Altonji, Blom, and Meghir, 2012). These decisions
are taken under uncertainty about one’s own ability and about the returns to ability in the
di erent occupations. Individuals choose the occupation which maximizes their utility based
on believed pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns on believed ability. The recent empirical
literature on collegemajor choice tries to identify the influence of belief updating and expected
future income on college major choice using survey experiments see e.g. Wiswall and Zafar
(2015); Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014). One main finding is that residual factors which
are non-pecuniary play a larger role for college major choice than pecuniary factors. There is
also a literature documenting correlations of occupations of children and parents (Hellerstein
and Morrill, 2011; Constant and Zimmermann, 2004) and clustering of specific non-cognitive
skills within occupations (John and Thompsen, 2014).2 In chapter 4 we investigate in a rich
panel data set how ability and ability signals influence occupational choice of teenagers in
Germany in comparison to parental occupations, and direct measures for individual tastes.
The e ects of institutions on occupational choice are di icult to study as international compa-
rable data is hardly available for the transition of teenagers and young adults into the labor
market. In the literature on college major choice (Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad, 2016) show
that there are significant income jumps at the cut-o of acceptance for college majors. This
suggests that institutions which restrict whomay study which subject probably have a large im-
pact on occupational choice. Similar institutional interventions into the choice of field of study
in Germany and Austria are for example the limitations to the study field of medicine. In light
of the ongoing technological change institutions might become evenmore important for low
andmedium skilled people. Hampf and Woessmann (2017) provide evidence that institutions
with a very early specialization into one occupation turn out to bemore rigid in the long-run
as it is harder for people to switch occupations. Chapter 5 adds to this literature investigating
the e ects of institutions on occupational choice during a past era of technological change.
An institution which distributed land — the key store of wealth in an agricultural society —
more evenly during industrialization encouraged people to seek employment in innovative
occupations.
2 In the view of (Altonji et al., 2016) non-cognitive skills are part of ability.
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1.3 Outline of the thesis
This thesis is a collection of four self-contained empirical studies in the field of economics of
education and its overlap with labor economics. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the influence
of family background on cognitive skill development and of institutions on school careers.
Chapter 4 determines the important factors for occupational choice of German teenagers
today. Chapter 5 shows how equal distribution of wealth via occupational choicemay influence
long-run development positively.
Chapter 2 explores consequences of parental separation for cognitive skill development of
children. In general, growing up with a single parent is related to lower educational achieve-
ment. Identification of a causal e ect is, however, challenging as growing up with a single
parent is correlated with other disadvantageous aspects of family background and separation
is an endogenous decision of parents. We use panel data from the National Educational Panel
Study (NEPS) on children in 5th grade. These data provide annual reports on living with a
single parent at home and bi-annual data on cognitive skills. While using a a value-added
setting conditions out fixed characteristics of family background, the issue of the endogenous
separation decision is not solved. The panel structure of the data allows to investigate the
timing of the onset of a negative e ect of separation on cognitive skills. Particularly, in the
year before parental separation occurs children are negatively a ected in their cognitive skill
development. This suggests that parental conflicts at home or the threat of separation is more
disadvantageous than the event itself. A!er separation cognitive skill development is not
significantly negatively a ected anymore. In terms of mechanisms the degree parents help
with homework is the only family input with a similar pattern in the timing as the cognitive
skill development.
Chapter 3 investigates the consequences of an institutional reform in the German school
system which awards high track school drop outs with lower track school degrees if they
accomplished 9th grade. Drop-outs who lack a school degree face di iculties in the labor
market as a school degree is an important signal for any future employer. The reform under
study focuses on high-track school drop-outs who fail to successfully complete 13 years of
schooling. In general, inmost data sets it is not possible to track students who did not finish the
high track school in Germany in a representative sample of adults and explore their past school
careers. We exploit detailed retrospective spell data on school and labor market careers from
the adult cohort of the NEPS from 2010. As the reform was introduced at di erent points in
time between 1965 and 1982 in the 11West-German states, we apply a di erence-in-di erences
approach for identification. Our results show that a!er the reform students are less likely to
switch between schools and tracks. Surprisingly, we find that the reform led to an increase
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in the number of high-track students who successfully finish the high-track school and enter
university. The reform reduced the perceived risk of trying longer in the high-track school and
thus led to an increase in the high-track completion rate.
Chapter 4 predicts the choice ofmath-intensive occupations by school grades. School grades
are an interesting determinant of occupational choice to investigate because grades are af-
fected by students’ ability and tastes andmay furthermore contain pure signals of achievement
(based on rank in class). So far, the literature on occupational choice focuses on college stu-
dents choosing their college major which is for academics the first moment when education
becomes specialized. The results of the existing literature show that non-pecuniary aspects of
occupations have a large influence on occupational choice. These aspects are mostly residuals
and interpreted as individual tastes. We use NEPS data, which follows 9th-grade students
in Germany into the labor market. These are students who generally will not go into higher
education and who are much more a ected by the recent technological change. For them
occupational choice is a crucial moment for future employment and life-time earnings. The
rich data allow us to link students’ math and reading achievement, their teacher-assigned
school grades, and tastes for specific activities to their choice of apprenticeship. Tomeasure
the math intensity of occupations, we use the adult cohort of NEPS to compute average math
skills of workers in each occupation and the Qualification and Career Survey (QaC) to compute
the math skill requirements per occupation. We find that better math grades are robustly
associated with themath intensity of chosen occupations. This relationship is, however, not ex-
plained by better math ability or by parents’ occupation. Furthermore, we exploit the fact that
teachers tend to grade on a curve and instrument a student’s school grades by her classmates’
average achievement. This allows us to estimate the causal e ect of a pure ability signal on
occupational choice, for whichwe find no evidence. Using extensive information on individuals’
interests in various domains, we find that the strong association between grades and math
intensity of occupations is completely explained by individuals’ di erences in tastes. This is in
line with existing studies, which find that non-pecuniary residuals are o!en themain driver
of occupational choice and are interpreted as di erences in tastes (without observing them
directly).
Chapter 5 shows that occupational choice is influenced by the distribution of land, a store
of wealth in an agricultural society. The old and remaining question in economics on the
consequences of inequality is hard to answer as suitable data and natural experiments in
inequality are scarce. In this chapter we exploit spatial variation in an exogenous institution
- agricultural inheritance rules. Within Germany, inheritance rules for land di ered sharply
across locations with some areas featuring rules prescribing an equal division of land among
children while others featured rules prescribing land to be indivisible. Leveraging a geographic
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regression discontinuity design at the boundary between equal and unequal division areas,
we document that equal division areas started to industrialize earlier particularly in innovative
industries which show a higher patenting activity. Other potential drivers of economic growth
are smooth at the boundary and using various data sets we can show that the head start in
economic development is only visible from the onset of industrialization on. Today, historical
equal division areas still draw on the advantage and show substantially higher employment in
the service sector and the share of university educated people is higher compared to unequal
division areas.
The next section discusses the results of the four chapters briefly and draws conclusions for
policy interventions tackling the challenges of technological change.
1.4 What do we learn?
The current technological change characterized by increasing speed and lowering prices of
standardized computations puts education policy in front of new challenges. This thesis pro-
vides a starting point for such policies as it provides insights into the individual and institutional
determinants of education and occupational choice.
The findings of chapter 2 suggest that parental separation is a crisis to cognitive skill devel-
opment of children which has the largest impact in the year before separation occurs. A er
separation cognitive skill development is hardly a!ected but level di!erences might persist.
Interventions might prevent that children are missing too much of the material covered in
school and put on a lower schooling trajectory from the crisis on. Such individual support po-
tentially increases average skill levels of children. Simultaneously to such supportive individual
interventions the institutional framework influences school careers. Risk-reducing, low-cost,
institutional reforms as analyzed in chapter 3 can incentivize to stick to the investment into
higher education. If students are encouraged to invest into university education average skill
levels in the cohort are increased as well.
The overview on determinants of occupational choice of German teenagers in chapter 4 sug-
gests that a major driver of occupational choice is individual taste. Tastes, however, do not
seem to be pre-determined. There is scope for school interventions to encourage students
individually to take-up innovative or sustainable occupations. Last but not least, chapter 5
suggests that institutions play a role for occupational choice particularly in times of techno-
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logical change. One role of institutions is the distribution of prerequisites which incentivize
individuals to take-up occupations in new, rising branches.
Overall, there aremanyopportunities for educationpolicy to increaseaverage skill levels, and to
make individuals more flexible in their occupational choice. Introducing reforms and interven-
tions in these directions might improve the ongoing transition process from an industrialized
economy to a digitized one.
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2 Separating Parents and the Timing of Consequences
for Children’s Cognitive Skill Development
2.1 Introduction
Family background explains about half of the variation in education (Bjoerklund and Salvanes,
2011). Growing up with separated parents is one aspect of family background which is studied
by a large interdisciplinary literature since the 1960s.1 Children growing up with separated
parents obtain less education, participate more in deviant behavior like smoking, and have
lower health outcomes compared to children growing up with two parents at home (Tartari,
2015; Francesconi, Jenkins, and Siedler, 2010a, 2010b; Wuertz Rasmussen, 2009; Ermisch,
Francesconi, and Pevalin, 2004; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001). In adulthood children who
grew up with separated parents have lower employment rates, lower earnings, and their rela-
tionships are more oen unstable (Gruber, 2004; Corak, 2001). While these correlations are
strong, it is unclear if these dierences arise due to separation or independently of parental
relationship status. Studies trying to identify a causal eect of parental separation, so far,
suggest very small or even zero eects (Bjoerklund, Ginther, and Sundstroem, 2007; Sanz-de
Galdeano and Vuri, 2007; Bjoerklund and Sundstroem, 2006; Gruber, 2004; Corak, 2001).
This chapter sheds light on the timing and mechanism how disadvantages in educational
achievements of children who experience a separation of their parents emerge. In rich panel
data from the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS)2 10-year-old children from
Germany are tracked from 2010 to 2014. The data provide cognitive skill measures in form of
standardized reading test scores in 2010 (first year of observation) and 2012 and reports on
family type, and household inputs into education production on an annual basis. The eect of
separation is estimated in a value-added setting which controls for test scores of the previous
testing wave linearly. This value-added approach eliminates all unobserved factors which
influence test scores in 2010 and 2012 simultaneously. The estimated pattern suggests that
separation aects cognitive skill development of children negatively and strongest in the year
before separation occurs. Aer parents separated a slight catching-up of skill development
occurs. This pattern of cognitive skill development over time is dierent from patterns of devel-
opment for household income and proxy variables for other family inputs: the number of books
at home and household size. However, we deliver evidence that parental time investments
1 See for exampleGruber (2004) andHavemanandWolfe (1995) for anoverviewof the economics and sociology
literature on consequences of growing up with separated parents.
2 For more information about the study see Blossfeld, Roßbach, and von Maurice (2011).
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play a role measured in the degree of parental help with homework. As cognitive skill develop-
ment, thedegreeof parental helpwithhomework is already reducedbefore a separationoccurs.
Most of the studies which find negative influences of separated parents on children estimate
correlations with cross-sectional data. Studies using longitudinal data applying di erence-
in-di erences approaches or family-fixed e ects do not find e ects of parental separation on
educational outcomes of children.Sanz-de Galdeano and Vuri (2007) apply a di erence-in-
di erences approach and compare in two periods the educational achievement of UK school
children who live with two parents with children who live with a single parent. Bjoerklund and
Sundstroem (2006) apply family-fixed e ects and treat one sibling who leaves home before
parents separate as a counter-factual for the other siblingwho is still at home. Both approaches
fail to identify a causal e ect of separation. However, if children are a ected by separation
before it occurs neither the pre-separation outcome measure nor the sibling leaving home
is una ected by future separation see for discussion of pre-separation e ects Corak (2001);
Piketty (2003).3 In longitudinal settings, lead and lag e ects of separation might introduce
misspecification. This chapter sheds light on the issue of lead and lag e ects of parental sepa-
ration on educational outcomes of the child and gives first insights fromwhen on and for how
long children are a ected in cognitive skill development if their parents separate.
In Germany about 17 percent of children under the age of 18 live in single-parent households
(Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2014). Although Germany has a
well established welfare state that supports low-income and single-parent households educa-
tional achievement depends strongly on family background. The report on PISA 2012 (OECD,
2013) ranked Germany above the OECD average for the influence of family background on
educational achievement. Woessmann (2015) compares the disadvantage in PISA test scores
of single-parent children internationally and finds that also in Germany a disadvantage exists
although it is smaller than in other OECD countries. Earlier studies on Germany find that chil-
dren living with a single parent are more likely to drop out of school (Bohrhardt, 2000), less
likely to attend the highest secondary school track (Mahler and Winkelmann, 2004), and less
likely to obtain university-entrance qualification (Francesconi et al., 2010a). Policy measures
which support children of separated parents might potentially reduce inequality in the German
school system.
To tailor policy interventions specifically to the needs of children who experience a separation
of their parents it is necessary to understand themechanism how a separation a ects cognitive
3 There is also a literature in health economics documenting that divorces or deaths of spouses a ect adults
before the event occurs if they are pre-announced (Laporte and Windmeijer, 2005; Siflinger, 2016).
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skill development. Theoretically, the literature on intergenerational transmission of education4
suggests that household resources, parental education, preferences, and skills are input factors
into the educational achievement of children. A separation a ects many of these family inputs.
A policy intervention should focus on the input which is most influential or most a ected
by a separation. In line with the literature on the importance of parental time investments
for educational achievement (Avvisati, Gurgand, and Maurin, 2014; Bergman, 2014; Banerji,
Berry, and Shotland, 2013; Kra! and Dougherty, 2013), this chapter suggests that the timing of
reduction in the degree of parental help with homework coincides most with the timing of the
reduction in cognitive skill development.5
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the data. Section 3 discusses
the empirical strategy to identify a lead and a recent separation e ect and heterogeneous
separation e ects. Section 4 presents the results on the lead e ect of separation and section 5
presents results on heterogeneity. Section 6 shows robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Data
The NEPS starting cohort 3 is a representative panel on German children which starts in 2010
when children are in 5th grade in regular schools.6. Our sample consists of 3287 children from
this cohort. The data feature repeated subject specific tests in math, language competencies,
and science administered in the class environment. These tests allow to track cognitive skill
development of children over time. Additionally, the data include detailed information on
family background and school environment reported repeatedly from parents, teachers, and
principals.
2.2.1 NEPS students within the German school system
In 2010, the first observation period, most children in the sample are in the first year of sec-
ondary school in a new school. In the German school system children are usually tracked at age
10 a!er four years of comprehensive primary school.7 There are 6 school types distinguished
in NEPS. These 6 school types more or less represent the three tracks in the German school
system from 5th grade on: lower, middle, and high track. While lower track provides grades 5
4 see e.g.Bjoerklund and Salvanes (2011) or Black and Devereux (2011)
5 Although a reduction in parental help with homework is in general — estimated for children a ected and
una ected of a separation of their parents — not a significant driver of cognitive skill development.
6 The sampling procedure has two steps. First, it randomly selects the schools and second, within each of
these schools it samples two classes in 5th grade. If the school has only one class in 5th grade, then one
class is sampled
7 Exceptions are Berlin and Brandenburg where children are tracked a!er 6 years of primary school.
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to 98, middle track provides grades 5 to 10. Both school tracks primarily prepare for vocational
training and are less academically demanding. The high track provides grades 5 to 139 and
awards students who complete the track with a university entrance qualification. The used
NEPS data tracks students from 5th grade to 9th grade in all school tracks. During that period
no compulsory switching of schools occurs.10
2.2.2 Data structure
One challenge of the analysis is that the time-distance between the reports of information
varies by variable. For example, while children are asked annually with whom they live in
a household, they are tested every second year. The time structure of the used variables is
therefore a crucial characteristic of the data. Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the tests and
reports on separation. In general, child questionnaires and parent interviews are conducted in
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 (fall)/2015 (spring). Separation can occur either in S0, S1, S2,
or S3. The T in 2010, 2012, and 2014 indicates when children are tested in reading andmath.
11
NEPS-trained interviewers conduct the written tests within the classrooms of the children.12
In the analysis we focus on two time periods for testing: 2010 and 2012.13 For consistency we
use the observation of 2010 and 2012 for all outcome variables even if they would be available
on a more regular basis. To capture the timing of the separation e ect, however, we exploit
that we know if a separation occurred on an annual basis.
2.2.3 Definition of separation
The treatment variable indicates a separation i.e. when children who lived with two parents
start to live with a single parent. This indicator uses the information from parents and children
on the annually reported family type.14 Family type is a dummywhich equals 1 if the child lives
8 There is an optional 10th grade available.
9 If there are 12 or 13 grades necessary to obtain university entrance qualification depends on the state.
10 Children can voluntarily switch schools. In that case NEPS individually tracks these students and interviews
and tests them at home. However, for those children test score data in 2012 and 2015 is not available.
11 Although children are tested in reading and math in 2014, in the used data publication only reading test
scores of 2014 are available.
12 In 2010, besides reading and math, cognitive basic skills and reading speed is tested. In 2011 scientific
literacy, listening comprehension of vocabulary, and ICT literacy is tested. In 2012, besides reading and
math, orthography, and Russian or Turkish for children with Russian or Turkish as mother tongue is tested.
In 2014/15 tests are performed on: cognitive basic skills, reading speed, listening comprehension, scientific
literacy, Russian and Turkish, ICT literacy, and orthography.
13 In 2014 a quarter of our sample does not participate in the testing and first analysis suggest that participants
are positively selected.
14 For 2012 there is only information from parents available.
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with a single parent and 0 if she lives with two parents.15 Table A-1 in the appendix lists the
questions which are used to categorize a family type. If information from parents and children
is available, the information of parents is favored.16 A child lives with a single parent in year t if:
1. the parent does not report to live with a partner in year t, or
2. the information if the parent is living with a partner is missing but the parent reports that
there is only one person older than 15 living in the household, or
3. the parent reports in year t+ 1 that there was no partner present in year t, or
4. the child reports to live only with one biological parent and neither with the other one
nor with any other partner of the biological parent.
If the information of 1) is available, the algorithm for defining if the child lives with a single
parent stops there. If the information is missing the algorithm proceeds. If no information for
any of the four conditions is available, family type is set to missing for year t. Missing values in t
are filled if the report on family type is available for t− 1 and t+ 1 and the family type in t− 1
equals the one in t+ 1. If the child reports living with two parents in t− 1 and as living with
a single parent a er t+ 1, it is assumed that parents separated between t and t+ 1.17 In the
final sample 169 children experience a separation between 2010 and 2014.
2.2.4 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for our sample of 3287 children. About 5 percent of children
in our sample experience a separation of their parents between 2010 and 2014. For our main
analysis we distinguish four groups among those children: those who experience a separation
until 2011, until 2012, until 2013, and until 2014 (always compared to the last observation one
year earlier). About 8 percent of our sample live with a single parent in 2010. These children
are in the control group as they live in a stable family environment from 2010 to 2014.
15 Two parents include two biological parents or a patchwork family. There are 19 children who live in a foster
family which are dropped due to the low number.
16 For 46.84 percent of children reports of parents and children are available. In 91.91 percent the information
on family type is the same. This is mainly driven by the children living with two parents. When children
report to live with a single parent, 81.71 percent of their parents also report to be a single parent. If the
parents report to be a single parent only 15.95 percent of their children also report to live with a single parent.
Regulations in which the child lives for some days with one parent and for some days with the other might
drive these findings.
17 Separation is always assumed to have happened in the year before the first report of living with a single
parent.
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Cognitive skills are tested in reading and math in 2010 and 2012. They are standardized to
mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in 2010 and in 2012 standardized to the 2010 mean and 2010
standard deviation. The positive mean for reading and math in 2012 reflect that students
improve in their cognitive skills over time. Figure 2.2 shows for our control group and the four
separation cohorts means and di erences in reading test scores for 2010 (le! graph) and for
2012 (right graph). In 2010 test scores for the five groups do not di er significantly (on the 5
percent level), however, the mean is clearly more negative for children who will experience a
separation until 2011 and until 2012. For children who will experience a separation until 2013
or until 2014 the mean is close to zero which is the mean of the control group. In 2012, test
scores do not di er significantly (on the 5 percent level) either but again it is visible that the
mean is lower for children who have experienced a separation within the past two years and
those who will experience a separation in the next year (2013).
The degree help with homework is a five-scale variable in which children report in 2010 and
2012 howmuch their parents help themwith their homework. It is one of the few available
panel variables (so far) in the NEPS data which captures parental time involvement in their
children’s educational achievements. The value of 5 means that parents help their children
very o!en with their homework, the value of 1 means that they do not help them at all. The
mean reduces slightly from 2010 to 2012 which might capture the fact that children become
more independent in studying between age 10 and age 14.
The individual characteristics and the number of books at home are our control variables. We
use an indicator for being female and having migration background (the child or at least one
parent is born abroad). The log household income per household member is calculated from
two variables – one summarizes reports from parents on the household income in 2010 (either
in form of an open question or of categories), the other one states the number of household
members. As the household income contains many missing values we impute household
income with variables on the number of books at home, the school track the child attends,
migration background, the family type, highest parental education, home possessions, and
household size. An indicator captures for 35 percent of children in our sample that we imputed
their household income. There are 6 categories for the number of books at home which we
include as dummies into our analysis. Additionally, we control for year of birth with a majority
of 94.28 percent born in 1999 and 2000.
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2.3 Empirical strategy
Toestimatewhenaseparationa ects cognitive skill developmentmost,weapply a value-added
approach with the following equation:
Ti,2012 = β0 +
2014∑
k=2011
β1,kseparationi,k + β2Ti,2010 +Xi,2010β3 + ǫi,2012.(2.1)
The outcome variable Ti,2012 is the level of cognitive skills of child i in 2012measured in test
scores. The coe icients of interest are β1,k which captures the coe icients of skill development
for the cohort of children who experience a separation between 2010 and 2011, between 2011
and 2012, between 2012 and 2013, and between 2013 and 2014, separately. The value-added
approach is visible through the variable Ti,2010 on the right hand side. Ti,2010 controls for the
test score level of child i in 2010. The matrixXi includes a dummy for being female, having mi-
gration background, dummies for the year of birth, dummies for the number of books at home,
and the imputed income of households (including an indicator for household income being
imputed). These variables are measured in 2010 to exclude that they are already influenced by
separation. ǫi,2012 is the error term. Standard errors are clustered on school level.
The value-added approach is similar to a first-di erence approach with the feature that the
coe icient of the past value is not restricted to being 1.18 Ti,2010 captures all observed and
unobserved influences into cognitive skills which influence the test scores in 2010 as well as in
2012. Therefore, all unobserved factors which do not change in their influence on test scores
in 2010 and 2012 do not bias our results. Sources of potential bias might only come from
unobserved changes in education production inputs. Changes in family inputs – like a drop of
income, household size, etc. – are assumed to be driven by separation only. If we controlled
for levels in these variables in 2012 or for changes, we would introduce a bad control problem.
Section 2.5 shows that a separation shocks these inputs suggesting that they should not be
included as control variables.
Unobserved inputs which might change from 2010 to 2012 are school inputs. This is prob-
lematic if children who experience a separation are not randomly distributed to schools. In
the robustness checks, we estimate equation 2.1 with school-fixed e ects. In that setting we
compare only children within the same school who would be prone to the same changes of
school inputs between 2010 and 2012.
18 Estimated coe icients of Ti,2010 range from about 0.5 to 0.7 and are highly statistically significant. The
assumption that the coe icient is not 1 is therefore plausible.
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Classical analysis of separation e ects using longitudinal data assumes that separation a ects
children from the moment it happens on. However, separation is not exogenous but pre-
announced by parental conflicts. Separation might be anticipated by children (Piketty, 2003;
Corak, 2001) and then it is unclear for any longitudinal study which pre-separationmeasure
of the outcome variable is una ected by future separation.19 Identifying causal e ects of
separation in a longitudinal setting is not possible if it is unclear when the treatment starts.
This might explain why di erence-in-di erence approaches so far failed to identify an e ect of
separation. We do not claim that our data contain an una ectedmeasure of cognitive skills.
However, distinguishing four di erent pints in time when separation happens with respect to
the moment when cognitive skills are measured, delivers at least descriptive insights into the
evolution of a separation e ect. For interpretation of the evolution of the separation e ect, we
assume that children who experience a separation in 2011, 2012, 2013, or 2014 do not di er
significantly in unobserved factors. In the robustness checks we provide some descriptive
evidence that this is the case.
2.4 Separation and cognitive skills
In this sectionwepresentourmain findingson thee ect of parental separationoncognitive skill
levels and cognitive skill development of children. We document in our data that children who
livewitha singleparent achieve lower test scores thanchildrenwho livewith twoparents. These
are the gaps we want to explain by investigating what happens to cognitive skill development
in the years before and a!er separation.
2.4.1 Level dierences in cognitive skills
The first step of our analysis is to show that level di erences in cognitive skills exist between
children who live with a single parent and children who live with two parents exist. Table 2.2
shows that childrenwho livewith a single parent in 2010 achieve significantly lower reading test
scores in 2010 (column 1) and 2012 (column 2) compared to children who live with two parents.
This is robust to including control variables (column 3).20 However, applying a first-di erence
approach as in column 4 or a value-added approach as in column 5 reveals that children who
live with a single parent do not di er significantly in their cognitive skill development. Their
gains in reading skills are comparable to children who live with two parents. This suggests that
19 Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) and Siflinger (2016) show that for adults lead and lag e ects of divorce and
death of a spouse should be taken into account.
20 These gaps vanish if school-track or school-fixed e ects are included. For the German systemwhich tracks
a!er 4th grade there might be issues of selecting children with separated parents to low or middle track
schools.
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at some point in the unobserved past the gaps in cognitive skills emerged for children who live
with a single parent in 2010 and although they improve their skills they are unable to close the
gap over time.
2.4.2 Dierences in cognitive skill development
As we observe large level di erences between children who live with a single parent and chil-
drenwho livewith twoparents, a question naturally arising is, if the gap emerges in themoment
of separation. For childrenwho experience a separation of their parents between 2010 and 2014
we can investigate this question. Table 2.3 uses reading test scores of 2012 as outcome variable.
It shows that a separation which lies one or two years in the past does not significantly reduce
test score gains of these children (column 1). However, the small sample size of children who
experience a separation inhibits that an e ect size of 10 percent of a standard deviation can be
identified.21 Taking future separations into account (column 2) increases the magnitude of the
coe icient and it becomes significant at the 10 percent level. In column 3we distinguish all four
separation cohorts estimating an e ect separately for children who experience a separation in
2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. The results show that the negative e ect of a separation between
2010 and 2014 on reading test scores in 2012 is mainly driven by the cohort experiencing a
separation in 2013 – during the next year. With a p-value of 0.157 this e ect is slightly above
conventional significance levels.
To exclude that these results are driven by changes in school inputs, we include school-fixed
e ects in table A-2. These patterns that future separations influence test scores more than
past separations are robust. The pattern is also not specific to reading test scores. Table A-3
shows that future separations a ect cognitive skill development in math also more than past
separations. However, it seems that the pattern is driven by separations in 2014, two years
ahead (column 3).
To explore the influence of past and future separations on cognitive skill development further,
we apply an event study design following the four separation cohorts from 2010 to 2014. Figure
2.3 plots the demeaned reading test scores of children in the four separation cohorts against
the year-distance to separation of their parents. The graph suggests that in the year before
separation, test scores are most a ected. A!er separation test scores improve again. We now
use the additional reading test scores of 2014 and apply individual-fixed e ects in a panel
setting. Table A-4 column 1-3 compares the reading test score of children four and two years
21 Power calculations show that with our sample size of 169 separations the e ect size would have to be -0.196
to be significant at a 10 percent level and a power of 0.8. To find a significant e ect with a magnitude of -0.1
we would need at least 500 observed separations.
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before and 2 years a er their parents separate with the test score they achieve in the year of
separation. Column 4-6 compares reading test scores of children three years before and one
or three years a er their parents separate with the test score they achieve one year before
separation. While columns 1-3 suggest that test scores do not significantly di!er over time
compared to the test scores in the year of separation, column 4 and 5 suggest that test score
gains reach a clear minimum one year before parents get separated. The event study design,
therefore, confirms the findings of table 2.3.
2.4.3 Grades
The test scores provided in the NEPS data are goodmeasures for cognitive skills which make
children comparable over all schools in Germany and over time. However, these measures
are not reported to children, teachers, or parents. The influence of these test scores on school
careers is therefore unclear. Another measure for educational achievement are grades which
are awarded to the children from their teachers. Beside cognitive skills in the specific subject
grades capture for example participation in class and doing one’s homework. If grades are
negatively a!ected by parental separation children could be discouraged to study, they might
have to repeat a grade, or might struggle finding an apprenticeship position later on.
In table A-5 we use grades in German and math in 2012 as outcome variables. For grades
the patterns are di!erent compared to test scores. Overall, grades and particularly grades in
German (column 1-3) are negatively a!ected by separations. However, past separations of 2011
and 2012 have a stronger negative influence on the grades of 2012 than future separations. One
drawback of grades as measure for educational achievement is that they are not a longitudinal
measure for increasing skills. The range is fixed and thus they do not necessarily rise over time.
However, as we do find a negative e!ect even on grades, the results suggest that separation —
maybe with delay — decreases school grades of children significantly as well.
Overall, our results on the relationship between separation and cognitive skills suggest that
one to two years before parents get separated children experience a lower cognitive skill
development than children who live in stable families in the next years. However, cognitive
skill development catches-up a er parents separated. Therefore, the years before separation
are potentially the years when the educational achievement gaps between children who live
with a single parent and children who live with two parents emerge. In the next section we
explore if specific patterns in parental inputs match the pattern of cognitive skill development
when children experience that their parents get separated.
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2.5 Mechanism: Family inputs shocked by separation
Policy interventions would need information on themechanism of the reduction of cognitive
skill development. If cognitive skill development is reduced because a specific family input
is reduced like parental time or household income, supportive interventions should di er
respectively. In the following we explore household income, parental help with homework as a
proxy for parental time, and two proxy variables for family inputs in general: the number of
books at homeandhousehold size as factorswhichmight influence cognitive skill development
in case of separation. The number of books at home could capture the loss of possessions in
the household or the loss of contact to the higher educated parent. Household size captures in
general the reduced number of adults at home andmight subsume reduced adult time and
household income. As some of these variables capture similar aspects of family inputs they
should be included separately into a regression to avoid bad control issues.
In a first step, table A-9 in the appendix checks which family input factors have the largest
impact on cognitive skill development as policy interventions might want to tackle the most
e ective family input. The outcome variable in table A-9 is reading test scores of 2012 and all
three specifications control for reading test scores of 2010. The family input measures stem
from 2012. Column 1 includes household income and the degree of parental help with home-
work. While the degree of help has an almost zero e ect on cognitive skill development, the
e ect of household income is positive and highly statistically significant. Column 2 shows that
similarly, the number of books at home has a positive and highly statistically significant e ect
on cognitive skill development while household size is only significant in the squared term –
suggesting that very large households have a negative e ect on cognitive skill development.
Including all family inputs into the estimation equation simultaneously confirms these patterns:
household income and the number of books at home seem to bemost relevant family input
factors.
In a second step, we check which family input is most a ected by a separation. Household
incomemight influence cognitive skill development most, however, it might be hardly a ected
by a separation because of social security systems. In table 2.4 and A-6 we use the four di erent
family inputs measured in 2012 as outcome variable controlling for the value of the family
inputs in 2010. Table 2.4 shows in columns 1-3 that household income is only reduced from
the moment on when parents separate. In column 3 only children who experienced a parental
separation one year ago have a significantly lower household income. Although household
income is an important input for cognitive skill development in general, the evolution of house-
hold income when a separation occurs is di erent from the evolution pattern of cognitive skill
development. Therefore, household incomemight not be the crucial family input which could
ameliorate the negative influence of a separation on cognitive skill development. The pattern
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for the degree of help with homework is di erent. Column 4 of table 2.4 suggests that past
separation have hardly an e ect on the degree of help with homework. However, taking future
separations into account in column 5 suggests that the degree is significantly reduced by a sep-
aration. Column 3 shows that this pattern is driven by childrenwhowill experience a separation
of their parents during the following year. This pattern is very similar to the pattern of cognitive
skill development andmight be a potential channel. Parents shortly before they separate are
absorbed with their conflicts and do not find time to support their children in school anymore.
A!ernoon care for children in school which provides help with homework might be a reason-
able policy intervention for childrenwhoexperience ahighdegree of parental conflicts at home.
The number of books at home and household size are proxy variables for observed and unob-
served family inputs. Table A-6 columns 1-3 show that the number of books at home is also
particularly a ected if separation occurs one year ahead. As the most plausible explanation
why separation should influence the number of books at home is that one parent moves out
and takes some books with her, it is unclear why the e ect is so pronounced one year before
separation occurs. One concern would be that this captures peculiarities of the separation
cohort S2 which experiences a separation in 2013. The robustness checks will deal with that
issue. Columns 4 to 6 show that household size is significantly reduced by about one person if
separation occurred in the past. However, the pre-separation e ect on household size is close
to zero. Future research should explore more direct measures of family inputs and specifically
more measures on parental time investments if such measures are available as panel variable.
Overall, mainly the degree of parental help with homework coincides in the timing with the
decrease in cognitive skill development. Although the results of table A-9 suggest that parental
help with homework does not influence cognitive skill development significantly, it might
ameliorate negative e ects of separation for the treatment group.22
2.6 Robustness checks
The robustness checks address some issues on identification of a separation e ect and on the
interpretation of our results.
22 An interaction of a decrease in the degree of help with homework and separation is particularly negative for
cognitive skill development. If the help with homework does not change or increases, the separation e ect
becomes almost zero. Results are available upon request.
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2.6.1 Reversed causality and omitted variables
One issue for identifying a separation e ect is, if parents select into separating because of the
educational achievement of their children. If this is the case causation is reversed. To address
reversed causality we, first, use pre-observational measures for educational achievement: the
probability of attending a high track school in 2010 and the probability of having repeated
a grade in school before 2010 and check if these measures are correlated with separations
between 2010 and 2014. Additionally, we check if birth weight a long-run measure for well-
being of the child is significantly di erent for children of parents who separate between 2010
and 2014. Second, we predict a future separation with past test scores and past behavioral
measures. Behavior in school might be an omitted variable driving separation and test scores.
Table 2.5 shows that the coe icients of experiencing a separation of one’s parents between
2010 and 2014 are very small (2 percent and 1 percent of a standard deviation) and insignificant.
This holds for the probability of attending a high track school (columns 1 and 2) and for the
probability of having repeated a grade (columns 3 and 4). These findings contradict the findings
of Piketty (2003) and suggest that there are no large long-run disadvantages in educational
achievement for children who will experience a separation in the future (at least for 10- to
14-year olds). The earliest measure for child-well being which is studied extensively in the
literature is birth weight. Birth weight a ects future outcomes (Behrman and Rosenzweig,
2004) and in particular cognitive development of children (Figlio, Guryan, Karbownik, and Roth,
2014). In table 2.5, columns 5 and 6 show that children who will experience a separation 10
years in the future do not have a significantly lower weight at birth.
In table A-10 we predict future separations with test scores andmeasures of behavior. Columns
1 and 2 show that past test scores from 2010 do not predict future separations.23 Similarly for
measures of behavior in columns 3 and 4 the coe icients are close to zero and insignificant.
Problematic behavior ismeasured by the strength-and-di iculties questionnaire (SDQ) in 2012.
Overall, these results deliver evidence that parents do not select into separation - neither by
observed factors like test scores or behavior, nor by unobserved factors which would influence
child development negatively early on.
23 The outcome here is a dummy equal to 1 if the child experiences a separation between 2010 and 2014.
Therefore, the large and significant correlation between test scores in 2010 and a separation in 2011 shown
in table A-8 does not show up here.
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2.6.2 Heterogeneity of separation cohorts
For interpretation of the timing of the separation e ect it is crucial that the four di erent sepa-
ration cohorts do not di er significantly. The aim is to interpret the cohort which experienced a
separation in 2013 as representative for any other cohort which experiences a separation in the
following year. For that we can only deliver descriptive evidence. First, table A-8 shows that
also in reading test scores in 2010 (column 1) the level of those children who will experience a
separation in 2011 – which is one year ahead of the testing – is lowest. As the panel starts in
2010 there are no pre-2010 test scores available to apply a value-added approach. Column 2,
additionally shows that the results do not hold for math test scores in 2010. Second, table A-7
shows means and standard deviations of our control variables for the four separation cohorts.
Column 6 shows if the the means of the specific cohort are significantly di erent from the
mean of the cohort which experiences a separation in 2013. The first two cohorts which experi-
ence a separation in 2011 and 2012 are not significantly di erent except for the 2012-cohort in
household income and the 2011-cohort in the share of imputed household income. The 2014-
cohort di ers significantly in primary school math grades, share of children with migration
background, and the share of children with imputed household income. We conclude that the
children who experience a separation of their parents in 2013 are overall comparable to the
other separation cohorts - except for the cohort which experiences a separation in 2014.
2.6.3 External validity
One issue in theNEPS data is that sample selection or non-randompanel attrition and item-non
response lead to results which are not externally valid. To address this issue, first, we check in
German population data on family structure and school track attendance how representative
the NEPS data are in that dimensions. Second, we investigate panel attrition and item-non
response patterns within the NEPS data.
Representativeness of NEPS To check whether NEPS is representative in the family struc-
ture children live in, we compare the 10-year olds in NEPS 2010 to the 10-year olds in the
German Microcensus data from 2011. In the Microcensus 18 percent of 10-year-old children
live with a single parent at home. In the NEPS sample only 10 percent of the 10-year olds live
with a single parent. This di erence suggests that single-parent families are underrepresented
in the NEPS data.
More than the level di erence, a positive selection on separations between age 10 and 14 mat-
ters for external validity of our findings. However, there is no representative data set available
for changes in family types for 10-year olds. In the census 20 percent of the 14-year olds livewith
a single parentwhich suggests an increase by 2 percentage points compared to the 10-year olds.
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However, here cohort e ects cannot be disentangled from age e ects. Additionally, the group
of 14-year olds who live with a single parent consists of children who lived with a single parent
since they are 10 and of childrenwho experienced a separation in the past four years reduced by
the group of children whose parents moved in with a new partner. The rate of new separations
between age 10 and 14might therefore be higher in reality. In the NEPS sample 5 percent of
children are a ectedby a separation. Administrative data from2014ondivorces shows that 9.25
percent of all children aged 0-18 experienced a divorce of their parentswithin the past five years.
If divorces are evenly distributed over the five years about 1.85 percent experience a divorce
each year. Again, the 5 percent new separations within four years in NEPS seem low compared
to population data. However, it is possible that separations and divorces are not equally dis-
tributed over the age of children. It is possible that the share of children experiencing a parental
divorce is lower for children between age 10 and 14 than between age 0 and 10 or age 14 and 18.
Another issue might be that NEPS selected a sample of schools which are particularly good
(or bad) in dealing with children who experience a separation. Specifically, if the share of high
track students is higher in the NEPS data than in the German population it is possible that the
estimated e ect is not representative. The allocation of 10-year-old children to school tracks
gives insights into the selectivity of the NEPS sample with respect to educational achievement.
In the Microcensus 40 percent of all 10-year olds attend high track schools. In the NEPS sample
used for the analysis 55 percent attend the high track school. However, in the whole sample 43
percent of children attend a high track school. The over representation of high track school
students in the analysis comes from non-random panel attrition and item-non response. It is
unclear, if a positively selected sample concerning school tracks provides an upper or lower
benchmark of the separation e ect. Children who are attending a high track school might
either compensate a separation of their parents better or they might be more a ected as they
have a higher level of parental inputs to lose. If the positive selection is particularly prevalent
for the control group of children in stable families, the estimated e ect is overestimated.24
Panel attrition and item-non response The sample used for the analysis is a sub-sample
of the total sample due to panel attrition and item-non response. Panel attrition happens
because of withdrawal of participation consent while item-non response occurs either through
absenteeism at the test and survey day or refusal to answer a specific question. A withdrawal
of participation consent can occur on the individual or on the school level. On the individual
level until 2012, 47 and until 2014, 312 children have been lost to the sample. On the school
level until 2014, 15 schools have withdrawn their consent reducing the sample by about 300
24 However, we are not very much concerned about overestimation as the magnitudes of our main results are
very similar when we include school-fixed e ects in table A-2.
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children.25 Temporary missing values are more frequent. 38.1 percent of students miss at least
one of the five survey and test days. Themajority of them, 18.6 percent miss only one survey
and test day. About 4 percent of students participate in only one survey and test. In 2012,
784 students missed the survey and test and in 2014, 1292missed it. On top of these types of
missing observations comes item-non response. From those who participate in the survey in
2010, 15 do not take the reading test. In 2012, this number increases to 648 students and in
2014, to 907 students (about 20 percent). For 528 children who participated in the reading tests
2010 and 2012 there is no or only onemeasure of family-type information. The final sample
for analysis consists of 3287 children who participated in the reading tests of 2010 and 2012,
who have at least twomeasures for their family type between 2010 and 2014, and for whom
information on control variables is available.
Panel attrition and item-non response might bias the results if they occur non-randomly. If
children who experience a separation are more likely to drop out of the sample e.g. because
they switch schools, are more o en absent from school, or are less motivated to fill out ques-
tions about their family life, the treatment group is selected. If the most a!ected students
drop out of the sample, the separation e!ect is underestimated. This might be the case in
the NEPS setting. Table 2.6 analyses the correlation between separation between 2010 and
2014 and non-participation in the NEPS and between reading test scores in 2010 andmissing
information. Column 1 shows that separation between 2010 and 2014 and non-participation
in NEPS are hardly correlated. Children whose test scores in 2012 are missing performworse
than their non-missing peers but this is not a specific problem for children who experience a
separation as the interaction terms show (columns 2 and 3). However, column 4 shows that
children whose family type is missing perform worse in 2010 than children whose family type
is available. If there are children who experience a separation but do not report it they are
probably the lower performing children. This holds as well for missing parent interview data
which is the first source to extract information on the family type. Overall, this suggests that
some low performing children drop out of the sample and it is possible that these children
might have also experienced a separation. The estimated e!ects in section 2.4 might therefore
be underestimated. If the dropped out children are most likely living in two parent families the
control groupmight be positively selected and the e!ects could be overestimated.
2.7 Conclusion
Many studies document large level di!erences in educational outcomes between children
who grow up with a single parent and children who grow up with two parents. However, so
25 From those, 8 schools withdraw their consent between 2010 and 2011 and additional 7 schools between
2011 and 2012.
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far, the literature could not identify when and how these di erences emerge. With rich panel
data from the NEPS on 10-year-old children this chapter investigates when a separation starts
to a ect cognitive skill development of children. The panel data tracks children from 5th
grade in 2010 until 9th grade in 2014. The data provide cognitive skill measures in form of
standardized reading test scores in 2010 and 2012 and annual reports on family type, and
household inputs into education production. Applying a value-added approach, we find that
the e ect of separation is negative and strongest in the year before separation occurs. A!er
parents separated a slight catching-up of skill development occurs. These findings shed light
on the issue of lead and lag e ects of parental separation on child outcomes and give first
insights fromwhen on and for how long children are a ected if their parents separate. With
information on household income, the degree parents help with homework, the number of
books at home, and household size, we further analyze which family inputs are a ected by
parental separation. The pattern of cognitive skill development over time coincides most with
the pattern in the development of degree of parental help with homework when a separation
occurs. Policy measures which support children of separated parents might take these findings
into account to reduce inequality in the German school system.
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2.8 Figures and tables
Figure 2.1 : Structure of NEPS panel data on 10-year olds
Notes: Figure 2.1 shows the structure of NEPS panel data of starting cohort 3 for the main variables: reading and
math test scores and separation. Children are tested in fall 2010, 2012 and 2014/2015 (spring) in reading and
math. Data on family structure of the children is available for 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014. Separation which is
reported in 2011 happened between 2010 and 2011. The same holds for the other years. Three periods during
which separation happens can be identified: S0=2010/2011, S1=2011/2012, S2=2012/2013, and S3=2014 (spring).
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Figure 2.2 : Mean reading test scores 2010 and 2012 by year of separation and for control group
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Notes: Figure 2.2 shows separately for 2010 (le ) and 2012 (right) the di!erences in mean reading test scores for
the control group of children living in stable families from 2010 to 2014 and for the four separation cohorts S0, S1,
S2, and S3. The grey bars indicate the 95-percent confidence interval.
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Figure 2.3 : Demeaned reading test scores by time distance to separation and separation cohort
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Notes: Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of reading test scores (demeaned) for children who experience a separation
of their parents in S0=2011 (yellow), S1=2012 (beige), S2=2013 (brown), and S3=2014 (olive). The dark blue line
marks the benchmark of demeaned test scores by year (second x-axis) of children who do not experience a
separation.
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Table 2.1 : Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Separation between 2010 and 2014 0.05 0.22 0 1
Living with a single parent 2010 0.08 0.27 0 1
Cognitive skills
Reading
2012 0.44 1.09 -3.1 4.5
2010 0.00 1.00 -3.1 3.1
Math
2012 0.57 1.09 -4.5 4
2010 -0.00 1.00 -3.4 3.4
Degree help with homework
2012 3.42 0.99 1 5
2010 3.64 1.01 1 5
Individual characteristics
Female 0.49 0.50 0 1
Migration background 0.31 0.46 0 1
Log household income per member (imputed) 6.67 0.44 3.1 10
Income imputation indicator 0.35 0.48 0 1
Number of books at home
Up to 10 books 0.03 0.17 0 1
11-25 books 0.07 0.26 0 1
26-100 books 0.24 0.43 0 1
101-200 books 0.20 0.40 0 1
201-500 books 0.27 0.44 0 1
More than 500 books 0.18 0.39 0 1
Observations 3287
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for outcome and control variables. Data source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Level di erences Di erences in change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2010 2012 2010 First di erence Value-added
single parent -0.315∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.145∗ 0.037 -0.074
(0.082) (0.095) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073)
Controls No No Yes No No
Observations 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961
R2 0.005 0.003 0.149 0.000 0.346
Mean outcome 0.217 0.765 0.217 0.548 0.765
SD outcome 1.209 1.330 1.209 1.158 1.330
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table shows in column 1-3 level di erences in reading test scores 2010 and 2012 for children who live with a single parent in 2010 and children
who live with two parents in 2010. Column 4 estimates for the same groups of children a first di erence approach with reading test scores 2012-reading
test scores 2010 as outcome variable. Column 5 estimates a value-added approach with reading test scores of 2012 as outcome variable controlling on
the right-hand side for reading test scores in 2010. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC3
6.0.1.
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Table 2.3 : Eect of separation on reading test score development
Reading test scores 2012
(1) (2) (3)
past past and future exact year
separation btw 2010 and 2012 -0.103
(0.082)
separation btw 2010 and 2014 -0.114∗
(0.067)
separation 2011 -0.060
(0.136)
separation 2012 -0.132
(0.102)
separation 2013 -0.163
(0.113)
separation 2014 -0.060
(0.157)
Reading test score 2010 Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3287 3287 3287
R2 0.385 0.386 0.386
Mean outcome 0.443 0.443 0.443
SD outcome 1.090 1.090 1.090
Notes: The table estimates the eect of separation on cognitive skill development in a value-added approach with reading test scores of 2012 as outcome
variable controlling for reading test scores of 2010. The first column estimates the eect if a separation happened between 2010 and 2012, the second
column estimates the eect for any separation between 2010 and 2014. The third column distinguishes the four separation cohorts: S0, S1, S2, and S3.
All specifications include individual and family controls from 2010. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data
source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Table 2.4 : Mechanism: Family inputs of money and help with homework
Household income 2012 Help homework 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
past past and future exact year past past and future exact year
separation btw 2010 and 2012 -0.043 -0.075
(0.083) (0.113)
separation btw 2010 and 2014 -0.011 -0.176∗∗
(0.054) (0.086)
separation 2011 -0.114∗ -0.150
(0.066) (0.191)
separation 2012 0.008 -0.041
(0.131) (0.150)
separation 2013 0.047 -0.280∗∗
(0.059) (0.136)
separation 2014 0.027 -0.276
(0.056) (0.179)
Outcome 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1787 1787 1787 3004 3004 3004
R2 0.565 0.565 0.566 0.094 0.096 0.096
Mean outcome 6.796 6.796 6.796 3.427 3.427 3.427
SD outcome 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.993 0.993 0.993
Notes: The table estimates the e ect of separation on household income per household member (in logs) and the degree parents help their children with
homework in a value-added approach. Measures of the outcome variable from 2010 are included on the right-hand side. In column 1-3 household income
in 2012, in column 4-6 the degree of help with homework in 2012 is the outcome variable. The first/forth column estimates the e ect of a separation
which happened between 2010 and 2012, the second/fi!h column estimates the e ect for any separation between 2010 and 2014. The third/sixth column
distinguishes the four separation cohorts: S0, S1, S2, and S3. All specifications include individual and family controls from 2010. Standard errors are
clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Table 2.5 : Pre-separation eects - attending highest secondary school track, having repeated a grade, birthweight
in high track repeated grade birthweight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ols with controls ols with controls ols with controls
separation 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -19.804 -39.068
(0.039) (0.033) (0.018) (0.014) (50.583) (49.165)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3406 3406 3237 3237 2513 2513
R2 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.308 0.000 0.024
Mean outcome 0.553 0.553 0.056 0.056 3392.203 3392.203
SD outcome 0.497 0.497 0.230 0.230 613.378 613.378
Notes: Table 2.5 shows results for regressing the probability of attending the high track school in 2010 (column 1-2) and the probability of having repeated
a school grade at least once (column 3-4) on experiencing a separation between 2010 and 2014. In column 5-6 a retrospective measure of birthweight is
used as outcome variable. All coeicients are estimated with OLS. Column 2, 4, and 6 add individual and household characteristics as control variables.
Standard errors in parentheses clustered on school level; * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
3
5
2
S
e
p
a
ra
tin
g
P
a
re
n
ts
Table 2.6 : Missing patterns and school switches by family type
non-participation reading test scores 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
predict missing test scores test scores family type parent interview
separation 0.025 -0.113 -0.091 -0.009
(0.023) (0.101) (0.083) (0.077)
x missing test scores 0.155 0.202
(0.173) (0.160)
x missing parent interview -0.251
(0.181)
missing test scores -0.346∗∗∗ -0.082
(0.075) (0.072)
parent interview -0.077∗
(0.043)
missing family type -0.286∗∗∗
(0.043)
Controls Yes No No No No
School track FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4340 4171 4171 5193 4171
R2 0.021 0.013 0.310 0.342 0.310
Mean outcome 0.218 0.126 0.126 -0.020 0.126
SD outcome 0.328 1.238 1.238 1.266 1.238
Notes: Table 2.6 explores missing patterns of the NEPS data. Column 1 shows results of regressing the probability of becoming a non-participating child
on a dummy indicating that the child experiences a separation. Columns 2-5 use reading test scores 2010 as outcome variable to check if children who
drop out of the sample later on perform significantly di erent from children who do not drop out. All coe icients are estimated applying OLS. Standard
errors in parentheses clustered on school level; * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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2.9 Appendix A
Table A-1 : Survey questions used to construct separation dummy
Parents
Q1: Are you currently ...
A Married and live with your spouse,
B Married and live apart from your spouse,
C Divorced,
D Widowed,
E Single,
F Or do you live in a registered civil partnership?
Q2: Do you currently live with a long-term partner?
Yes/No
Q3: Is this the same partner as in our last interview?
Yes/No/No partner present in the last wave
Children
Q4: Who normally lives with you in your household?
A Biological mother, adoptive mother, foster mother
B Stepmother or father’s girlfriend
C Biological father, adoptive father, foster father
D Stepfather or mother’s boyfriend
E Siblings and/or step siblings
F Grandmother and/or grandfather
G Other people
Notes: Q1,Q2, Q3are administered to the interviewedparent of the specific child in the yearly conducted telephone
interview. Q4 is administered to the children in school by a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Q4 is asked in 2010,
2011, and 2013. If Q1-Q4 are available for a child, the information from the parents is used. The family type is
’living with a single parent’ if Q1 is not A or F and Q2 is "No". Q3 is used if information from last wave from the
parents is missing. If all information from parents (Q1-Q3) is missing, the information from the children (Q4) is
used. The family type is set to ’living with a single parent’ if either Q4 is A but not C or D or Q4 is C but not A or B.
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Table A-2 : Eect of separation on reading test score development - school fixed eects
Reading test scores 2012
(1) (2) (3)
past past and future exact year
separation btw 2010 and 2012 -0.113
(0.081)
separation btw 2010 and 2014 -0.104
(0.063)
separation 2011 -0.105
(0.142)
separation 2012 -0.121
(0.100)
separation 2013 -0.120
(0.109)
separation 2014 -0.047
(0.149)
School FE Yes Yes Yes
Reading test score 2010 Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3287 3287 3287
R2 0.465 0.465 0.465
Mean outcome 0.443 0.443 0.443
SD outcome 1.090 1.090 1.090
Notes: The table estimates the eect of separation on cognitive skill development in a value-added approach with reading test scores of 2012 as outcome
variable controlling for reading test scores of 2010. The dierence to table 2.3 is that it includes school-fixed eects in all specifications. The first column
estimates the eect if a separation happened between 2010 and 2012, the second column estimates the eect for any separation between 2010 and
2014. The third column distinguishes the four separation cohorts: S0, S1, S2, and S3. All specifications include individual and family controls from 2010.
Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Table A-3 : Eect of separation onmath test score development
Math test scores 2012
(1) (2) (3)
past past and future exact year
separation btw 2010 and 2012 -0.091
(0.072)
separation btw 2010 and 2014 -0.124∗∗
(0.056)
separation 2011 -0.109
(0.138)
separation 2012 -0.087
(0.080)
separation 2013 -0.065
(0.142)
separation 2014 -0.295∗∗∗
(0.095)
Math test score 2010 Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3283 3283 3283
R2 0.541 0.542 0.542
Mean outcome 0.571 0.571 0.571
SD outcome 1.088 1.088 1.088
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table estimates the eect of separation on cognitive skill development in a value-added approach with math test scores of 2012 as outcome
variable controlling for math test scores of 2010. The first column estimates the eect if a separation happened between 2010 and 2012, the second
column estimates the eect for any separation between 2010 and 2014. The third column distinguishes the four separation cohorts: S0, S1, S2, and S3.
All specifications include individual and family controls from 2010. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data
source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Table A-4 : Separation eect in event study design
compared to year of separation compared to one year before separation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
reading test scores reading test scores
separation in 4 years -0.028
(0.236)
separation in 2 years 0.058
(0.121)
separation 2 years ago 0.199
(0.159)
separation in 3 years 0.216
(0.144)
separation 1 year ago 0.231∗∗
(0.113)
separation 3 years ago 0.227
(0.194)
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6181 9585 5885 7002 9558 6181
R2 0.520 0.311 0.214 0.179 0.314 0.522
Mean outcome 0.648 0.674 1.004 0.429 0.674 0.644
SD outcome 1.326 1.330 1.281 1.316 1.330 1.327
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table shows results for comparing pre- and post-separation reading test score measures of 2010, 2012, and 2014 with the respective test score
performance in the year of separation or in the year one year before separation occurs. In each column only two performances are compared. In column
1 performance 4 years before separation, in column 2 performance 2 years before separation, and in column 3 performance 2 years a er separation
is compared to the performance in the year of separation. In column 4 performance 3 years before separation, in column 5 performance 1 year a er
separation, and in column 6 performance 3 years a er separation is compared to the performance one year before separation. The eects are estimated
in a panel setting with individual-fixed eects. The sample varies as the children who experience a separation in another period are excluded from the
sample. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Table A-5 : Eect of separation on development of grades
German grades Math grades
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
past past and future exact year past past and future exact year
separation btw 2010 and 2012 -0.145∗∗ -0.117
(0.064) (0.081)
separation btw 2010 and 2014 -0.097∗∗ -0.095
(0.048) (0.070)
separation 2011 -0.171 -0.041
(0.110) (0.152)
separation 2012 -0.131 -0.164∗
(0.085) (0.087)
separation 2013 0.009 -0.002
(0.100) (0.151)
separation 2014 -0.126 -0.170
(0.156) (0.157)
Grades 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3154 3154 3154 3161 3161 3161
R2 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.220 0.220 0.221
Mean outcome 3.384 3.384 3.384 3.350 3.350 3.350
SD outcome 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.870 0.870 0.870
Notes: The table estimates the eect of separation on German andmath grades 2012 in a value-added approach controlling for grades of 2010. Column 1-3
estimate eects for German grades. Column 4-6 estimate eects for math grades. The first/fourth column estimates the eect if a separation happened
between 2010 and 2012, the second/fi h column estimates the eect for any separation between 2010 and 2014. The third/sixth column distinguishes
the four separation cohorts: S0, S1, S2, and S3. All specifications include individual and family controls from 2010. Standard errors are clustered on
school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Table A-6 : Mechanism: Family inputs approx. by the number of books at home and household size
Books at home 2012 Household size 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
past past and future exact year past past and future exact year
separation btw 2010 and 2012 -0.063 -0.992∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.094)
separation btw 2010 and 2014 -0.142 -0.605∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.081)
separation 2011 -0.094 -0.911∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.157)
separation 2012 -0.056 -1.031∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.116)
separation 2013 -0.447∗∗∗ -0.065
(0.170) (0.136)
separation 2014 0.110 0.103
(0.189) (0.069)
Outcome 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3013 3013 3013 2368 2368 2368
R2 0.373 0.373 0.374 0.824 0.812 0.824
Mean outcome 4.233 4.233 4.233 4.127 4.127 4.127
SD outcome 1.436 1.436 1.436 1.068 1.068 1.068
Notes: The table estimates the e ect of separation on the number of books at home in 2012 and the household size in a value-added approach. Measures
of the outcome variable from 2010 are included on the right-hand side. In column 1-3 the number of books at home in 2012, in column 4-6 the household
size in 2012 is the outcome variable. The first/forth column estimates the e ect of a separation which happened between 2010 and 2012, the second/fi!h
column estimates the e ect for any separation between 2010 and 2014. The third/sixth column distinguishes the four separation cohorts: S0, S1, S2, and
S3. All specifications include individual and family controls from 2010. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
Data source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Table A-7 : Descriptive dierences by separation cohort
Separation Cohort Mean SD Min Max Dierent from 2013
Grademath primary school
2011 3.88 0.79 1.5 5
2012 3.69 0.83 1 5
2013 3.80 0.81 1 5 -
2014 3.41 1.15 1 5 *
Grade German primary school
2011 3.78 0.61 2.5 5
2012 3.65 0.69 2 5
2013 3.69 0.64 2 5 -
2014 3.56 0.94 1 5
Female
2011 0.38 0.49 0 1
2012 0.36 0.48 0 1
2013 0.41 0.50 0 1 -
2014 0.50 0.51 0 1
Migration background
2011 0.28 0.46 0 1
2012 0.32 0.47 0 1
2013 0.39 0.49 0 1 -
2014 0.19 0.40 0 1 *
Log household income per member (imputed)
2011 6.69 0.51 6.1 7.9
2012 6.77 0.47 5.8 8.3 *
2013 6.61 0.46 5 7.2 -
2014 6.59 0.49 5.7 7.5
Income imputation indicator
2011 0.19 0.40 0 1 *
2012 0.34 0.48 0 1
2013 0.39 0.49 0 1 -
2014 0.19 0.40 0 1 *
Observations
2011 32
2012 56
2013 49
2014 32
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for the four dierent separation cohorts who experience a separation
of their parents in S0=2011, S1=2012, S2=2013, and S3=2014. The sixth column indicates if themean is statistically
significantly dierent from the cohort S2. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Table A-8 : Pre-separation eects on test scores
Test scores 2010
(1) (2)
reading math
separation 2011 -0.369∗∗∗ -0.044
(0.140) (0.167)
separation 2012 -0.146 -0.123
(0.134) (0.133)
separation 2013 0.039 -0.027
(0.134) (0.116)
separation 2014 0.036 -0.096
(0.167) (0.137)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 3287 3283
R2 0.157 0.187
Mean outcome 0.000 -0.000
SD outcome 1.000 1.000
Notes: The table shows descriptive results for level dierences in reading (column 1) and math (column 2) test scores of 2010 for the four dierent
separation cohorts. Both specifications include individual and family controls. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC3 6.0.1.
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Table A-9 : Cognitive skill development and parental inputs
Reading test scores 2012
(1) (2) (3)
direct measures indirect measures horse race
help homework -0.010 -0.015
(0.019) (0.019)
household income 0.199∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.044)
no. books at home 0.118∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016)
household size linear 0.085 0.093
(0.054) (0.059)
household size squared -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Reading test score 2010 Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1917 2289 1883
R2 0.362 0.377 0.376
Mean outcome 0.562 0.572 0.573
SD outcome 1.060 1.063 1.055
Notes: The table regresses reading test scores of 2012 on di erent family inputs measured in 2012: the degree of parental help with homework, household
income per household member (in logs), the number of books at home, and the household size (linear and squared term). Column 1 includes only the
degree of help with homework and household income - which are direct measures of family inputs in education production. Column 2 includes the
number of books at home and household size as proxy variables for unobserved factors in family inputs. Column 3 performs a horse race among all four
family input factors. All specifications include reading test scores of 2010 as control variable (value-added approach) and individual and family controls
of 2010. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on school level; * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table A-10 : Predicting separations
future separation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ols with controls ols with controls
reading test scores 2010 -0.005 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
math test scores 2010 0.002 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006)
medium low SDQ problematic behavior score -0.006 -0.005
(0.009) (0.010)
medium SDQ problematic behavior score 0.007 0.001
(0.010) (0.010)
medium-high SDQ problematic behavior score 0.005 -0.001
(0.014) (0.016)
high SDQ problematic behavior score 0.022 0.015
(0.028) (0.029)
Controls No Yes No Yes
School FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 3284 3284 3374 3374
R2 0.000 0.069 0.001 0.062
Mean outcome 0.051 0.051 0.042 0.042
SD outcome 0.221 0.221 0.200 0.200
Notes: Table A-10 shows the results from regressing the probability of experiencing a separation in the future on test scores in 2010 (column 1 and 2)
and on 4 categories of the strengths-and-diiculties questionnaire (SDQ) score for problematic behavior (column 3 and 4). 1 is the second lowest score
for problematic behavior, 4 is the highest score. The lower the score the less problematic is the behavior. Column 1 and 3 show a linear probability
estimation, column 2 and 4 add controls. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on school level; * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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3 Does Awarding a Low-Track School Degree Improve
the Fate of High-Track Drop-Outs? Evidence from a
German School Reform*†
3.1 Introduction
An accomplished school degree determines an individual’s labor market career at various
stages. On the one hand, it influences the transition into the labor market. In Germany, for
example, it is an institutionalized prerequisite for vocational training. On the other hand, a
school degree is a signal for any future employer about cognitive and so skills. Numerous
economic studies find negative eects of school dropout on individual schooling careers and
employment prospects (Rumberger and Lamb, 2003; DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall, 2006;
Oreopoulos, 2007; Brunello and De Paola, 2013; Cahuc, Carcillo, and Minea, 2017). In the Euro-
pean Union (EU) in 2012, 13 percent of all 18- to 24-years-olds – about 5.5 million young people
– had dropped-out of upper secondary education before obtaining a degree (EU, 2013). Many
countries are eager to establish education policies that reduce the number of dropouts, e.g.
the Europe 2020 strategy aims at "reducing the share of early leavers of education and training
to less than 10%" (Commission, 2014). Notably, school dropouts are not only a phenomenon
among low-track school students. Also in high-track schools, there is a relatively stable dropout
rate of up to 10 percent of students, since 1950.
In this chapter, we analyze a reform of the German school system, a systemwith tracking and
grade repetition. The school reform under study awarded high-track dropouts, failing to suc-
cessfully complete 13 years of schooling, with a low-track school degree if they accomplished
at least the 9th grade. The high track in Germany is themost time-consuming secondary school
track awarding students a degree aer accomplishing the 13th grade. In contrast, in the low
tracks (Hauptschule, basic school, and Realschule, middle school) students obtain a low-track
school degree aer having accomplished 9th resp. 10th grade. Before the reform, students
who dropped out from the high track were le without any degree and had to qualify for the
labor market otherwise, e.g. by switching to a low-track school and repeating a grade there.
* This chapter is based on joint work with Larissa Zierow.
† Financial support by theGermanResearch Foundation (DFG) throughPriority Program (SPP) 1646 "Education
as a Lifelong Process" is gratefully acknowledged.
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A er the reform, the students received a basic school degree if they passed the 9th grade of the
high track, and received amiddle school degree if they passed the 10th grade of the high track.
Theoretically, such a reform could lead to various outcomes at least via the four mechanisms
discussed in the following. The first set of expectations contains the group of students who
actually drop out of the high track. In a mechanical way, the number of students who leave
the school systemwithout any school degree should decrease. This was the main policy goal
behind implementing the reform. If high-track dropouts switched schools to obtain any other
low-track school degree, the reform should result in reduced downgrading. In case of sheepskin
e!ects holding a degree, given the same time spent in school, should improve the labormarket
prospects of the students in terms of employment and wage see Layard and Psacharopoulos
(1974); Hungerford and Solon (1987); Jaeger and Page (1996). The second and third expec-
tations concern incentives for students at risk of dropping out. On the one hand the reform
incentivizes students to leave the high-track school a er having completed the 9th resp. 10th
grade to enter the labor market. This would result in a lower number of students with a high-
track degree, a higher number of students with a low-track degree, and a younger labor market
entry age. On the other hand, the reform reduced the risk of staying in the high track. Parents
whomight have favored downgrading their low-performing child from the high track to the low
track before the reform, might now bemore likely to keep their child in the high track. Given
that the child is already awarded a low-track degree a er successful completion of the 9th
grade, the reform reduced the risk of staying in the high track on the relevance of risk aversion
for schooling decisions, see Lavecchia, Liu, and Oreopoulos (2016); Wölfel and Heineck (2012).
Staying in the high-track school could then exert a positive e!ect on the student’s motivation
to try hard to successfully finish the high track. Such behavioral response to the reform would
lead to an increased completion rate of the high track, and eventually to a higher university
enrollment rate. Fourth, once the reform is implemented and known by students and their
parents, there could arise selection into the high track. The possibility of receiving a (low track)
school degree in the high track, even in case of failure a er the 9th grade, reduced the risk of
high-track enrollment. Therefore, parents whomight have sent their low-performing child to a
low-track school before the reformmight now take these new opportunities into account when
deciding on their child’s secondary school. This would lead to an increase in the high-track
school enrollment rate.
Our study aims at estimating the causal e!ects of the German dropout reform and by that at de-
tecting which of the above presentedmechanisms is the most prevalent one. For identification
we exploit the di!erent timing of the reform implementation across German states. In 1965,
a er alarming numbers on high-track school dropouts were released (Peisert and Dahrendorf,
1965; Stamm, 2010) the Kultusministerkonferenz (the Standing Conference of the Ministers of
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Education and Cultural A airs of the Länder) announced the reform on rewarding dropouts
from high-track schools with low-track school degrees in order to reduce the number of stu-
dents without any degree and to facilitate their labor market entry. Although announced at the
federal level, the German states reacted at di erent points in time (Helbig and Nikolai, 2015).
The di erent timing of the reform between 1965 and 1982 in 11 West German states1 enables
us to apply a di erence-in-di erences (DID) framework for identification of the causal reform
e ect. In this approach, we compare high-track school students in the respective reform state
before and a"er the reform and compare the changes in student outcomes to the respective
changes in high-track school student outcomes in states that did not reform at the same point
in time. The inclusion of state fixed e ects allows furthermore to abstain from any state specific
features that could a ect student outcomes and the inclusion of time fixed e ects controls for
potential nation-wide shocks. Importantly, in the baseline specification we restrict the sample
to students who were already enrolled in high-track schools at the time of the reform in order
to rule out reform-induced selection into high-track schools.
For estimation, we use two unique data sources. Our first data source consists of rich and
detailed survey data of the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) adult cohort from 2010
for more detail on the data, see Blossfeld et al. (2011). The NEPS data have two specific fea-
tures enabling us to tackle our research question in a methodologically clear-cut manner: first,
the data include information on the respective nature of dropping-out: we can di erentiate
whether a students le" a school for good, whether the student switched to another school
resp. to another school track, and at which point in time the student e ectively ended her
schooling career.2 Second, the NEPS data reports the individuals’ state of schooling in addition
to the state of current residence. This is very important for an analysis of state reforms in a
context where migration across states during an individual’s lifespan cannot be ruled out. Our
second data source is the German Microcensus: administrative data covering 1 percent of the
population. We combine information on the jobs held at age 20 and 35 provided by the NEPS
data with income information on the occupation in the Microcensus. Additionally, we use the
Microcensus for common trend assumption considerations.
Our results show compliance with the reform in the sense that students are less likely to switch
between schools and tracks. This reform e ect is thus in line with the first theoretical mech-
anism. The results, however, do not support the second theoretical mechanism. We do not
find that more students leave school with a low-track school degree to enter the labor market
1 We abstain from including the East German states in our analysis as their education systemwas exposed to
substantial changes a"er reunification.
2 This is in contrast to other studies that only rely on school data reporting howmany students le" a school
without degree but being ignorant of the subsequent educational path of the reported dropout. Usually,
dropout is not well defined as students are not tracked over time.
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earlier. Instead, we find that students, rather surprisingly, stay longer in the school system and
finish school with a higher school degree due to the reform. This supports the third theoretical
mechanism. The reform seems to reduce the perceived risk of trying longer in the high-track
and thus leads to an increase in the high-track completion rate and in the university enrollment
rates. Yet, we do not find significant reform e ects on individual labor market income at age
20 and age 35 which implies that sheepskin e ects cannot be shown. Regarding the fourth
theoretical mechanism we find that selection into high-track schools is indeed a ected by the
reform. Students who enroll in a high-track school a!er the reform, and are thus potentially
(adversely) selected, are less likely to complete the high track, andmore likely to downgrade
to a low-track school. As regards heterogeneity of the reform e ects we find that students with
a low socio-economic background benefit more from the reform than students with a high
socio-economic background.
This study mainly relates to two strands of literature in the economics of education. First, we
relate to studies on dropouts and their school respectively labor market careers. Oreopoulos
(2007) focuses on dropouts from the US and argues that compulsory schooling laws prohibiting
drop out add to students’ health, life satisfaction, and wealth. Yet, opposed to our approach,
the authors only focus on time spent in school and not on the role of degrees. DesJardins et al.
(2006) focus on interrupted enrollment on graduation from college. They find that students
a!er having dropped-out once are more likely to experience subsequent enrollment disrup-
tions. Such disruptions are found to be detrimental to the student’s probability of graduating.
So far, there are only few dropout studies that focus on the particular group of dropouts from
high-track schools. One study taking the German context into consideration is the descriptive
study of Peisert and Dahrendorf (1965) who focus on Baden-Württemberg – a South Western
German state – and conducted interviews with dropouts from the academic track.3 Second, we
relate our study to the emerging literature on behavioral aspects of the economics of education.
One closely related study is Heckman, Humphries, LaFontaine, and Rodriguez (2012) who look
at the GED Testing Program in the US. This program allows dropouts to attain a degree by doing
the GED which is a high school diploma equivalent. While surely meant well by the politicians
the authors find that this program created incentives to drop out from high school. These find-
ings show the importance of considering the riskiness of decisions in the educational system
to understand student behavior. In the same vein, some further recent studies show that the
role of the default in the education system plays an important role for educational careers
and outcomes for an overview, see Lavecchia et al. (2016). The German dropout reform under
3 The authors find that there are a number of reasons for dropouts to leave the school, mainly problems in
school subjects and personal reasons. The reasons for dropout are not easily distinguishable andmerge into
each other.
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study can be interpreted as a low-cost intervention that changed the behavior of students in a
beneficial way and thus adds to this strand of literature.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we provide causal evidence on the e ects of
a dropout reformmaking use of time variation of reform implementation across German states.
This is in contrast to the existing literature which is mostly relying on descriptive evidence only.
Second, we can reconstruct the whole school and labor market careers of individuals surveyed
in our data and link these developments to reforms on the state level while the existing litera-
ture o!en fails to identify the subsequent periods of individual careers a!er experiencing a
dropout. Third, we show that student behavior can be changed by a low-cost intervention in a
rather surprisingly beneficial way.
This study proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide information on the institutional
background of the German school system and in particular, on the reform under study. Section
3.3 presents the main data sets and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 explains the em-
pirical framework. Section 3.5 presents the results and section 3.6 provides the heterogeneity
analysis. Section 3.7 discusses a series of robustness checks. Finally, section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Institutional background
Germanyhas a specific institutional setupof its education system. This setupallows to study the
dropout reform e ects on high-track school students’ behavior in a very detailedway, including
school switches, track down- and upgrading as well as grade repetition. In the following we
give a brief overview of the German school system for the birth cohorts in West Germany under
study and describe the reform and its timing in detail.
The German school system Germany’s school system is decentralized and is at the respon-
sibility of each of the 16 states. Although there are some di erences across states, the general
structure is quite uniform and illustrated in Figure 3.1. The school system tracks children at
age 10 a!er 4 years of primary school into mainly three secondary school tracks.4 The di er-
ent tracks are characterized by the final degree and the academic requirement. In the basic
school (Hauptschule) a student has to pass 5 grades until compulsory schooling ends a!er
accomplishing 9th grade. The basic school education is completed with a basic school degree
which traditionally enables students to go into vocational training (Helbig and Nikolai, 2015).
In the middle school (Realschule) a student has to pass 6 grades and finishes with a middle
4 In two states, Berlin and Brandenburg, tracking takes place at age 12 a!er 6 years of primary school.
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school degree. The middle school degree opens-up more vocational training opportunities. In
the high track (Gymnasium) the student has to pass 9 grades and finishes with an academic
school degree (Abitur)which is the university entrance qualification.5 Tracking is doneby ability.
Teachers in primary school recommend the highest school track which they think is suitable
for the child. In some states this recommendation is limiting the school track choice to the top.
Parents finally choose the secondary school track from the (limited) set of available school
tracks. Upgrading from lower tracks into higher ones is in general possible if the attended lower
track is completed successfully. Students may also downgrade to a lower track at any time.
A er secondary school, individuals may either go into vocational training, which comprises
classes at a vocational school as well as practical training from an employer, or enter tertiary
education.6 For the evaluation of the reform it is important to note that high ability children
are tracked into the high track. Nonetheless, it is possible to dropout before obtaining a school
degree. The high track takes the longest time until a school degree is accomplished and is the
academically most demanding.
The reform under study In the 1950s and 60s there was no legal regulation of the school
degree high-track students would receive when dropping out from the high track.7 Figure 3.2
shows that close to 10 percent of all students who attend the 8th grade in high-track schools
drop out in all birth cohorts from 1950 on and in Baden-Württemberg it was even observed
that in the 1950s and 1960s, more than 20 percent of students dropped out from the high track
without a degree (Peisert and Dahrendorf, 1965). The first regulations concerned students
who just did not pass the high-track school degree in 13th grade. For dropouts from lower
grades, however, only from 1965 on necessary regulations were started to be discussed. In
1965 the Kultusministerkonferenz (the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and
Cultural A"airs of the Länder) announced a reformmaking school-leaving diplomas from the
high track comparable to school degrees from lower tracks.8 The aimwas to make dropouts
available for vocational training. Although the reformwas announced at the federal level in
5 Helbig andNikolai (2015) provide insights in various dimensions into the school systemof Germany including
at which stage which degree can be obtained.
6 See Biewen and Tapalaga (2017) and Buchholz and Schier (2015) for a good overview and description of
school careers in the German school systemwith the NEPS adult cohort data.
7 There is some evidence for Baden-Wüerttemberg that the customwas to count certificates for having passed
10th grade as middle school degree at least for some occupations for example in the public sector. Similar
customs are not known for other states.
8 The original name of the reformwas ’Gleichwertigkeit von Abgangszeugnissen der Realschulen und Gym-
nasien mit Abschlusszeugnissen der Hauptschulen’ (Equality of school leaving diploma of middle and
high-track schools with basic school degrees). This means that also students in the middle track schools
were treated by the reform. Additionally, changes in the school careers of high andmiddle track students
might have influenced via spillover e"ects students in the low-track schools. In future research we plan to
investigate reform e"ects for these groups separately in more detail. First results from the overall reform
e"ect suggest that these groups reacted di"erently than the high-track students.
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1965, the German states reacted to this announcement at di erent points in time, see table
3.1 (Helbig and Nikolai, 2015). While the first state to reform was Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria
reformed only in 1982 and the states of East Germany reformed a"er re-unification. Thuringia
reacted latest, only a"er a high-track school dropout perpetrated a shooting rampage in the
city of Erfurt in 2002. Following this tragedy, the media discussed the missing perspective of
high-track school dropouts and politicians reacted. In some states (e.g. Berlin) the reform
granted low-track school degrees also retroactively.
The reform aimed at supporting students, who although probably of high-ability, struggled to
enter the labor market without a school degree. Generally, students had to obtain a low-track
school degree via some other path first. In our analysis we will focus on the reforms in West
Germany between 1965 and 1982. We exclude the former East German states as the school
systemwas not completely comparable. Students from Bremen where the reform took place in
1999 are only observed in the untreated state.
As we want to evaluate if the reform improved the situation for dropouts, we would like to
knowwhat students’ outside options were when dropping out of school without a degree. As
dropouts are hardly tracked over time, there is little knowledge about the pre-reform outside
options. There is some narrative evidence from Peisert and Dahrendorf (1965) studying the
state of Baden-Württemberg. Peisert and Dahrendorf (1965) interview students from high-
track schools and track dropouts for some years a"er they le" the high track. They find that
the majority of dropouts are still in education in the years a"er the dropout to either obtain a
middle or even ahigh-track school degree. The secondbiggest group is in public service or trade
occupations which rewarded a certificate of 10th grade as middle school degree. Peisert and
Dahrendorf (1965) describe the following reasons for dropout before obtaining the high-track
school degree in the early 1960s: personal reasons, problems in school subjects, family reasons,
the school, teachers, the peer group in school, and commuting to school. Personal reasons
include that students do not want to go to school anymore or that they have an occupation in
mind for which an academic degree is not necessary. Taking all topics together problems in
school subjects would be the most stated reason for dropout.
3.3 Data
We combine three unique data sources to estimate the reform e ects. First, wemake use of rich
and detailed survey data of the adult cohort of the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS)
from 2010.9 We extract attendance of the high track without accomplishing a school degree
9 see Blossfeld et al. (2011) for more detail.
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and our education- and labor-market-related outcomes from spell data on individual schooling
and occupational careers. Second, we use data from various waves of the German Microcensus
- a representative 1 percent sample of the German population - to test the common trend
assumption and to use information on income that wemerge with the NEPS data. Third, we
use the years reported in table 3.1 as starting point of the treatment. We created a treatment
indicator from the information provided by Helbig and Nikolai (2015). The indicator states if
children who dropped out of the high track received a low-track school degree or not.10
NEPS The NEPS data provide detailed data on individual schooling and occupational careers
of a representative sample of adults living in Germany. The data have two specific features en-
abling us to tackle our research question in amethodologically clear-cutmanner: first, the data
include information on the respective nature of dropping-out: we can di erentiate whether a
student le! a school for good, whether the student switched to another school resp. to another
school track, and at which point in time the student e ectively ended her schooling career.11
Second, the NEPS data report the individuals’ location of schooling on federal state level. This
is crucial for an analysis of past state reforms in a context where migration across states during
an individual’s lifespan cannot be ruled out.
From theNEPS adult cohort we use a subsample of 3878 adults who attended secondary school
in a West German state (including Berlin) and are born between 1944 and 1983. NEPS asked
in 2010 retrospectively all participants about their school careers documenting school types
and locations of schools. We use these spell data to construct our main outcome variables
which should capture important characteristics of school careers. Table 3.2 shows descriptive
statistics for these outcome variables. The first variable years of schooling states the number
of years a person reports to be in educational spells. The variable longer in education than
standard is an indicator which is equal to 1 if a person stayed longer in the education system
than it would have been expected given her final degree. It is the di erence between years of
schooling and calculated standard years of schooling from the last CASMIN.12 The variable no
degree in last school episode is an indicator which is equal to 1 if a person leaves the school
system at a maximum of age 19 without reporting having obtained a degree in the last episode.
If a person reports to having obtained a basic school degree in the last school episode, the
indicator basic school degree in last school episode is equal to 1. Downgrading is an indicator
which is equal to 1 if a person switches from the high track to a lower ranked school, i.e. basic
10 The indicator does not distinguish between basic andmiddle school degrees as the type of degree varies
heavily by state and the complexity was too high to document this detail (Helbig and Nikolai, 2015).
11 This is in contrast to other studies that rely on school data reporting howmany students le! a school without
degree but being ignorant of the subsequent educational path of the reported dropout.
12 The CASMIN is short for ’Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations’, and exists as classifi-
cation of education since the 1980s.
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or middle school.13 Similarly, upgrading indicates if a person switches from a lower ranked
school type to the high track. The number of school episodes counts howmany schools a person
attends and age at leaving school system contains the age at which a person switches from
school episodes to vocational training (including university education), employment, military,
or other types of spells.
The variables on school degrees are indicators as well, capturing reported school degrees at
two di erent points in an individual’s life. The first point is at the end of the last school episode
between 11 and 19. The second point is in 2010 as highest accomplished school degree. The
indicators di er as people can accomplish school degrees later on in life.
The occupational outcomes capture if an individual holds a vocational degree in 2010 and
job quality in terms of average income in these jobs at age 20 and 35. The vocational degree
indicator is constructed from the CASMIN. The average income in the job held at age 20 or 35 is
merged information from the Microcensus and is described below.
From the background questionnaire we construct the control variables: sex, birth cohort,
migration background, highest parental education level, and the number of siblings. Table 3.2
shows the summary statistics for the control variables. We construct 3-year bins as birth cohort
dummies - each including 3 successive birth cohort years.14
Microcensus While the NEPS data o er many advantages with regard to our research ques-
tion like detailed school spells and the location of schools, the dataset unfortunately lacks
precise information on the income of the individuals. Our second data source, the German Mi-
crocensus, helps to overcome this problem. The German Microcensus contains cross-sectional,
administrative data covering 1 percent of the German population in each wave since 1970. The
data include income, occupations, and schooling (current school type for people in educa-
tion and final degree for people out of education). First, we use these data to construct the
retrospective, average income in the jobs individuals in our NEPS sample hold at age 20 and
35. For the age group 20 to 25 and 30 to 35 we construct in state-year-occupation-gender-age
cells the average income. Income is always net income in about 7 bins. An occupation cell is a
13 We cannot distinguish between these school types in the spell data.
14 We do so because the number of observations per year of birth is small. Including dummies for each year of
birth does not change the results.
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3-digit KldB classification.15 Second, we use the 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2011 waves to construct
the share of people with a specific school degree by age at the reform year and use it for our
analysis of the common trend assumption.
3.4 Identication strategy
For identifying the causal e ect of the dropout reformwe exploit the di erent timing of the
reform between 1965 and 1999 in the 11 former West-German states and apply a DID approach.
Our DID approach relies on the comparison of students in the highest track pre- andpost-reform
within and between states. For the baseline specification, we restrict the sample to include only
students who had a high-track episode in their school career. One issue of evaluating reforms
in general is selection into treatment. As soon as people know that the high track awards
additional lower-track school degrees, selection of people into the high track might change. To
avoid selection e ects, our treatment is not only the interaction of age and attending at least
the high track once in life. We define our treatment group as high-track students who are 11-19
years old in the reform year. With this restriction we put 93 students in the control group who
chose to attend the high track a!er the reform at an older age than 11. Figure 3.3 shows for
the 11 West German states our treatment and control groups. Black represents the cohorts at
age 11 which are treated. White represents the pre-reform control group. Grey is the treatment
group we exclude due to possible selection e ects. In our main specification we estimate:
Yi,s,t = β0 + β1post reforms +Xiβ5 + µs + µt + ǫi,s,t.(3.1)
Yi,s,t are the various outcomemeasures for school- and occupational-career characteristics of
student i in state s of birth cohort t. The coe icient of interest is β1, showing the e ect of the
reform for students who attend the academic track in the reform year. The matrixXi contains
all control variables. State- and birth-cohort-fixed e ects are captured byµs andµt respectively.
In our main specification standard errors are clustered on state level as the treatment varies on
state level.16
The coe icient β1 represents the causal e ect of the reform if the assumptions of a DID frame-
work hold. In our setting, first, the common trend assumption has to hold which implies that –
in absence of the treatment – treatment and control group would lie on the same longer-run
15 KldB is a German classification of occupations and stands for ’Klassifikation der Berufe’. It was introduced
by the Federal Agency for Labor and the German Statistical O ice. Themost recent classification of 2010 is
highly compatible with the international classification of ISCO.
16 As we only have 11 German states the number of clusters is small. We apply wild-cluster-bootstrap methods
to account for this.
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trend with respect to the outcome variables. Second, the treatment e ect we pick up with β1
should not represent any other development than the reform.
The NEPS data do not allow a thorough evaluation of pre-reform trends as the number of
observations per birth cohort and state are small and decrease with age of the survey partici-
pants. Shares of people with a specific school degree, therefore, fluctuate a lot by birth cohort
and state. To obtain some evidence whether the states were at di erent trends in the years
before the reformwas introduced, we pool the German Microcensus of 1991, 1996, 2001, and
2011. As the first reformwas introduced in 1965 we would like to observe birth cohorts who
have completed their education already in 1965. As the first Microcensus wave available is the
Census of 1970 for most states it is not possible to observe the direct schooling decisions of the
pre-reform cohorts. We decided on the above years as in that time education or work induced
migration will potentially play a minor role. There might be even more people returning to
their place of birth at older ages. In general, in the Microcensus data we do not know in which
states individuals were born or where they attended schools. Note that migration might bias
any result also our presented evidence for the common trend assumption which should thus
be interpreted with some caution.17 For each birth cohort we calculate the share of people with
a basic, middle, or high-track school degree per state. In figure B-1, B-2, and B-3 we plot the
share of people with a specific degree against the age of the birth cohort when the reform was
introduced. We assume that the cohort which was 20 in the year of the reform is the last resp.
youngest cohort which was not a ected by the reform. Younger people could have benefited
from the reform if they still attended the academic track in the reform year.18 The second
assumption for this analysis of the common trend is, that the majority of people did not move
to another state between school and the Microcensus survey.19 This might in particular be
an issue for the city-states and could explain why the state of Bremen (orange line) seems to
be a special case in terms of degrees.20 Figure B-1 shows that there is a trend of decreasing
basic school degrees from the cohort which is 70 in the reform year to the cohort which is 20.
Simultaneously, figure B-3 shows that high-track degrees becomemore common. The results
for middle school degrees vary more by state and between the cohorts but overall there is a
positive trend the younger the cohort. Particularly for the cohorts just out of the education
system in the reform years, trends look similar, although levels vary (between 50 percent to 70
percent for low-track schooldegreesand10percent to20percent forhigh-track schooldegrees).
17 Therefore,we refrain frompresentingaDIDestimationwith timevarying treatmente ects for theMicrocensus
data.
18 A student attending the high track is in most cases still in school at age 19.
19 As indicated beforehand in the Microcensus we only observe people at their current state of residence.
20 Bremen, as a city state might attract people with an academic school degree for university education.
Additionally, it might attract people with university degree from the surrounding areas as many companies
are located in cities.
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To provide further evidence for a pre-reform common trend, we use o icial statistics from 1962
to plot figure B-4. It shows the share of children in 7th grade who attend the high track from
1950 to 1962 by state. Again the trends seem similar although the levels vary.21 So far, the
graphical evidence is a first step to mitigate concerns that the estimated e ects could be due
to diverging developments of specific states.
To avoid that we pick up other developments within states with the same timing as our reform,
we investigated if other education reforms a ecting secondary schooling were introduced
simultaneously. So far, we do not find evidence for that but we are still exploring in this
direction. From an empirical point we can rule out that we are capturing state-time trends and
that specific states are driving our results. These robustness checks are presented in section
3.7.
3.5 Main Results
In this section we describe and discuss the results estimating equation 3.1. First, we consider
direct reform e ects on school careers of a ected students. Second, we estimate e ects on
the school degrees they obtain. Third, we estimate if there are any longer run e ects on
occupational outcomes. The reported e ects in this section are average treatment e ects for
the group of high-track students. Last but not least we estimate the e ect of the reform on
selection into the highest track.
3.5.1 School careers and degrees
Regarding school career outcomes we expect to find that the reformmade high-track students
switch less between school tracks because a!er the reform they can receive the lower track
school degrees as well in the high-track school. This should reduce down- and upgrading. As
regards the time spent in school, the number of school episodes, and the age when leaving the
education system, the reform e ect depends on the relative role of the following two incentives.
1) The incentive to leave school and enter the labormarket before obtaining a high-track school
degree. 2) The incentive to stay in the high-track school and try to successfully finish 13 years
of schooling with a lower risk level.
Table 3.3 shows that overall, the reform changes school careers of students in the highest track
as expected in a way that they become more stable and linear. Students spend almost one
year more in school (column 1) which is about 70 percent of a standard deviation such that
they are about half a year older when leaving the school system (column 3). It is not likely
21 The drawback here is that the time-distance to the reform introduction varies by state. As the time series is
not long enough we cannot provide a similar plot as for the Microcensus data.
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that this is due to students repeating classes more o en a er the reform as excess time in
the highest track does not significantly increase (column 2). Taking these findings together
indicates that students drop out later or finish school more o en due to the reform. This is
in line with a stronger incentive e!ect for trying to finish high-track school at a lower risk.
Additionally, school careers stabilize as students reduce their school episodes (column 4) by
half an episode which is 60 percent of a standard deviation. This means that they switch less
o en between di!erent schools. This is also true for downgrading which is switching to a
lower-track school (column 5). Downgrading is reduced by almost 90 percent of a standard
deviation. Upgrading is slightly reduced as well but not significantly. As students downgrade
less o en they mechanically cannot upgrade to the highest track as much as before. These
results are robust to wild-cluster bootstrapping of the standard errors as it is recommended by
Cameron and Miller (2011). The third row shows the p-value for testing if the reform coe!icient
is zero obtained fromwild-cluster bootstrapping the standard errors. The significance levels
hardly change applying wild-cluster bootstrapping methods.
The treatment group contains students aged 11 to 19. Results might be driven by a specific age
group of students as it is possible, for example, that the incentive to leave school and enter
the labor market earlier is larger for the older students than for the younger students. If this
is the case, we would expect that the e!ects we find are driven by the younger students and
might go into another direction for the older ones. Table B-1 in the appendix shows that this is
not the case. The e!ects always go into the same direction for all three age groups: age 11-14,
age 15-17, and age 18 and older.22 The significance levels are also almost the same for the
di!erent age groups. This suggests that the reform hardly incentivized students to enter the
labor market immediately.
One aim of the reform was to provide students who otherwise would have held no school
degree with a school degree. Therefore, we expect that the share of people without any school
degree decreased with the reform while the share of people with school degrees should in-
crease (particularly for low or middle track school degrees). Table 3.4 shows the estimated
reform e!ects on the likelihood of holding various school degrees. Column 1 to 4 use informa-
tion from the retrospective school spells on the school degree obtained in the last reported
school episode. Column 5 to 8 use information on the highest school degree obtained in 2010.
Column 1 shows that the likelihood to end the last reported school episode without any school
degree is slightly, yet not significantly, reduced. This suggests that even before the reform
high-track dropouts hardly completed their school career without any degree. It is more likely
and complies with the anecdotal evidence that high-track dropouts obtained a lower track
school degree at a lower track school and finished their school career with such a degree. In
line with that story we find that students are less likely a er the reform to finish their school
22 The exception is upgrading which is of course very unlikely for the older students as they would have to
downgrade first and upgrade a erwards.
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career with a basic school degree (column 2) and a middle school degree (column 3). They
are, however, more likely to finish their school career with a high-track school degree (column
4). The same pattern holds for the highest accomplished school degree in 2010, see column 4
to 8. People who attended the highest track in the reform year hold significantly less middle
school degrees but the share of people with a high-track degree increased by 60 percent of
a standard deviation compared to people attending the high track before the reform. Again,
the significance levels hold when applying wild-cluster bootstrapping methods (third row). In
sum, table 3.4 delivers evidence that people are incentivized to stay at the high track and try
to obtain a high-track school degree with the reduced risk of ending-up without any school
degree.
The reform thus seems to motivate students to stay in the high track even if they are at risk
of not achieving its completion. The consequence of staying in the high track is surprisingly
beneficial for the students. As the estimates show, many of them actually pass the high-track
school degree and thus qualify for university and di erent career paths. Therefore, in the next
section we analyze if we can find longer-run e ects of the reform on occupational outcomes.
3.5.2 Occupational outcomes
More years of schooling and higher degrees should positively a ect students’ labor market
careers. Table 3.5 shows the reform e ect on occupational outcomes. As students are pushed
away from lower school degrees they are also less likely to hold a vocational school degree
(column 1) but more likely to obtain a university degree (column 2). This push into higher
education, however, is so far not visible in the quality of jobs held at age 20 and 35 ranked by
income. Yet, at age 20 (column 3) the sample is reduced by about 500 people and the coe icient
of the reform is negative. This could be due to individuals now being in university education at
age 20 and therefore not reporting an occupation at that age. Future research will explore in
more detail if the reform changed labor market careers and will investigate a larger variety of
moments when jobs are held.
3.5.3 Selection into the academic track
As the reform reduced the risk of dropping-out of the high track without any school degree, we
expect that (lower ability) students should select into the high track. Lavecchia et al. (2016)
andWölfel and Heineck (2012) show that risk aversion plays an important role in schooling
decisions. Relaxing our sample restriction from above to students who attended the high track
in the reform year, we apply two approaches to investigate the degree of selection into the
high track. First, we analyze if the share of students attending the high track at di erent points
of their school career increased with the reform. Second, we analyze if there are additional
e ects on the outcomes of table 3.3 and 3.4 for birth cohorts who could have selected into the
high track.
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For our first approach, table 3.6 shows that a er the reform a higher share of students attended
the high track – independent of measuring attending the high track as a dummy for having
at least one high-track school episode, as attending the high track as first secondary school,
or as attending the high track in 8th grade. However, the positive e!ect is only significant for
the likelihood of having any high-track school episode.23 The e!ect size is 5 percentage points
which is about a tenth of a standard deviation.
For our second approach, we investigate whether the reform e!ect changes as soon as parents
and children can take the new opportunities into account when deciding on their child’s
secondary school. In table B-2 and B-3 in the appendix we enlarge our sample to all available
birth cohorts and include an extra dummy for the interaction of being in the high track a er the
reform but younger than 10 in the year of the reform. The coe!icient of post reform shows the
overall reform e!ect, the coe!icient post reform selected captures an additional reform e!ect
for cohorts which could have selected into the high track a er the reform. The selection e!ects
are only significant for the number of school episodes, downgrading, and upgrading. In these
cases the selection e!ect has the opposite sign of the overall reform e!ect. The same pattern
holds for degrees as can bee seen in table B-3. The additional selection e!ect is significant for
holding no degree or a high-track degree at the end of one’s school career. In these cases the
selection e!ect also goes into the opposite direction. These findings are in line with negative
selection into the high track. Students who are probably less suited for the high track select
into it and when they struggle they switch schools more again.
3.6 Heterogeneity by parents’ school degree
The aim of the reformwas to provide dropouts from the high track with better labor market
opportunities. Estimating average treatment e!ects, therefore, might attenuate the e!ect
the reforms have on the target population which is the group of students which is potentially
a!ected by a dropout. Ex-post it is hard to define the group at risk because not all members of
that group actually drop out. Indicators like grades or repeating a grade are not documented
in our data. In the following we investigate to which extent students with parents without a
high-track degree profited from the reform di!erently than students with parents with a high-
track degree. Dropping-out of the high track might be particularly an issue for children who do
not have strong parental support to pursue a high-track school career. Therefore, the group of
students with parents without a high-track degreemight belong to the target population of the
reform. The group of students with parents who hold a high-track degree is, however, small
and includes only the most privileged students.
23 If we apply robust standard errors instead of clustered ones the e!ects are significant for all three measures.
In future research we will investigate into this more.
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Comparing the results in table 3.7 panel A with those in panel B shows that all coe icients go
into the same direction for both groups. Also the magnitude is mostly comparable except for
excess time in education (column 2) which is negative and insignificant for students of parents
with a high-track school degree. Overall, e ects are larger and therefore more significant for
students with parents who do not hold a high-track degree.
In order to detect di erences in final school degrees table 3.8 panel A has to be compared to
panel B. Again the e ects go into the same direction for both groups. Yet, the other estimates –
particularly the estimated reform e ect on the accomplishment of a high-track school degree
(column 4 and column 8) is twice as large for students with parents without a high-track school
degree. These results suggest that the reformwasespecially beneficial for studentswithparents
who do not hold a high-track school degree.
3.7 Robustness checks
In this section we test the reform e ect for the whole population and address some identifi-
cation issues of our DID approach. First, we do not restrict the sample to high-track school
students and treat everybody who is 19 or younger in the year of the reform as being treated.
Second, we include linear state-time trends, third, we exclude one state at a time.
3.7.1 Eect on the whole population
In the sections above we identify e ects on a very small subgroup of the whole population of
students within a state, namely students in the high track. There are two arguments in favor of
estimating an overall e ect. First, the reform also targeted students in middle-track schools
who accomplished the 9th grade and awarded themwith a basic school degree. Second, there
might be spillover e ects on students from other school tracks. Resource constraints could
prevent high-track schools from getting over-enrolled while middle-track schools will try to
attract students from the low-track schools to fill their seats. On the local labor markets it
is possible that high track school dropouts with a school degree crowd-out students from
themiddle track schools. Table 3.9 shows that for the whole population the share of people
without any school degree decreased significantly with the reform, all other e ects, however,
are close to zero and insignificant. This suggests that e ects might go into di erent directions
for di erent student subgroups. In future research we will explore reform e ects on students
in other school tracks in more detail.
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3.7.2 Linear state trends
In DID approaches it is possible that the reform e ect picks-up state-specific time trends and,
in this case, cannot be interpreted as a causal reform e ect. To ensure that state-specific time
trends are not driving our results we include linear state trends into equation 3.1. The results
are shown in table 3.10. It shows that our main findings for the increased stability of school
careers and a push into more high-track degrees are robust to the inclusion of linear state
trends.24
3.7.3 Leave-one out
In Germany education policy in general di ers by state. It is possible that our reform e ects
are driven by specific states where the setting of the education system is peculiar. To make
sure that no single state is driving our results we estimate all regressions in a restricted sample
leaving one state out at a time. We do not report all results but only those for the largest
states which contribute most observations to our analysis: Northrhine-Westphalia and Bavaria.
Additionally we show results for leaving out Berlin, which was in part East Germany at the time
of the reform. Table 3.11 panel A shows the results for years of schooling and the number of
school episodes. Panel B shows the results for downgrading and the holding of a high-track
degree. The magnitudes of the coe icients hardly change and the e ects stay significant. This
holds as well for leaving out any other state (not shown here).
3.8 Conclusion
In the context of the German school system, we investigate the e ects of a school reform that
rewarded high-track school dropouts with a low-track school degree if they at least accom-
plished the 9th grade. For identification we exploit that the reform was introduced at di erent
points in time in the 11West German states from 1965 to 1999. Detailed retrospective spell data
on school and labor market careers from the NEPS allow us to identify exactly who attended
the high track regardless of completing a degree or not and where – in terms of federal state –
she attended it. Both are features many other data sets lack of. Our results show compliance
with the reform in the sense that students are less likely to switch between schools and tracks.
Surprisingly, however, we find that the reform led to an increase in the number of high-track
students who successfully finish high-school and enter university. This is in linewith theoretical
considerations on risk perception that changes students’ motivation: The reform seems to
24 We can also include non-linear state-decade-fixed e ects with the first decade of people born before 1950,
the second people born between 1950 and 1959, the third people born between 1960 and 1969, the forth
people born between 1970 and 1979, and the fi!h people born a!er 1979. These decade dummies are
interacted with the state dummies. Our results do not change if we include the state-decade dummies.
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have reduced the perceived risk of trying longer in the high-track school and thus led to an
increase in thehigh-track completion rate. The reformcan thereforebe interpretedas a low-cost
intervention that changed the behavior of students in a beneficial way.
Interestingly, there is heterogeneity in the e ects. Students from lower socio-economic status
benefit particularly from the reform. As selection into treatment is one big issue of reform
evaluationsourmain results stem froma reduced sampleof studentswhowere already enrolled
in a high-track school in the reform year. Investigating selection e ects into the high track in
later cohorts suggests that selection played a role as we detect some negative selection of
low-performing students into the high track.
In future research, we aim to estimate the total e ect of the reform, including not only selection
e ects but also spillover e ects in terms of enrollment patterns and completion rates in low-
track schools.
Onemight argue that international policy conclusions that couldbe takenaway fromthis reform
evaluation are limited sincewe study a very specific context. The dropout reform took place in a
system with tracking, grade repetition and strong implications of a degree for the labor market
entrance. Thus, this reformmight just not be applicable to another country’s school system.
Yet, our results show one important insight which is of importance to education policies in
general: Along the school career, milestones which are awarded can motivate students to
actually try longer and harder to successfully finish the next milestone. A prominent example
of the introduction of such amilestone is the European Bologna reform that introduced the
bachelor degree as a milestone in university graduation. The results of our evaluation serve as
evidence that such milestones indeed change students’ behavior and improve their outcomes.
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Figures and tables
Figure 3.1 : The Structure of the German School System
Notes: The figure depicts the German school system from primary school through university education. The le 
axis shows the year of schooling for each stage. The right axis the age of students in that stage.
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Figure 3.2 : Dropouts from the high track in Germany
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Notes: The blue dots show for birth cohorts from 1950 to 1986 the share of people who attended the high track in
Germany at age 13/14 (8th grade). The orange dots shows for the same birth cohorts the share of people who
dropped out from the high track among the people who attended the high track in 8th grade. The respective lines
are the linear fit of the raw data points. Data source: NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Own calculations.
Figure 3.3 : Restricted sample: control and treatment group sample
Notes: The figure shows the restricted sample we use for our main analysis. The cohorts which turn 11 in the
specific year are pre-reform cohorts if the cell is white and belong treatment group not prone to selection if the
cell is black. Grey cells are the birth cohorts which belong to the treatment group prone to selection and are
excluded from our analysis. Source: (Helbig and Nikolai, 2015).
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Table 3.1 : Timing of the dropout reforms
state reform
Baden Wuerttemberg 1965
Hamburg 1966
Hessen 1967
Schleswig Holstein 1970
Rheinland Pfalz 1972
Niedersachsen 1976
Saarland 1976
Berlin 1977
Nordrhein Westfalen 1978
Bayern 1982
Brandenburg 1991
Mecklenburg Vorpommern 1994
Bremen 1996
Sachsen 1999
Sachsen Anhalt 2002
Thueringen 2003
Notes: The table shows the timing of the dropout reforms in the German federal states. Source: (Helbig and
Nikolai, 2015).
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Table 3.2 : Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
School career
Years of schooling 12.30 1.09 8 13
Excess time in education 0.31 0.46 0 1
Age at leaving school system 18.55 0.90 14 19
School episodes 2.56 0.85 1 8
Downgrading from high track 0.13 0.33 0 1
Upgrading into high track 0.12 0.32 0 1
School degree
No degree in last school year 0.05 0.21 0 1
Basic school degree in last school year 0.02 0.14 0 1
Middle school degree in last school year 0.19 0.39 0 1
High track school degree in last school year 0.69 0.46 0 1
No degree in 2010 0.00 0.03 0 1
Basic school degree in 2010 0.01 0.11 0 1
Middle school degree in 2010 0.15 0.36 0 1
High track school degree in 2010 0.83 0.37 0 1
Occupational Outcomes
University degree 0.54 0.50 0 1
Holding a vocational degree 0.40 0.49 0 1
Average income in job held at age 20 721.49 325.49 0 2,100
Average income in job held at age 35 2,180.49 1,482.49 0 7,750
Personal characteristics
Female 0.49 0.50 0 1
Year of birth 1958.22 6.23 1944 1982
Migration background 0.08 0.26 0 1
Highest parental education
No degree 0.00 0.05 0 1
Basic school degree 0.42 0.49 0 1
Middle school degree 0.20 0.40 0 1
High track school degree 0.11 0.32 0 1
University degree 0.27 0.44 0 1
Number of siblings
No siblings 0.16 0.37 0 1
One sibling 0.38 0.49 0 1
Two or more siblings 0.46 0.50 0 1
Observations 1462
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for the outcome and control variables constructed from the NEPS data.
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Table 3.3 : Reform eect on school career
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Excess time Age at leaving School Downgrading Upgrading
schooling in education school system episodes
post reform 0.725∗∗∗ 0.055 0.605∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.032
(0.121) (0.050) (0.076) (0.111) (0.039) (0.035)
p-value [0.000] [0.476] [0.000] [0.004] [0.004] [0.48]
wild-cluster bootstrap
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 1462 1461 1460 1462 1460 1460
R2 0.105 0.065 0.087 0.094 0.098 0.122
mean outcome 12.296 0.313 18.547 2.563 0.128 0.120
SD outcome 1.088 0.464 0.895 0.851 0.334 0.325
Notes: The table shows the results of estimating equation 3.1 for years of schooling, excess time in school, age at leaving the school system, the number
of school episodes, downgrading, and upgrading described in detail in section 3.3. We report the coeicient post reformwhich is the reform eect for
students age 11-19 attending the high track in the year of the reform. Standard errors are clustered on state level. The third row reports p-values of
wild-cluster bootstrapping the standard errors. All specifications include state- and birth-cohort fixed eects and the set of control variables. Data stems
from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Asterisks show the significance level:* = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 3.4 : Reform eect on school degrees
degree in last school episode final school degree 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
none basic middle high track none basic middle high track
post reform -0.026 -0.037∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.005 -0.235∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.016) (0.040) (0.051) (0.001) (0.011) (0.030) (0.031)
p-value [0.456] [0.184] [0.004] [0.000] [0.372] [0.688] [0.004] [0.000]
wild-cluster bootstrap
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 1460 1460 1460 1460 1462 1462 1462 1462
R2 0.057 0.025 0.079 0.094 0.012 0.013 0.081 0.079
mean outcome 0.047 0.019 0.188 0.693 0.001 0.013 0.155 0.832
SD outcome 0.212 0.137 0.391 0.461 0.026 0.113 0.362 0.374
Notes: The table shows the results of estimating equation 3.1 for degrees obtained in the last school year (no degree, basic, middle, and high track school
degree) and degrees held in 2010 (no degree, basic, middle, and high track school degree) described in detail in section 3.3. We report the coeicient post
reformwhich is the reform eect for students age 11-19 attending the high track in the year of the reform. Standard errors are clustered on state level.
The third row reports p-values of wild-cluster bootstrapping the standard errors. All specifications include state- and birth-cohort fixed eects and the set
of control variables. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Asterisks show the significance level:* = * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 3.5 : Reform eect on occupational outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Holding vocational degree university degree Income in job at age 20 Income in job at age 35
post reform -0.140∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ -9.376 90.995
(0.037) (0.038) (17.631) (72.018)
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 1462 1462 938 1292
R2 0.091 0.072 0.198 0.479
mean outcome 0.399 0.540 721.490 2180.486
SD outcome 0.490 0.499 325.492 1482.488
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table shows the results of estimating equation 3.1 for the likelihood of holding a vocational, or a university degree in 2010 and the quality of
the job in terms of income held at age 20 and 35. The variables are described in detail in section 3.3. We report the coeicient post reformwhich is the
reform eect for students age 11-19 attending the high track in the year of the reform. All specifications include state- and birth-cohort fixed eects and
the set of control variables. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are clustered on state level. Asterisks show the significance level:* = p<0.1,
**=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 3.6 : Reform eect: selection into high track
(1) (2) (3)
Any high track episode First secondary school: high track Grade 8: high track
post reform 0.050∗ 0.034 0.025
(0.027) (0.025) (0.022)
state FE Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes
observations 8621 8233 8621
R2 0.180 0.175 0.177
mean outcome 0.361 0.362 0.432
SD outcome 0.480 0.481 0.495
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: For the overall population we estimate if the share of students in the high track increased a er the reform. We distinguish between having any
high track episode (column 1), reporting the high track as first attended secondary school (column 2), and attending the high track in 8th grade. Post
reform captures if students are 19 or younger at the year of the reform. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are clustered on state level.
Asterisks show the significance level:* = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 3.7 : Heterogeneity of reform eect on school careers by parental school degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Excess time Age at leaving School Downgrading Upgrading
schooling in education school system episodes
Panel A. Subsample: parents with high track school degree
post reform 0.278 -0.090 0.258∗ -0.387∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.033
(0.191) (0.063) (0.118) (0.172) (0.063) (0.040)
observations 557 556 557 557 557 557
R2 0.108 0.108 0.091 0.090 0.085 0.109
mean outcome 12.454 0.300 18.662 2.542 0.110 0.065
SD outcome 0.954 0.459 0.740 0.882 0.313 0.246
Panel B. Subsample: parents without high track school degree
post reform 0.962∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ -0.035
(0.148) (0.047) (0.112) (0.112) (0.061) (0.046)
observations 905 905 903 905 903 903
R2 0.119 0.062 0.098 0.116 0.142 0.134
mean outcome 12.199 0.320 18.476 2.576 0.140 0.154
SD outcome 1.153 0.467 0.973 0.832 0.347 0.361
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the results of our subgroup analysis restricting the sample to people with parents who hold an high track school degree. We
estimate equation 3.1 for this subgroup with years of schooling, excess time in school, age at leaving the school system, the number of school episodes,
downgrading, and upgrading as outcome variables described in detail in section 3.3. We report the coeicient post reformwhich is the reform eect
for students age 11-19 attending the high track in the year of the reform. All specifications include state- and birth-cohort fixed eects and the set of
control variables. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are clustered on state level. Asterisks show the significance level:* = p<0.1, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01.
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Table 3.8 : Heterogeneity of reform eect on school degrees by parental school degree
degree in last school year final school degree 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
none basic middle high track none basic middle high track
Panel A. Subsample: parents with high track school degree
post reform 0.022 -0.038 -0.152∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.005 -0.002 -0.139∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.017) (0.032) (0.033) (0.074) (0.003) (0.014) (0.037) (0.048)
observations 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 557
R2 0.105 0.061 0.081 0.108 0.029 0.033 0.096 0.087
mean outcome 0.047 0.020 0.142 0.738 0.002 0.011 0.113 0.874
SD outcome 0.211 0.139 0.349 0.440 0.042 0.103 0.317 0.332
Panel B. Subsample: parents without high track school degree
post reform -0.053 -0.031∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.007 -0.282∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.009) (0.055) (0.050) (.) (0.012) (0.033) (0.031)
observations 903 903 903 903 905 905 905 905
R2 0.061 0.021 0.088 0.105 . 0.025 0.084 0.088
mean outcome 0.048 0.019 0.217 0.666 0.000 0.014 0.180 0.806
SD outcome 0.213 0.136 0.412 0.472 0.000 0.119 0.384 0.396
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the results of our subgroup analysis restricting the sample to people with parents who hold an high track school degree. We
estimate equation 3.1 for this subgroup with degree obtained in the last school year (no degree, basic, middle, and high track school degree) and degrees
held in 2010 (no degree, basic, middle, and high track school degree) described in detail in section 3.3. We report the coeicient post reformwhich is the
reform eect for students age 11-19 attending the high track in the year of the reform. All specifications include state- and birth-cohort fixed eects and
the set of control variables. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are clustered on state level. Asterisks show the significance level:* = p<0.1,
**=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 3.9 : Robustness check: eect on whole population
school career final school degree 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years of schooling School episodes Downgrading none basic middle high track
post reform -0.087 -0.041 -0.010 -0.003∗∗ -0.028 0.047 -0.016
(0.136) (0.066) (0.009) (0.001) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031)
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 3878 3878 3850 3878 3878 3878 3878
R2 0.160 0.036 0.022 0.022 0.095 0.069 0.153
mean outcome 11.027 2.527 0.059 0.004 0.192 0.351 0.452
SD outcome 1.578 0.794 0.236 0.064 0.394 0.477 0.498
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table shows the reform eect on school careers and school degrees for the whole population (not only high track attendees). The coeicient
of post reform is the treatment eect for students being younger than 19 in the year of the reform. All specifications include state- and birth-cohort fixed
eects and the set of control variables. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are clustered on state level. Asterisks show the significance
level:* = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 3.10 : Robustness check: including linear state trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years of No. of Downgrading no basic middle academic
schooling school episodes degree school degree school degree school degree
post reform 0.823∗∗∗ -0.548∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.005 -0.276∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.130) (0.028) (0.001) (0.012) (0.019) (0.024)
linear state trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 1462 1462 1460 1462 1462 1462 1462
R2 0.138 0.100 0.113 0.016 0.017 0.103 0.102
mean outcome 12.296 2.563 0.128 0.001 0.013 0.155 0.832
SD outcome 1.088 0.851 0.334 0.026 0.113 0.362 0.374
Notes: The table shows robustness checks including in our estimation equation 3.1 linear time-state trends. The outcome variables are years of schooling,
school episodes, downgrading, holding no degree, a basic, middle, or high track school degree in 2010. The variables are described in detail in section 3.3.
We report the coe icient post reformwhich is the reform e ect for students age 11-19 attending the high track in the year of the reform. All specifications
include state- and birth-cohort fixed e ects and the set of control variables. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are clustered on state level.
Asterisks show the significance level:* = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table 3.11 : Robustness check: leave one state out at a time
Panel A.
Years of schooling School episodes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no NRW no Bavaria no Berlin no NRW no Bavaria no Berlin
post reform 0.672∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ -0.530∗∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.554∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.156) (0.124) (0.133) (0.151) (0.111)
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 941 1095 1406 941 1095 1406
R2 0.088 0.121 0.111 0.088 0.129 0.093
mean outcome 12.243 12.291 12.303 2.589 2.536 2.568
SD outcome 1.130 1.077 1.092 0.881 0.810 0.857
Panel B.
Downgrading high track school degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no NRW no Bavaria no Berlin no NRW no Bavaria no Berlin
post reform -0.287∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.041) (0.044) (0.046) (0.032)
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 939 1094 1404 941 1095 1406
R2 0.105 0.084 0.096 0.088 0.083 0.077
mean outcome 0.140 0.103 0.130 0.815 0.853 0.828
SD outcome 0.347 0.304 0.337 0.388 0.354 0.378
Notes: The table shows robustness checks excluding one state at a time from our estimation equation 3.1. The outcome variables are years of schooling,
school episodes, downgrading, and holding a high track school degree. The variables are described in detail in section 3.3. Columns 1 and 4 show results
for leaving out Northrhine-Westphalia, columns 2 and 5 show results for leaving out Bavaria, and column 3 and 6 show results for leaving out Berlin. We
report the coe icient post reformwhich is the reform e ect for students age 11-19 attending the high track in the year of the reform. All specifications
include state- and birth-cohort fixed e ects and the set of control variables. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are clustered on state level.
Asterisks show the significance level:* = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.77
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Appendix B
Figure B-1 : Common trend assumption: share of people with basic school degree by state pre-reform
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Notes: The figure shows the share of people who hold a basic school degree by birth cohort and state. Data source:
Microcensus 1991, 1996, 2001, 2011. Own calculations.
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Figure B-2 : Common trend assumption: share of people with middle school degree by state pre-reform
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Notes: The figure shows the share of people who hold a middle school degree by birth cohort and state. Data
source: Microcensus 1991, 1996, 2001, 2011. Own calculations.
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Figure B-3 : Common trend assumption: share of people with high school degree by state pre-reform
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
s
h
a
re
 o
f 
a
g
e
 g
ro
u
p
 w
it
h
 s
p
e
c
if
ic
 d
e
g
re
e
20 30 40 50 60 70
age at reformyear
SH HH NS HB NRW
HE RP BW BY SL
High track school degree
Notes: The figure shows the share of people who hold an high school degree by birth cohort and state. Data source:
Microcensus 1991, 1996, 2001, 2011. Own calculations.
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Figure B-4 : Common trend assumption: share of children in high track by state 1950-1962 (pre-reform)
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Notes: The figure shows for the years 1950 to 1962 the percentage of the specific birth cohorts who attend the
high track in 7th grade by state. Source: (Wissenscha srat, 1964). Own calculations.
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Table B-1 : Reform eect on school careers by age group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Excess time Age at leaving School Down- Up-
schooling in education school system episodes grading grading
11-14 0.560∗ 0.054 0.387∗∗ -0.657∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
years post reform (0.270) (0.071) (0.142) (0.152) (0.061) (0.036)
15-17 0.680∗∗∗ 0.037 0.599∗∗∗ -0.636∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.076∗
years post reform (0.153) (0.053) (0.092) (0.124) (0.049) (0.039)
18+ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.072 0.649∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗∗ 0.024
years post reform (0.102) (0.052) (0.060) (0.131) (0.030) (0.044)
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 1462 1461 1460 1462 1460 1460
R2 0.108 0.066 0.093 0.097 0.098 0.131
mean outcome 12.296 0.313 18.547 2.563 0.128 0.120
SD outcome 1.088 0.464 0.895 0.851 0.334 0.325
Notes: In the table we estimate the reform eect on school careers for three dierent age groups of high track school attendees. The first age group is
11-14 years old in the year of the reform, the second 15-17, and the third 18 and older. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are clustered on
state level. Asterisks show the significance level:* = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table B-2 : Additional reform eect on school careers by selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Excess time Age at leaving School Downgrading Upgrading
schooling in education school system episodes
post reform 0.297∗∗ 0.027 0.268∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.051∗
(0.125) (0.022) (0.084) (0.083) (0.038) (0.025)
post reform selected 0.058 0.035 0.053 0.326∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.026) (0.051) (0.095) (0.011) (0.061)
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 3723 3721 3719 3723 3719 3719
R2 0.095 0.033 0.074 0.071 0.036 0.089
mean outcome 12.497 0.292 18.675 2.656 0.134 0.169
SD outcome 0.957 0.455 0.761 0.908 0.341 0.375
Notes: In this table we increase the sample to the possibly selected treated individuals from later birth cohorts. The table shows the results of estimating
equation 3.1 for years of schooling, excess time in school, age at leaving the school system, the number of school episodes, downgrading, and upgrading
described in detail in section 3.3. Additionally to the coeicient of post reformwhich is the reform eect for students age 11-19 attending the high track in
the year of the reform, we report the treatment eect for the selected treatment group additional selection e ect. All specifications include state- and
birth-cohort fixed eects and the set of control variables. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are clustered on state level. Asterisks show
the significance level:* = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
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Table B-3 : Additional reform eect on school degrees by selection
degree in last school year final school degree 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
none basic middle high track none basic middle high track
post reform -0.014 -0.018 -0.142∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.003 -0.104∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.038) (0.048) (0.001) (0.006) (0.030) (0.030)
post reform selected 0.016∗ -0.005 0.004 -0.053∗ 0.002 0.001 -0.014 0.011
(0.008) (0.006) (0.017) (0.026) (0.001) (0.006) (0.020) (0.018)
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
birthcohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 3719 3719 3719 3719 3723 3723 3723 3723
R2 0.027 0.016 0.053 0.059 0.007 0.012 0.049 0.054
mean outcome 0.039 0.016 0.151 0.737 0.001 0.010 0.119 0.871
SD outcome 0.194 0.126 0.358 0.440 0.023 0.098 0.324 0.335
Notes: In this table we increase the sample to the possibly selected treated individuals from later birth cohorts. The table shows the results of estimating
equation 3.1 for degrees obtained in the last school year (no degree, basic, middle, and high track school degree) and degrees held in 2010 (no degree,
basic, middle, and high track school degree) described in detail in section 3.3. Additionally to the coeicient of post reformwhich is the reform eect for
students age 11-19 attending the high track in the year of the reform, we report the treatment eect for the selected treatment group additional selection
e ect. All specifications include state- and birth-cohort fixed eects and the set of control variables. Data stems from NEPS SC6:7.0.0. Standard errors are
clustered on state level. Asterisks show the significance level:* = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01.
8
4
4 Predicting Choice of Math-Intensive Occupations by
School Grades: The Role of Ability, (Rank) Signals, and
Taste*†
4.1 Introduction
Computerization threatens a substantial share of occupations (Frey and Osborne, 2017) and
technological change has increased the demand for cognitive skills (Goldin and Katz, 2008).
It is thus important to understand the determinants of occupational choice. However, iden-
tifying these determinants has not proven easy. While economic factors, such as expected
earnings, explain only little, it appears that dierences in tastes across individuals—typically
not observed in existing studies—are the most important factor in choosing a field of study
and, hence, an occupation (Wiswall and Zafar, 2015).1
We study determinants of occupational choice in Germany and find that individuals’ school
grades are significantly associated with chosen occupations. In particular, individuals with
goodmath grades—relative to their German-language grades—tend to choose math-intensive
occupations.2 Because we use the grade dierence across two subjects, we implicitly account
for any level eects, such as studentswith goodmath grades and goodGermangrades choosing
occupations that require high skills in both math and reading. The positive association be-
tween grade dierence and the math intensity of the chosen occupation is robust to including
school fixed eects, implying that we are comparing only individuals within the same local
labor market. We investigate five dierent factors that may drive this association: (1) absolute
* This chapter is based on joint work with Marc Piopiunik.
† Financial supportby theGermanResearch Foundation (DFG) throughPriority Program (SPP) 1646 "Education
as a Lifelong Process" is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Arcidiacono (2004), Bey, Fougère, and Maurel (2012), and Gemici and Wiswall (2014) find similar evidence.
Similarly, Zafar (2013) finds that gender dierences in tastes for college majors are the most important
determinant of the gender gap in major choice, whereas beliefs about ability andmajor-specific earnings
explain only little of this gap.
2 To be precise, we use the dierence in the classroom’s ordinal rank between math grade and German grade.
We prefer grade ranks instead of absolute grades because teacher-assigned grades may vary systematically
across the subjects math and German. For example, German-language teachers may assign the best grade
to the best students in their classroom, whereas math teachers may assign only the second-best grade
to their best students (or vice versa). Results are similar, however, when using the simple math-German
grade dierence instead. In the remainder of the chapter, we use the term “grade dierence” to refer to the
dierence betweenmath grade rank and German grade rank.
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achievement in math and reading; (2) parents’ occupations; (3) individuals using the grade
di erence as a signal of their subject-specific ability; (4) employers using the grade di erence
as a signal of applicants’ relative skills; and (5) the role of tastes. We find that the first four
factors do not explain the positive association between grade di erence andmath intensity of
chosen occupation. However, we find that di erences in tastes across individuals—measured
immediately before entering the labor market—completely explain this association, suggesting
that tastes play an important role in occupational choice.
We use panel data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), which follows 9th-grade
students into the labormarket. These students chooseapprenticeship training inanoccupation,
which typically starts a!er 9th or 10th grade. Importantly, only a minority of apprenticeship
graduates switch occupations a!er completing the vocational training (Seibert, 2007; Seibert
andWydra-Somaggio, 2017). The NEPS data containmeasures of individuals’ math and reading
achievement, assessed just before choosing an occupation. As we include school fixed e ects,
wee ectively compareonly individuals fromthe sameschoolwhoexperienced the sameoverall
school quality and the sameoccupationsandemployerswithin their (small) local labormarket.3
We quantify the math intensity of occupations using two complementary measures. First, we
compute the average math skill level of current workers in each three-digit occupation, using
the adult cohort fromNEPS. Second, we compute the averagemath skill requirements (no skills,
basic, or advanced) in each three-digit occupation. For this measure, we use two recent waves
of the Qualification and Career Survey (QaC), in which employees reported the requirements of
their current job with respect to various domains (e.g., mathematics). For both types of math
intensity measures, in addition to using the math level, we also use the di erence between
math and reading/language skills to eliminate any level e ects, for example, some occupations
demanding high skills in both math and reading.
While individuals’ absolute achievement in math and reading are related to the math intensity
of chosen occupations, they do not explain the positive association between grade di erence
andmath intensity of chosen occupation. Additionally controlling for the level of math grades
does not change the coe icient of interest either, suggesting that the association is not simply
driven by individuals with (very) goodmath grades.
3 Note that apprenticeship trainees tend to stay in the regionwhere theywent to school, thus are geographically
rather immobile (BMBF, 2015). To some extent, this is likely due to the fact that these individuals are only
about 17 years old when starting their vocational education.
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Parents’ occupationmay be an important determinant of occupational choice, given that ex-
isting studies find a correlation between parents’ and children’s occupation for Germany, see
Constant andZimmermann (2004). Furthermore, Zafar (2012, 2013) finds that parental approval
is one of the most important factors underlying the choice of majors for college students in the
United States. In our setting, parental approval may be even more important since individuals
are only about 16 or 17 years old when choosing their occupation.
Since teachers in Germany typically use relative grading to assess students’ performance, we
exploit quasi-random variation in classmates’ average achievement to estimate the causal ef-
fect of receiving amath ability signal (i.e., higher/lower math grade rank relative to the German
grade rank) on occupational choice.4 Under relative grading, if a given student’s classmates
perform poorly in math but well in reading, then she tends to receive a goodmath grade, but a
poor German grade, conditional on her own achievement in math and reading. We therefore
exploit the quasi-random variation in classmates’ relative achievement (math vs. reading)
across two classrooms within the same school as an instrument for the grade di erence of
a given student. While the first stage is strong (i.e., evidence for relative grading), we find
no evidence that random variation in the math ability signal (induced by teachers grading
relatively) a ects students’ occupational choice.5
Any observed occupation is the result of the interaction between the supply of job seekers and
the demand of firms. Because firms in Germany typically observe themath and German grades
on the (written) applications for apprenticeship positions, the positive association between
grade di erence andmath intensity of observed occupation may arise if employers use the
gradedi erence as a signal of applicants’ (domain-specific) skills. To rule out this interpretation,
and thus provide evidence for a supply-side e ect, we use the dream jobs that individuals
reported at the start of 9th grade, that is, before they started to apply for apprenticeship posi-
tions. We find a positive association between grade di erence and themath intensity of the
dream job, which is of similar magnitude as the association with the math intensity of actual
4 In general, there are two types of grading schemes for assessing students’ performance. Under absolute
grading, grades depend on students’ own performance only and are independent of their classmates’
performance. Under relative grading, also known as “grading on a curve,” students’ grades depend on their
positions, that is, their ordinal rank, in the class’s achievement distribution. Relative grading is used, for
example, in colleges in the United States and in German schools see, e.g., Piopiunik and Schlotter (2012);
Milek, Luedtke, Trautwein, Maaz, and Stubbe (2009).
5 Using quasi-random variation in classmates’ average achievement is related to studies that investigate
the impact of students’ ordinal rank in the class (or cohort) on later educational outcomes (Murphy and
Weinhardt, 2014; Elsner and Isphording, 2017). A crucial di erence is that classmates’ achievement in our
settingmatters because teachers employ relative grading, whereas in the other settings, ordinal rankmatters
through its impact on students’ perceived ability or confidence in a subject for a review on this so-called
Big-Fish-Little-Pond E ect, see Marsh, Trautwein, Lüdtke, Baumert, and Köller (2007).
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occupations. This suggests that the association between grade di erence andmath intensity
of chosen occupations is not driven by employers.
Concerning economic determinants of occupational choice, we find a clear association be-
tween occupation-specific average hourly wages (unemployment rates) and the level of math
grades. However, these economic attributes are unrelated to individuals’ grade di erences.
This is not surprising since grade di erences net out any level e ects, such as individuals with
goodmath grades and good German grades choosing high-paying occupations or occupations
with low unemployment risk.
While existing studies suggest that di erences in tastes across individuals are the most impor-
tant factor in choosing a field of study, they do not observe tastes directly e.g., Wiswall and
Zafar (2015). We contribute to the literature by usingmeasures of individuals’ tastes elicited just
before entering the labor market. In particular, two dimensions of tastes—practical-technical
interests and social interests - drive the positive association between grade di erence and
math intensity of chosen occupation. Individuals with strong practical-technical interests
are substantiallymore likely to choose math-intensive occupations, whereas individuals with
strong social interests are substantially less likely to choose math-intensive occupations.6 This
finding provides direct evidence on the crucial role played by tastes for occupational choice.
While we cannot make strong causal claims, we find an e ect of tastes on occupational choice
when instrumenting own tastes with the average tastes of classmates, conditional on own
grades and classmates’ mean achievement.7 While the existing literature finds evidence that
individuals tend to choose fields in which they have a comparative advantage (Kirkeboen et al.,
2016),8 we provide direct evidence that tastes play an important role in occupational choice.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the panel data that
follow 9th-grade students into the labormarket and the data sets on adult workers used to com-
pute the math intensity of occupations. Section 4.3 lays out our empirical model. Section 4.4
reports the main results on the association between grade di erence andmath intensity of
chosen occupation, followed by the results for the factors that may drive this association.
Section 4.5 concludes.
6 Practical-technical interests and social interests explain between 10 and 27 percent of the variation in the
math intensity of chosen occupations.
7 However, we cannot rule out that teachers influence both own tastes and classmates’ tastes.
8 This is in line with a Roy model of self-selection (Roy, 1951).
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4.2 Data
For our analysis we combine rich survey data on individuals in 9th grade who, one or two years
later, enter an occupation in the labor market with various measures of the math intensity
of occupations, obtained from other data sets. Furthermore, we also merge information on
average earnings and unemployment rates from administrative data for each occupation.
4.2.1 NEPS panel data
In 2010, the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) started following 9th grade
students, that is, students in their last year of compulsory general education.9 In Germany,
a er 9th or 10th grade, students either stay in school and continue an academic school career
(in Gymnasium) or enter the labor market via an apprenticeship training.10 The NEPS data
include information on students, school environment, and achievement in standardized math
and reading tests. Additionally, the data contain information on the type of occupation in
which students have apprenticed (based on telephone interviews and online surveys). During
9th grade, NEPS interviews students in the fall and spring to more precisely document the
transition into the labor market a er compulsory education. Individuals who want to enter the
labor market a er 9th grade usually start their application process in the spring. Most datasets
either lack comparable data on individual achievement and classmates before entering the
labor market or lack information on occupations in the labor market. NEPS samples students
in a two-step procedure. First, a representative set of German schools is drawn. Within these
schools, if 9th grade contains more than one class, two classes are sampled. In general, stu-
dents can choose not to participate in NEPS; however, if schools support the survey, most
students participate (at least either in the survey or test).11 In starting cohort 4, basic school
students are oversampled. This works in favor of our project as basic school students are
the most important target group for engaging in an apprenticeship and entering the labor
market directly a er compulsory schooling. We restrict our sample to students who report
an apprenticeship position a er spring 2011 and do not distinguish between students who
start an apprenticeship in 2011, 2012, or 2013. For grade rank calculations, we use all students
who participate in the fall 2010-survey, even though some of these students will continue an
academic school career and therefore be dropped from our sample for the analysis. However,
9 This chapter uses data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS): Starting Cohort Grade 9,
doi:10.5157/NEPS:SC4:9.0.0 (Blossfeld et al., 2011). From 2008 to 2013, NEPS data were collected as part
of the Framework Program for the Promotion of Empirical Educational Research funded by the German
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). As of 2014, NEPS is carried out by the Leibniz Institute
for Educational Trajectories (LIfBi) at the University of Bamberg in cooperation with a nationwide network.
10 Basic school ends a er 9th grade, middle school a er 10th grade. The majority of students enter the labor
market a er grade10, that is, a er graduating frommiddle school or a er completinganadditional, voluntary
’qualification’ year in basic school.
11 On average, in each class about 70 percent of students participate.
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to minimize measurement error in grade ranks, we use the math and reading achievement of
all observed students in the classroom.
4.2.2 Math intensity of occupations
We quantify the math intensity of occupations using two complementary measures. First,
we compute the average math skill level of current workers in each three-digit occupation,
using the adult cohort from NEPS. This sample (starting cohort 6) is representative of adults in
Germany who have completed their education and, in 2010, were between 21 and 65 years old.
The sample is completely independent from starting cohort 4 and contains about 11,700 adults,
whose math and reading achievement was assessed in 2010. For each 3-digit ISCO occupation
code, we calculate workers’ average math and reading achievement.12
Second, we compute the average skill requirements in each three-digit occupation. For this
measure, we use two recent waves of the Qualification and Career Survey (QaC), a survey of
employees conducted by the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training (Bundesinsti-
tut für Berufsbildung, BIBB) and the Research Institute of the Federal Employment Agency
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). To increase sample sizes, we pool the
most recent waves from 2005/2006 and 2011/2012, each covering about 20,000 employed and
self-employed individuals aged 15 and older.13 The surveys cover a wide range of industries,
including services andmanufacturing.
Survey participants were asked to indicate, for several domains, the skills required in their cur-
rent occupation,with the three answer categories being “no skills,” “basic skills,” and “advanced
skills.” For math skill requirements, we use the domain “skills in mathematics, specialized
calculus, and statistics.” For reading skill requirements, we use answers to the domain “skills
in German, written expression, and orthography.”14 For the analysis, we use three di!erent
measures of occupational requirements at the individual level: (i) the original outcome with
the three values 0 for no skills, 1 for basic skills, and 2 for advanced skills; (ii) a dummy vari-
able indicating whether any math skills (either basic or advanced) are required; and (iii) a
12 We cannot use a finer occupation classification (at the four or five digit-level) as occupation cells would
become too small. Using median skills instead of mean skills leads to similar results.
13 The first four waves were conducted in 1979, 1985/1986, 1991/1992, and 1998/1999. Individuals in jobs that
are part of vocational training, such as apprenticeships, are excluded in the surveys.
14 The question, in the original German version, reads as follows: “Ich lese Ihnen nun verschiedene Kenntnisge-
biete vor. Bitte sagen Sie zu jedem Gebiet, ob Sie bei Ihrer derzeitigen Tätigkeit als <Tätigkeit einblenden>
diese Kenntnisse benötigen und wenn ja, ob Grundkenntnisse oder Fachkenntnisse. Wenn Fachkenntnisse
nur auf einem Teilgebiet benötigt werden, geben Sie bitte trotzdem Fachkenntnisse an.” The two items that
we use for math and German-language requirements read as follows: “Kenntnisse im Bereich Mathematik,
Fachrechnen, Statistik” and “Kenntnisse in Deutsch, schri$licher Ausdruck, Rechtschreibung,” respectively.
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dummy variable indicating whether advanced math skills are required. We then aggregate
these individual-level measures to the level of two-digit occupations.
For both types of math intensity measures—skill level and skill requirement—in addition to
using themath level, we also use the di erence betweenmath and reading/language skills to
eliminate any level e ects, for example, some occupations demanding high skills in both math
and reading. For skill requirements, we use the measure (i), which is based on the original
three-point scale, to computer this math-reading di erence. Additionally, we rank occupations
by average earnings and unemployment rates, using administrative data from the German
Statistical O ice at the 5-digit occupation level. In the next section, we describe summary
statistics of the NEPS student panel data and of the occupational characteristics.
4.2.3 Summary statistics
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for ourmain explanatory, other student characteristics, and
outcome variables. Our sample consists of 5,045 students who transit into an apprenticeship.
Themain variable of interest is the grade di erence, which is the di erence between the rank of
the math grade in class and the rank of the German-language grade in class. students’ grades
are averages of the grade received at the end of 8th grade and in the middle of 9th grade. The
grade di erence varies between−1 and+1. A value of+1means that the student has the best
math grade in class and the worst German grade in class. At the other extreme, a value of−1
means that the student has the best German grade in class and the worst math grade in class. A
value of 0means that the student has the same grade rank in both subjects (e.g., the best grade
in both subjects or the worst grade in both subjects or something in between). Figure C-1 in the
appendix shows the distribution of our key explanatory variable. As expected, grade di erence
is normally distributed, with a mean of roughly zero. Achievement in math and reading are
z-standardized within our sample. The sample is 47 percent female and about one-quarter has
migration background. On average, we observe 18 students per class, ranging from 6 to 35
students.15
Themath and reading achievement of workers have been z-standardized within the overall
NEPS adult sample. As our estimation sample only includes apprenticeship occupations—but
not occupations that require tertiary education—it is not surprising that the average math skill
level of workers is below zero in our sample. The highest math skill level, with value 1, are
found in engineering (telecommunications engineers and electrical engineers). The di erence
15 Comparing these numbers of observations with categories for class sizes reported by teachers shows that
on a weighted average, 70 percent of all students in class participate in NEPS. Theminimum is 22 percent.
Reported class sizes by the teachers, however, are sometimes missing and some reports of class sizes are
lower than the number of participants.
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betweenmath and reading level is close to zero on average. The largest (positive) di erence is
observed for glass and ceramics plant operators and stationary plant andmachine operators,
who have a math level below zero. For the above-mentioned engineers with the highest math
level, the di erence is about 0.7. The first measure for skill requirement shows, with a mean of
0.74, that three-quarters of the occupations chosen by our students require basic math skills;
however, only one-quarter requires advancedmath skills. Occupations that require the highest
level of advanced math include agriculture, science occupations, engineering, and machinists.
The average di erence in math and language requirements is slightly negative, suggesting
that language requirements are, on average, higher than math requirements in the chosen
occupations.
Average earnings aremeasured by the gross hourly wage (in Euro) and reported for each 5-digit
KldB classification code. The average monthly apprenticeship pay is 790 Euro, and the average
unemployment rate in the chosen occupation is 8.4 percent. Finally, individuals report how
satisfied they are with their apprenticeship position in 2012/2013, ranging from 0 (not satisfied
at all) to 10 (completely satisfied); the average is 8.27 among individuals in our sample.
4.3 Empirical strategy
To estimate the association between grade di erence andmath intensity of chosen occupation,
we run the following OLSmodel:
yi,c,s = α + βgrade differencei,c,s + γAi,c,s+
δXi,c,s + λs + κZi,c,s + ǫi,c,s, where
(4.1)
yi,c,s represents the math intensity of the occupation of individual iwho attended class c in
school s. The math intensity is measured by the skill level of workers in that occupation and
by the occupation’s math requirements, respectively. Grade differencei,c,s is the di erence
between the grade rank individual i holds in math class c and in German class. The grade
di erence is continuous and varies between −1 and +1.16 The coe icient β is the focus of
interest. The vectorAi,c,s contains flexible measures (third-order polynomials) of individual i’s
math and reading achievement, which have been assessed in grade 9. The vectorXi,c,s con-
tains student characteristics, such as gender, age, and migration background, as well as family
background characteristics, such as number of books at home and highest level of parental
education. We always include school fixed e ects, λs, so as to compare only individuals who
have been subject to the same school environment andwho face the same potential employers
16 In table C-1, we use the absolute grade di erence as well as the math and German grade levels alternatively.
Our results are robust to using these alternative measures.
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in the same local labor market when choosing an occupation. ǫi,c,s is an idiosyncratic error
term. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
Since the grade di erence is based on the dierence between math and German, all factors
that similarly a ect the grade rank inmath and the grade rank in German are already absorbed.
Hence, general ability and non-cognitive skills, such as conscientiousness and grit, do not bias
the coe icient β, as long as these factors have a similar influence on both themath andGerman
grades. Therefore, any bias in β must be due to subject-specific influences.
As the relative achievement in math versus reading is strongly related to the math intensity of
the chosen occupation (see figure C-3), we always control flexibly for both math and reading
achievement (except for the very first baseline results; see panel A of table 4.2). Therefore, only
subject-specific factors that are unrelated to achievement di erences can biasβ, our coe icient
of interest. Furthermore, by additionally controlling for the math grade level, we show that β is
not driven by comparing students with goodmath grades to students with poor math grades.
Controlling for absolute achievement withAi,c,s, the termZi,c,s captures varying control vari-
ables that we successively include to investigate two further factors that may drive the positive
association between grade di erence andmath intensity of occupation: parents’ occupation
(see section 4.4.2) and tastes (see section 4.4.5).
4.4 Grade difference and math-intensity of occupation
We first present baseline results, without and with controls for absolute achievement (sec-
tion 4.4.1). Then, we investigate the role of parents’ occupation in section 4.4.2. Using an
IV approach, we assess whether individuals use their grade di erence as a signal of subject-
specific ability in section 4.4.3. To investigate whether employers use the grade di erence
as a signal of applicants’ relative skills, we use individuals’ dream jobs instead of observed
occupations (section 4.4.4. Finally, section 4.4.5 investigates the importance of individuals’
tastes.
4.4.1 Baseline results
Individuals who rank higher in math than in German at the end of school tend to choose occu-
pations in which workers have higher math skills (see figure 4.1) and occupations that require
highermath skills (see figure C-2 in the appendix). In general, this association is not surprising if
the grade di erence reflects di erences in individual’s math and reading achievement. Indeed,
there is also a strong positive correlation between relative math achievement (vs. reading) and
themath intensity of chosen occupations (figure C-3 in the appendix). Amatch between amore
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math-intensive occupation and an individual who performs better in math is likely e icient
for the economy. However, the correlations between grade di erence andmath intensity of
occupations shown in figures 4.1 and C-2 are conditional onmath and reading achievement.
This indicates that the grade di erence incorporates factors beyond absolute achievement
that drive occupational choice.
Table 4.2 shows that there is a strong correlation between the grade di erence and the five
measures of occupations’ math intensity (panel A). These correlations are robust to including
individuals’ achievement inmath and reading, which are flexibly controlled for with third-order
polynomials (panel B). The associations are highly statistically significant regardless of how
math intensity is measured. The magnitude of the e ect is also comparable across the five
measures and varies between 17 and 25 percent of a standard deviation in math intensity.
Rather than using grade ranks (our preferredmeasure), studentsmay view themselves as being
talented in math by receiving a (very) goodmath grade, irrespective of their German grade and
independent of their grade rank in the classroom. To rule out the possibility that our grade
di erence is simply capturing puremath grade e ects, panel C of table 4.2 controls for the level
of math grade. The e ect of grade di erence is somewhat reduced, but statistically significant
for most outcomes, particularly whenmath intensity is measured by the di erence between
math and reading skills and skill requirements, respectively (columns 2 and 6).
To assess whether our findings are driven by the specific construction of our grade-di erence
measure, we use alternative measures. Importantly, teachers in Germany do not have to use
the entire grade spectrumwhen assessing their students’ performance. Therefore, the worst-
performing student in math might receive a “5,” whereas the worst-performing student in
German class may receive a “3.” Using the absolute di erence in grades would suggest that
this student has a quite large absolute grade di erence. Based on our preferred rank-based
measure, the grade di erence would be zero as she receives the worst grades in both subjects.
To rule this out, we prefer using the rank-basedmeasure for grade di erence. However, panel A
in table C-1 shows that our finding is robust to measuring the di erence in absolute grades and
not in ranks. For the grade levels we find a positive correlation with math grade (panel B) and
a smaller but negative correlation with the German grade (panel C). Including both absolute
grades simultaneously shows that there is a positive and significant correlation of the occupa-
tion’s math intensity with the math grade and a negative and significant one with the German
grade (panel D). The overall association observed in table 4.2 therefore comes from both the
positive correlation with math grades and the negative correlation with German grades.
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One question arising from this correlation is whether other characteristics of math-intensive
occupations are driving this relationship. For example, it is possible thatmath-intensive occupa-
tions (among all occupations o ered in the apprenticeship system, i.e., excluding occupations
of college graduates) pay higher wages or o er more job security. In this case, individuals may
simply choose higher-paying or safer occupations, rather than choosing occupations based
on their skill requirements. In panel A of table C-2 in the appendix we use apprenticeship
pay, hourly wages (based on 5-digit occupations), and unemployment rates of occupations
as outcomes (columns 1-3). We find no significant relationship between grade di erence and
these occupational characteristics. However, as expected, we find a clear positive association
with average earnings in the occupation, apprenticeship pay, and a negative correlation with
unemployment risk when using the math grade level (similarly for German grade level; see
panel B), indicating that better students do choose better paid and safer occupations. In con-
trast, these level e ects are eliminated when looking at the grade di erence betweenmath
and German. Finally, we find that individuals with a higher math grade rank are significantly
more satisfied with their apprenticeship occupation (column 4).17
4.4.2 Parental occupation
The positive association between grade di erence andmath intensity of chosen occupation
might arise if omitted factors both a ect the grade di erence and the probability of choosing a
math-intensive occupation. Importantly, research shows that parents’ occupations are related
to their children’s occupation (Constant and Zimmermann, 2004; Hellerstein and Morrill, 2011).
Parents with math-intensive occupations might use their professional network to find an
apprenticeship position in a math-intensive occupation for their child and simultaneously
support their children more in math than in German. Such subject-specific support might
not be completely reflected in the child’s math achievement, but may a ect grades, which
also reflect active participation in class, among other things. To assess the role of parents’
occupations, we control for parents’ occupation by using the occupation of themother or father
that minimizes the di erence in the two-digit ISCO classification from the occupation of the
child (regardless of one-digit classification).18 Table 4.3 shows that our coe icient of interest
does not change when we include parents’ occupation, indicating that parental occupation
does not drive this association.
17 Individuals are asked about satisfaction with their apprenticeship position on a yearly basis. From 2011
onward, the relationship with grade di erence is positive and statistically significant in four out of five years
and has about the samemagnitude as in column 4.
18 Alternative measures, such as using the higher-ranked parental occupation, lead to similar findings. We have
no information of parents’ occupation for about 25 percent of the individuals in our sample. We include a
dummy for missing parents’ occupation so as to retain keep all individuals in our sample. However, results
do not change if we exclude individuals with missing parental occupation information.
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4.4.3 Grade dierence as signal of own subject-specific ability
Since we compare individuals who attended the same school and we control for the absolute
achievement level, variation in grade di erence (i.e., di erences in grade ranks betweenmath
and German) may arise via two channels. First, di erences in class participation might drive
di erences in grade ranks because more intensive class participation typically leads to a better
grade, conditional on achievement. Second, conditional on own achievement, di erences in
classmates’ achievement leads to di erent grades because teachers use relative grading.19
That is, higher-achieving classmates in math, ceteris paribus, lead to a lower achievement rank
in math, and therefore to a worse math grade and lower math grade rank.
We exploit idiosyncratic di erences in classroom composition within the same school to use
classmates’ average achievement (more precisely, the di erence betweenmath and reading
achievement) as an instrument for a given student’s grade di erence. To illustrate: we com-
pare student 1 to student 2, who are in two di erent classrooms, A and B, in the same school.
Student 1 and student 2 have the same achievement in math and reading. Compared to class
B, class A, on average, performs worse in math than in reading. Therefore, student 1 (in class A)
tends to receive a better math grade and therefore a signal that she is talented in math as she
obtains a higher grade rank in math than in German.
Figure C-4 in the appendix depicts the first-stage relationship. As expected, the grade di erence
becomes smaller, that is, the ownmath grade rank lower, when classmates perform better in
math. Table 4.5, column 1, presents the regression results of the first stage. Grade di erence
and the di erence in classmates’ achievement in math and reading are strongly negatively
correlated and the F-statistic of the excluded instrument is large (about 27). Despite the fact
that classmates’ relative achievement is a strong predictor of a given student’s own grade
di erence, the instrument is completely unrelated to themath intensity of chosen occupations,
with coe icients being close to zero; see the reduced-form results in columns 2-7. Since there is
no reduced-form relationship, the IV results are also close to zero and statistically insignificant
(table C-4 in the appendix).
To ensure that this finding is not due to the fact that students simply do not react to their
grade di erence at all, we use the same instrument and investigate whether a student’s grade
di erence a ects her academic self-concept . Table C-3 in the appendix shows that there is a
positive e ect of a student’s grade di erence on the level of her academic self-concept in math
(column 1) and on the di erence in academic self-concept of math and German. This finding
19 Under relative grading, also known as “grading on a curve,” students’ grades depend on their positions, that
is, their ordinal rank, in the class’s achievement distribution.
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suggests that students do react to grade di erences: students with better math grades ranks
than German grade ranks are more confident in their math skills. However, the former finding
suggests that students do not use their grade di erence as a signal of own subject-specific
ability when choosing an occupation.
4.4.4 The role of employers
When investigating determinants of occupations, one issue is that observed occupations de-
pend on both firms and job seekers. While job seekers choose occupations, firms must also
hire them for the desired occupation. To understand the underlyingmechanism, it is important
to disentangle supply-side from demand-side e ects. Since our focus is on the determinants of
individuals’ occupation choices, we want to isolate the supply-side e ect. The NEPS dataset
enables doing so since students in 9th grade, before applying to apprenticeship positions, also
report their dream jobs, which should be una ected by firms.20
Table 4.4 shows that the coe icient on the grade di erence is almost the same when using
dream jobs instead of actual occupations. (Because the dream job sample is considerably
smaller as many students did not report a dream job, we replicated the baseline results for
the reduced sample in panel B.) This finding indicates that the relationship between grade
di erence andmath intensity of observed occupation is driven by individuals’ choices, not by
employers reacting to the grade di erences on individuals’ resumes when they apply for a job.
4.4.5 Di erences in tastes
Since research suggests that di erences in tastes across individuals are an important deter-
minant of occupational choice—which prior studies have only indirectly inferred based on
residual components (Altonji et al., 2012; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012, 2014) — we
directly control for tastes. We observe measures of subject interest in math and German and
general measures of individuals’ social interests as well as practical-technical interests, which
were reported before applying for jobs. The subject-specific interests come from three to four
statements on math and German activities that relate to what students do and like in their
leisure time (not in school).21 General interests are reported for the domains of conventional,
intellectual/researching, artistic/language, practical-technical, social, and entrepreneurial
20 At the 3-digit ISCO level, 30percent of individuals start an apprenticeship in their stateddream joboccupation;
at the 2-digit level, this is true for 34 percent and at the 1-digit level for 57 percent of individuals.
21 The statements for math interest are: "I enjoy figuring out a mathematical problem"; "When I amworking on
a mathematical problem, it may happen that I do not notice how time flies"; "If I can learn new things in
mathematics, I amwilling to spendmy leisure time on it"; and "Mathematics is one of the most important
things to me." The statements for German interest are: "It means a lot to me to get more familiar with the
German language and literature"; "I very much enjoy learning new things about myself and the world when
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interests. We use the indices on practical-technical interests and on social interests.22 These
measures allow us to directly investigate the importance of (stated) tastes for occupational
choice, and in particular whether heterogeneity in tastes across individuals explains the posi-
tive association between grade di erence andmath-intensity of chosen occupation.
In panel A of table 4.6 we include three dummies for math interest, three dummies for German-
language interest, and four dummies, respectively, for each dimension of practical-technical
and social interests. Controlling for individuals’ tastes completely eliminates the positive and
significant coe icient on grade di erence (while not a ecting standard errors). The coe icients
on the di erent levels of practical-technical interests and on social interests are plotted in
figure 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Figure 4.2 shows that individuals with higher practical-technical
interests choose more math-intensive occupations. (The omitted category is “very little inter-
est.”) The opposite is true for social interests: the higher the level of social interests, the lower
the math intensity of the chosen occupation (figure 4.3).
In contrast to existing studies that do not observe tastes, these results provide direct evidence
on the important role of tastes for occupational choice. Since the coe icient on grade di er-
ence essentially becomes zero, the association between grade di erence andmath intensity of
chosen occupation largely reflects di erences in individual tastes for certain fields (e.g., math).
Interestingly, these interests are only weakly correlated with individuals’ achievement. For
example, the math-specific interest andmath achievement are only correlated with r = 0.11
and practical-technical interests andmath achievement with r = 0.17.
However, these findings do not tell us whether the grade di erence a ects interests or whether
interests a ect the grade di erence. Unfortunately, we cannot answer this question with
the data at hand since we observe grade di erence and interests at the same time and only
once. However, we provide some evidence that tastes are influenced by a student’s environ-
ment. Assuming that classes within schools are formed quasi-randomly,23 we can exploit
reading books"; and "I am prepared to use part of my leisure time to get to know the German language
and literature better." For each statement, students can choose between "doesn’t apply at all" (1), "hardly
applies" (2), "partly applies" (3), and "completely applies" (4).
22 The activities for these interests are: Practical-technical: "setting up or putting things together"; "building
something according to a plan/sketch"; and "working with/making something out of metal/wood." Social
interests include the following three items: "supporting the matters of concern of others"; "helping sick
people"; and "looking a!er children or adults in needof help". For each activity, students can choose between
"I have very little interest in that; I do not like to do that at all" (1), "I have little interest in that" (2), "I am
somewhat interested in that" (3), "I am rather interested in that" (4), or "I am very interested in that; I like
to do that a lot" (5). Note that results are very similar if we additionally include the indices for the other
interests: conventional, entrepreneurial, artistic/language, and scientific/analytic interest.
23 In future research, wewill investigatewhether classes are formedquasi-randomlywithin schoolswith respect
to students’ practical-technical interests and social interests.
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classmates’ (average) interests as an instrument for a given student’s interests. We find that a
student’s practical-technical interests are strongly related to her classmates’ average practical-
technical interests (F-statistic on the excluded instrument is about 25). Using classmates’
average practical-technical interests as an instrument, we find a significant e ect of practical-
technical interests on occupational choice (table 4.7). This e ect is robust to including class-
mates’ average math achievement (panel B).24 Note, however, that this result may also arise if
great (or lousy) math teachers influence the tastes of all students in the classroom. In this case,
we would also observe an association between a given student’s interests and her classmates’
interests. But most importantly, in both cases—classmates’ influence or teachers a ecting all
students in the class—this finding suggests that interests can be shaped by the environment
and that tastes have an e ect on occupational choice.
4.5 Conclusion
We study the determinants of occupational choice among apprenticeship trainees in Germany.
We find that the di erence betweenmath and German grade is significantly associatedwith the
math intensity of the chosen occupation. Comparing only individuals who graduated from the
same school, we find that this robust association cannot be explained by any of the following
potential factors: individuals’ absolute achievement inmath and reading; parents’ occupations;
individuals using the grade di erence as a signal of their subject-specific ability; or employers
using the grade di erence as a signal of an applicant’s relative skills. However, we find that
di erences in tastes across individuals, measured before entering the labormarket, completely
explain this association.
While the literature on occupational choice, which does not observe tastes directly, suggests
that individuals’ di erences in tastes are the most important factor in choice of field of study,
we observe various measures of individuals’ tastes. We find that practical-technical interests
and social interests are strongly associated with occupational choice: individuals with strong
practical-technical interests are substantiallymore likely to choosemath-intensive occupations,
whereas individuals with strong social interests are substantially less likely to choose math-
intensive occupations. This finding provides direct evidence on the crucial role of tastes for
occupational choice.
24 We do not find a causal relationship for social interests, even though the instrument is even stronger in this
case.
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4.6 Figures and tables
Figure 4.1 : Grade di erence andmath skill level of occupation
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Notes: Thebinscatterplot shows thecorrelationofmath intensityofoccupationsmeasured in levels anddi erences
of skills of workers in an occupation and grade di erence. The average skills of workers are calculated in 3-digit
ISCO classified occupations from the NEPS SC6 adult sample. grade di erence is grade rankmath - grade rank
German. The le! figure shows the correlation for math skill level, the right figure the correlation for the di erence
in skill levels (math-reading). The correlation is conditional on school fixed e ects and individual achievement in
math and reading. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Figure 4.2 : Relationship between practical/technical interests andmath skill level of occupation
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coefficients on practical/technical interests 95% CI
Notes: The figure shows the beta coe icients of the four dimensions of practical/technical interest (compared to
no practical/technical interest). The coe icients stem from estimating equation 4.1 includingmeasures for subject
interest and four dummies for practical/technical and social interest in our basic specification. The le! figure
shows the e ects onmath skill level of workers in occupations, the right figure the e ects on themath-reading
skill levels of workers in occupations. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Figure 4.3 : Relationship between social interests andmath skill level of occupation
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coefficients on social interests 95% CI
Notes: The figure shows the beta coeicients of the four dimensions of social interest (compared to no social
interest). The coeicients stem from estimating equation 4.1 including measures for subject interest and four
dummies for practical/technical and social interest in our basic specification. The le figure shows the eects on
math skill level of workers in occupations, the right figure the eects on the math-reading skill levels of workers in
occupations. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table 4.1 : Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Student-level characteristics
Grade di erence 0.04 0.35 -1 1
Math achievement -0.00 1.00 -4 4.9
Reading achievement -0.00 1.00 -3.7 3.2
Female 0.47 0.50 0 1
Migration background 0.23 0.42 0 1
Class size 17.82 5.72 6 35
Practical/technical interest 2.91 1.18 1 5
Social interest 3.06 1.07 1 5
Occupation characteristics (outcomes)
Math skill level of workers in occupation -0.22 0.32 -1.4 1
Skill level di erence of workers in occupation 0.03 0.35 -.69 .94
Math requirements in occupation: basic/advanced 0.98 0.26 .15 1.9
Math requirements in occupation 0.74 0.13 .15 1
Advancedmath requirements in occupation 0.24 0.15 0 .88
Di erence in math requirements in occupation -0.31 0.39 -1.5 .67
Gross hourly wage 17.02 3.71 8.3 41
Monthly apprenticeship pay 790.01 155.29 269 1,125
Unemployment rate in percent 8.43 5.99 .4 39
Satisfaction with apprenticeship position 2012/13 8.27 1.64 0 10
Observations 5045
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for our control and outcome variables. The math skill level and the skill level di erence of workers stem from
calculations with the NEPS Adult cohort. The math requirements of an occupation stem from the Qualification and Career Survey. Section 4.2 describes
these variables in detail. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table 4.2 : Grade dierence andmath intensity of occupations: Baseline results
Skills of workers in occupation Requirements in occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math-reading Math Math (binary) Advancedmath Math-language
Panel A. Baseline Results - without controls for achievement
Grade dierence 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.0938∗∗∗ 0.0667∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0376∗∗∗ 0.0990∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0129) (0.0113) (0.00566) (0.00634) (0.0156)
Observations 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.259 0.387 0.267 0.219 0.288 0.355
Panel B. Baseline Results - with achievement controls
Grade dierence 0.0547∗∗∗ 0.0871∗∗∗ 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0871∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0130) (0.0116) (0.00580) (0.00657) (0.0160)
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.266 0.389 0.270 0.221 0.291 0.359
Panel C. Baseline Results - incl. math grade levels
Grade dierence -0.0144 0.0716∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗ 0.0137∗ 0.0159∗∗ 0.0926∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0153) (0.0144) (0.00728) (0.00797) (0.0193)
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.280 0.390 0.274 0.224 0.295 0.361
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test p-value math 0.043 0.547 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.040
F-test p-value reading 0.012 0.554 0.639 0.938 0.473 0.006
Mean outcome -0.223 0.027 0.977 0.737 0.240 -0.313
SD outcome 0.316 0.345 0.262 0.126 0.148 0.388
Notes: The table shows the estimated coeicient of grade dierence obtained from regressing equation 4.1. In panel A achievement is not controlled for. Panel B shows results for our main
specification which controls for math and reading achievement linearly, squared, and cubic. In panel C dummies for the math grade level are added. All regressions include school fixed
eects, individual (year of birth, quarter of birth, being female, migration background, class size) and family (number of books at home, highest parental education) controls. Standard errors
are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table 4.3 : Grade dierence andmath intensity of occupation: controlling for parents’ occupation
Skills of workers in occupation Requirements in occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math-reading Math Math (binary) Advancedmath Math-language
Grade dierence 0.0556∗∗∗ 0.0847∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0814∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0130) (0.0117) (0.00585) (0.00661) (0.0161)
Observations 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.276 0.396 0.280 0.231 0.301 0.369
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean outcome -0.223 0.027 0.977 0.737 0.240 -0.313
SD outcome 0.316 0.345 0.262 0.126 0.148 0.388
Notes: The table shows the estimated coeicient of grade dierence controlling in equation 4.1 additionally for the occupation of parents. We use the
occupation (if both parents report an occupation) with the minimal distance to the occupation of the child on the 2-digit level (regardless of the 1-digit
level). All regressions include school fixed eects, individual (year of birth, quarter of birth, being female, migration background, class size) and family
(number of books at home, highest parental education) controls. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data
source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
105
4
P
red
ictin
g
C
h
o
ice
o
fM
ath
-In
ten
sive
O
ccu
p
atio
n
s
Table 4.4 : Grade dierence andmath intensity of occupation: using individuals’ dream jobs
Skills of workers in occupation Requirements in occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math-reading Math Math (binary) Advancedmath Math-language
Panel A. Dream job
Math talent signal 0.0629∗∗ 0.0798∗∗∗ 0.0536∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0830∗∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0209) (0.0154) (0.00787) (0.00878) (0.0223)
Observations 2615 2612 2549 2549 2549 2549
R2 0.345 0.415 0.354 0.303 0.375 0.409
Panel B. Actual occupation using dream job sample
Math talent signal 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0891∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0810∗∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0193) (0.0162) (0.00807) (0.00901) (0.0237)
Observations 2615 2611 2615 2615 2615 2615
R2 0.346 0.456 0.346 0.301 0.366 0.430
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean outcome -0.139 0.038 0.969 0.732 0.237 -0.350
SD outcome 0.384 0.348 0.252 0.121 0.143 0.382
Notes: The table estimates equation 4.1 for the dream job occupation characteristics of the individuals reported in 9th grade (panel A). Panel B re-estimates
the results of table 4.2, panel B, in the reduced sample of individuals who report a dream job. All regressions include school fixed eects, individual (year
of birth, quarter of birth, being female, migration background, class size) and family (number of books at home, highest parental education) controls.
Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table 4.5 : Exploiting quasi-random variation in grade dierence (first stage and reduced form)
First stage Skills of workers in occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Grade di. Math Math-reading Math Math (binary) Advancedmath Math-language
average peer achievement: -0.129∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.005 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.020
math-reading (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.020) (0.010) (0.011) (0.031)
Math, reading Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(squared, cubic)
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4923 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.202 0.263 0.383 0.266 0.217 0.287 0.354
Mean outcome 0.036 -0.223 0.027 0.977 0.737 0.240 -0.313
SD outcome 0.347 0.316 0.345 0.262 0.126 0.148 0.388
Notes: The table shows in column 1 results of the first stage regressing the dierence in the grade rank in math and reading on the dierence of peer
achievement inmath and reading. Column 2-7 show the reduced form of regressing the instrument average peer achievement di erence onmath intensity
of occupations. The F-statistic of the instrument is about 27. All regressions include school fixed eects, individual (year of birth, quarter of birth, being
female, migration background, class size) and family (number of books at home, highest parental education) controls. Standard errors are clustered on
school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table 4.6 : Grade dierence andmath intensity of occupation: controlling for interests
Skills of workers in occupation Requirements in occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math-reading Math Math (binary) Advancedmath Math-language
Panel A. Includingmeasures for interest
Grade dierence 0.00542 0.0274∗ 0.0205 0.0112∗ 0.00931 0.0297
(0.0169) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.00659) (0.00765) (0.0186)
Observations 4417 4409 4417 4417 4417 4417
R2 0.297 0.450 0.332 0.275 0.351 0.422
Panel B.R2 from regressions including only interest measures
Observations 4487 4479 4487 4487 4487 4487
R2 0.105 0.289 0.194 0.141 0.210 0.270
Panel C.R2 from regressions including interest measures and school FE
Observations 4487 4479 4487 4487 4487 4487
R2 0.258 0.383 0.301 0.255 0.313 0.370
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean outcome -0.221 0.024 0.976 0.737 0.239 -0.319
SD outcome 0.316 0.344 0.261 0.126 0.148 0.389
Notes: The table shows the coeicient of grade di erence if subject interests, the dimensions of practical/technical interest and social interest are
controlled for (panel A). Panel B and panel C showwithR2 the explanatory power of interests for math intensity of chosen occupations. Panel A and
panel C include school fixed eects. In panel A we control for individual (year of birth, quarter of birth, being female, migration background, class size)
and family (number of books at home, highest parental education) characteristics. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table 4.7 : Eect of practical/technical interests on occupational choice: instrumenting own interest with peer interests
Skills of workers in occupation Requirements in occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math-reading Math Math (binary) Advancedmath Math-language
Panel A. Baseline results
practical/technical interest 0.0440∗ 0.0692∗∗∗ 0.0400∗ 0.0171 0.0229∗ 0.0486∗
(0.0230) (0.0236) (0.0212) (0.0104) (0.0120) (0.0276)
Observations 4710 4702 4710 4710 4710 4710
F-statistic 25.283 25.144 25.283 25.283 25.283 25.283
R2 0.130 0.330 0.181 0.122 0.206 0.285
Panel B. Controlling for average peer achievement math
practical/technical interest 0.0480∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0407∗∗ 0.0170∗ 0.0237∗∗ 0.0404
(0.0226) (0.0231) (0.0199) (0.00978) (0.0112) (0.0267)
Observations 4710 4702 4710 4710 4710 4710
F-statistic 30.433 30.388 30.433 30.433 30.433 30.433
R2 0.129 0.330 0.181 0.122 0.206 0.281
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean outcome -0.223 0.024 0.976 0.736 0.239 -0.316
SD outcome 0.317 0.344 0.262 0.127 0.148 0.388
Notes: The table shows the relation betweenmath intensity of occupations and own interests with an IV approach. Own interests (practical/technical) are instrumented by the average level
of interest of all peers. The first-stage F-statistic is reported in the third row of each panel. Panel A shows the baseline results. Panel B controls in the IV setting for average peer achievement
in math. Panel C controls for own grade levels in math. Panel D controls for the grade dierence. All regressions include school fixed eects, individual (year of birth, quarter of birth, being
female, migration background, class size) and family (number of books at home, highest parental education) controls. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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4.7 Appendix C
Figure C-1 : Histogram of grade di erence
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Notes: The figure shows in a histogram the distribution of our main explanatory variable: grade di erence=grade
rankmath - grade rank German. The dark orange line gives a normal distribution. The value -1 is reached if the
student is the best student in German but worst in math. The value +1 is reached if the student is the best in math
but the worst in German. The value 0means that the student has the same rank inmath and German. Data source:
NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Figure C-2 : Grade dierence andmath skill requirements in occupation
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Notes: The binscatter plot shows the correlation of grade dierence andmath intensity of occupationsmeasured in
levels and dierences of skill requirements in an occupation. The skill requirements are calculated in 3-digit ISCO
classified occupations from the Qualification and Career Survey (QaC). The le figure shows the correlation with
math skill requirements, the right figure the correlation with the dierence in skill requirements (math-German).
The correlation is conditional on school fixed eects and individual achievement inmath and reading. Data source:
NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Figure C-3 : Achievement dierence andmath skill level of occupation
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Notes: The bin-scatter plot shows the correlation of math skill levels of workers in 3-digit ISCO classified occupa-
tions from the NEPS SC6 adult sample and the dierence in math and reading achievement. The correlation is
conditional on school fixed eects. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Figure C-4 : Dierence in average peer achievement and grade dierence (first stage)
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Notes: The bin-scatter plot shows the correlation of grade dierence and the dierence in the average peer
achievement (math-reading). This is the correlation we exploit in the first stage of the IV setting in table 4.5. The
correlation is conditional on own achievement in math and reading and contains school fixed eects. Data source:
NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table C-1 : Relation between grades andmath intensity of occupation
Skills of workers in occupation Requirements in occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math-reading Math Math dummy Advancedmath Math-language
Panel A. Dierence in grades
Grade di erence (absolute) 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗
(0.00573) (0.00557) (0.00446) (0.00223) (0.00255) (0.00643)
Observations 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.269 0.390 0.273 0.223 0.293 0.360
Panel B. Math grade
Grademath 0.137∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0720∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0417∗∗∗ 0.0346∗
(0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0130) (0.00644) (0.00736) (0.0188)
Observations 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.276 0.386 0.271 0.221 0.292 0.355
Panel C. German grade
Grade German 0.0576∗∗∗ -0.0461∗∗∗ -0.00958 -0.00584 -0.00373 -0.0863∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.00737) (0.00813) (0.0194)
Observations 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.266 0.384 0.266 0.217 0.287 0.358
Panel D. Math and German grade
Grade German 0.0186 -0.0756∗∗∗ -0.0342∗∗ -0.0164∗∗ -0.0178∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0163) (0.0154) (0.00769) (0.00852) (0.0203)
Grade math 0.131∗∗∗ 0.0990∗∗∗ 0.0825∗∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0471∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0135) (0.00671) (0.00774) (0.0194)
Observations 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.276 0.389 0.272 0.222 0.293 0.359
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean outcome -0.223 0.027 0.977 0.737 0.240 -0.313
SD outcome 0.316 0.345 0.262 0.126 0.148 0.388
Notes: The table explores the general relation between math intensity of chosen occupations and grades or grade di erences. Panel A uses the raw
di erence of math and German grades - no ranks. Panel B includes the math grade linearly. Panel C includes the German grade linearly. Panel D includes
the math and the German grade linearly. All regressions include school fixed e ects, individual (year of birth, quarter of birth, being female, migration
background, class size) and family (number of books at home, highest parental education) controls. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * =
p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table C-2 : Grade dierence and other occupational characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gross hourly wage Monthly apprenticeship pay Unemployment rate Satisfaction apprenticeship 2012/13
Panel A. Grade dierence
Grade dierence 0.136 9.891 -0.213 0.287∗∗∗
(0.164) (8.389) (0.283) (0.108)
Observations 4844 4083 4917 2800
R2 0.222 0.181 0.185 0.182
Panel B. Math and German grades
German grade 0.406∗∗∗ 6.663 -0.383∗∗ -0.0666
(0.0963) (4.522) (0.163) (0.0633)
Math grade 0.456∗∗∗ 15.17∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.0746) (3.697) (0.122) (0.0501)
Observations 4844 4083 4917 2800
R2 0.237 0.187 0.192 0.184
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean outcome 17.039 791.360 8.410 8.274
SD outcome 3.716 155.434 5.999 1.640
Notes: The table shows the relation of grade dierence and other occupational characteristics: the gross hourly wage of an occupation, themonthly
apprenticeship pay, the unemployment rate (these variables stem from oicial sources - see section 4.2 for details), and the satisfaction level with the
apprenticeship position (i.e. the occupation) reported in NEPS. Panel A shows coeicients for grade dierence, panel B for the math and German grade.
All regressions include school fixed eects, individual (year of birth, quarter of birth, being female, migration background, class size) and family (number
of books at home, highest parental education) controls. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source:
NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table C-3 : Eect of grade dierence on academic self concept - IV: average peer achievement math-reading
(1) (2)
Math Math-German
Grade dierence 1.594∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗
(0.521) (0.573)
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes
F-statistic 27.426 27.426
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes
Observations 4923 4923
R2 0.325 0.313
Mean outcome 2.326 -0.020
SD outcome 0.990 1.038
Notes: The table reports coeicients for the causal eect of grade dierence on an index of academic self concept in math (column 1) and the dierence
of academic self concept (math-German) (column 2). The coeicients stem from an IV regression using the average peer achievement dierence
(math-reading) as instrument for the own grade dierence (as in table 4.5/C-4). All regressions include school fixed eects, individual (year of birth,
quarter of birth, being female, migration background, class size) and family (number of books at home, highest parental education) controls. Standard
errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
116
4
P
red
ictin
g
C
h
o
ice
o
fM
ath
-In
ten
sive
O
ccu
p
atio
n
s
Table C-4 : Exploiting quasi-random variation in grade dierence (IV)
Skills of workers in occupation Requirements in occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math-reading Math Math dummy Advancedmath Math-language
Grade dierence 0.024 0.037 -0.050 -0.021 -0.029 -0.155
(0.178) (0.196) (0.148) (0.073) (0.083) (0.224)
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 27.426 26.616 27.426 27.426 27.426 27.426
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4923 4915 4923 4923 4923 4923
R2 0.125 0.291 0.145 0.095 0.169 0.211
Mean outcome -0.223 0.027 0.977 0.737 0.240 -0.313
SD outcome 0.316 0.345 0.262 0.126 0.148 0.388
Notes: The table shows the results of the IV regression of table 4.5. The F-statistic of the first stage is reported in the fourth row. Grade dierence is
instrumented by average peer achievement dierence (math-reading). All regressions include school fixed eects, individual (year of birth, quarter of
birth, being female, migration background, class size) and family (number of books at home, highest parental education) controls. Standard errors are
clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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Table C-5 : Eect of interests on grades from pre-observational period
Grade dierence Grade levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math German Math German
math interests leisure 0.305∗∗∗ 0.020 0.194∗∗∗ -0.019
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
German interests leisure -0.070∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
practical/technical interests -0.025∗∗ -0.002 -0.017 0.000
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
social interests -0.020 0.007 -0.006 0.011
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Grade dierence 0.772∗∗∗ -0.685∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.035)
Math, reading (squared, cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family indiv.+family
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4379 4361 4379 4361
R2 0.480 0.324 0.603 0.447
Mean outcome 2.690 2.756 2.690 2.756
SD outcome 0.880 0.702 0.880 0.702
Notes: The table explores the relation between grade dierence and grade levels and interests. The outcome variable are an intensity of approval that the
individual always had good grades in math resp. German. All regression control for either the actual grade dierence or the actual grade levels such that
the outcome should capture previous grades from an unobserved period. The subject specific interests are:math interests leisure and German interests
leisure. All regressions include school fixed eects, individual (year of birth, quarter of birth, being female, migration background, class size) and family
(number of books at home, highest parental education) controls. Standard errors are clustered on school level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Data
source: NEPS SC4 9.0.0.
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5 Long-Term Consequences of Inequality: Evidence
fromHistorical Inheritance Rules*
5.1 Introduction
One of the oldest debates in economics concerns the eect of inequality on growth and de-
velopment see, e.g. Kuznets (1955). Howwould growth prospects change if income or wealth
were counterfactually distributedmore evenly? The answer to this question has become partic-
ularly relevant in recent decades due to rising levels of inequality, especially wealth inequality
(Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2015-2017; Piketty and Saez, 2014; Alvaredo,
Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2013). Yet, the debate has remained largely unresolved due to the
scarcity of suitable data and credible research designs allowing for an estimation of causally
interpretable eects, as variations in inequality likely correlate with drivers of growth (Banerjee
and Duflo, 2003).
We contribute to the resolution of this debate by leveraging sharp geographic variation in
institutions that govern how resources are passed from parents to children. Specifically, we
analyze the relationship between historical inheritance rules for land, inequality, and develop-
ment in Germany from before the Industrial Revolution until today. Historical inheritance rules
for agricultural land varied sharply within Germany and prescribed either equal or unequal
division of land among a decendent’s children. In unequal division areas agricultural property
was considered indivisible and had to be passed on to a single heir. In contrast, agricultural land
had to be divided equally among all children in equal division areas. The canonical economic
theories of inheritance rules (Stiglitz, 1969; Menchik, 1980; Chu, 1991) make a strong predic-
tion that wealth would bemore evenly distributed under an equal division regime, therefore
implying that dierences in inheritance rules lead to variation in the distribution of wealth.
For our study, we analyze the relationship between inheritance rules, inequality, and develop-
ment in a geographic regression discontinuity (RD) design, exploiting variation in inheritance
rules that is uncorrelated with other drivers of growth. We analyze data based on fine-grained
historical surveys on the local prevalence of inheritance rules see e.g., Sering (1897) that we
digitized and geocoded for the historical county-level of Germany. Broadly speaking, equal
division of agricultural land was prevalent in parts of Southern and Western Germany and the
* This chapter is based on joint work with Simon Jäger and Johannes Eigner. We thank Oliver Falck who was a
co-author at an earlier stage of this project for ideas, comments, and suggestions.
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boundary between the two inheritance rule regimes traverses political, linguistic, geological,
and religious borders. The geographic prevalence of the di erent inheritance rule regimesdates
back to the Middle Ages (Rösener, 2012) and is plausibly connected to the sphere of influence
of the Salian Frankish civil law code (507 AD), which prescribed an equal split of assets among
male o spring (Behrend, 1897).1 To estimate the relationship between inheritance rules and
longer-term outcomes, we hone in on counties close to the boundary between equal and un-
equal division areas in an RD design following Dell (2010). We show that predictors of long-term
development and also of a particular inheritance rule regime are smooth at the boundary,
thereby suggesting that the variation in inheritance rules that we analyze is idiosyncratic and
not systematically related to other drivers of growth.
We document that ownership of land–the key store of wealth in an agricultural society–was
more concentrated in unequal division areas, showing that inheritance rules indeed a ect the
inequality of landed wealth. This finding is non-trivial as a Coasean argument would suggest
that inter vivos land transactions may lead to concentrated land ownership in equal division
areas if transaction costs were low and concentrated ownership were optimal. Drawing on
county-level Prussian data from before the onset of the Industrial Revolution see Becker, Cin-
nirella, Hornung, and Woessmann (2012), we show that landholding inequality in the early
1800s was lower in equal division areas, which featured roughly a quarter SDs more landhold-
ings per population. Towards the end of the 19th centurywhen detailed landownership data for
the entire German empireweremeasured (Ziblatt, 2008), we find evenmore pronounced e ects
with equal division areas featuring 0.8 to 0.9 SDs more small landholdings and 0.6 SDs fewer
large landholdings.2 We further find that over time landholding inequality increasedmore in
unequal division areas compared to equal division areas. All in all, our results on inequality
in the 19th century paint a picture of di erences in inheritance rules leading to substantial
di erences in inequality. However, usingmodern tax data we do not find significant di erences
in the distribution of earnings anymore. This suggests that the higher level of equality did not
persist until today.
We next investigate whether di erences in inequality between equal and unequal division
areas are associated with di erences in long-term growth and find that modern income and
GDP levels are 6 to 14 percent higher in equal division areas. The robust positive relationship
between equal division inheritance andmodern growth outcomes is particularly remarkable
1 In section 2, we describe other theories on the origin of equal and unequal division rules in greater detail.
2 The stronger association between landholding inequality and inheritance rules towards the end of the 19th
century compared to the beginning of the century could indicate that the rapid population growth in between
contributed to stronger e ects. To illustrate, in a society with only one child per family equal or unequal
division would lead to the same distribution of wealth while di erences would bemuchmore pronounced in
large families.
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as observable determinants of long-term growth are smooth at the boundary between the
two inheritance regimes while actual growth outcomes di er discontinuously. Using a variety
of data sources on growth and economic development before the Industrial Revolution, we
further find no evidence that equal division areas hadmore advantageous starting conditions.
Agricultural productivity measured directly was not significantly higher. Similarly, urban popu-
lation and population density in general did not di er until the beginning of the 20th century.
Early measures for technology and industrialization are, if anything, lower in equal division
areas. Last but not least, general education levels hardly di ered at the beginning of the 19th
century. At a county level, the data therefore show a robust correlation between lower levels of
wealth inequality in the 19th century–associatedwith an equal division inheritance regime–and
favorable long-term outcomes and allow us to rule out a variety of potential confounders.
Why might a more even wealth distribution spur long-term growth? An influential body of
literature hypothesizes that the distribution of wealth a ects long-term growth through its
e ect on investment decisions and the occupational choice of individuals see, e.g., Galor and
Zeira (1993); Banerjee and Newman (1993); Ghatak and Nien-Huei Jiang (2002); Galor andMoav
(2004). In such models, individuals have the choice between, e.g., subsistence farming and
becoming a skilled worker or entrepreneur. Compared to a situation in which a large part of the
population has essentially no wealth, a more even distribution of wealth can alleviate credit
constraints in parts of the population or provide a bu er to absorb the potential risks of inno-
vating, investing in human capital, or becoming an entrepreneur, all of which have favorable
consequences for growth. Consistentwith inheritance rules a ecting long-termgrowth through
suchmechanisms, Ferdinand vonWeckherlin, the Finance Minister in the Kingdom of Wuert-
temberg, argued that Wuerttemberg’s economic strength at the time was ”the unconditionally
permissible division of landed property. On property of paltry size, the industriousness, thri
and ingenuity of the owner blossoms. He nourishes himself in the character of a businessman
[Gewerbsmann], indeed, he becomes [. . . ] a business man. [. . . ] No matter where one looks, one
finds everywhere industrious artisans, highly skilled manufacturers and thoughtful merchants.
That is the character of industry in this land. [. . . ] Supported by their small farms they are at least
able to salvage ameager existence until luck or genius brings to them better times” see Herrigel
(2000). The quote lends support to themechanisms hypothesized in the literature and suggests
that occupational choice and entrepreneurship could bemechanisms through which a more
even distribution of landed wealth contributed to long-term growth.
We investigate the hypothesizedmechanisms empirically drawing on our RD design and find
that occupational choice indeed diered between equal and unequal division areas as pre-
dicted by themodels. Specifically, we find that higher shares of the population in equal division
areas–with a more even land distribution–worked in manufacturing as well as in trade and ser-
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vices from industrialization on. The additional employment inmanufacturing is fully accounted
for by employment in particularly innovative sectors with high patenting activity defined as
in Streb, Baten, and Yin (2006), which command a 36 percent higher employment share in
equal division areas. We also find that self-employment out of agriculture is slightly higher in
equal division areas as well as the density of middle schools which addressed students who
want to become an apprentice. Finally, patenting activity was higher in equal division areas.
Overall, the data suggest that a more even distribution of wealth enabled workers to take up
new opportunities in a changing economy.
Our findings are in line with the literature on landholding inequality and economic growth.
Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) formalize in a theoretical model that a more equal land dis-
tribution supports the rise of a new entrepreneurial elite during industrialization. The en-
trepreneurial elite then supports education of the former unskilled labor force. Data on educa-
tion spending during the high-school movement in the US delivers evidence for that model.
Similarly, Cinnirella and Hornung (2016) find for Prussia a negative cross-sectional relationship
between large landholdings and primary school enrollment rates throughout the 19th century.
With our findings that equal division counties are characterized by higher innovative activity
andmore self-employed people out of agriculture, we deliver evidence that a more equal land
distribution fosters the rise of a new entrepreneurial elite and with that economic growth.
More broadly, our study builds on several additional strands of the literature. We add causal
evidence to the literature on the long-term e ects of historical conditions on the economic
development see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson (2001); Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004); Nunn (2009);
Alesina, Giuliano, andNunn (2013) aswell as to a body of literature studying the determinants of
growth at the regional level see, e.g., Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1992); Long and
Shleifer (1993); Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2013) and to the literature
on the economic and political consequences of landholding inequality see, e.g., Gerschenkron
(1966); Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan (2005); Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubín, and Robinson
(2007); Ziblatt (2008); Becker, Cinnirella, and Woessmann (2010); Bleakley and Ferrie (2013). In
addition, our study builds on previous research on industrialization in Germany see, e.g., Ger-
schenkron (1989); Tilly (1969); Herrigel (2000). Related to our work, Duranton, Rodríguez-Pose,
and Sandall (2009) correlate the regional prevalence of particular medieval family types with
long-run outcomes across European regions. Contrary to our findings, they observe lower GDP
levels in what wewould classify as equal division areas. Similarly, the authors find higher levels
of manufacturing and lower levels of service sector employment in what we would classify as
equal division areas. These di erences in the results might arise from di erences in methodol-
ogy as their analysis relies on a broader, cross-regional comparison. Habakkuk (1955) analyzes
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the role of family structures focusing primarily on population growth. He hypothesizes that
single-heir systems slow population growth whereas equal sharing rules foster it. With regard
to mobility, Habakkuk (1955) argues that unequal division areas facedmore out-migration as
non-inheriting children had fewer ties to the parental home. Analyzing micro-data from 19th
century Hesse-Cassel, Wegge (1998) finds some support for this hypothesis. Finally, our study
speaks to the historical origins of entrepreneurial activity.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the history and the hypothesized origins
of agricultural inheritance rules in Germany. Section 5.3 gives an overview of the di erent data
sets we use. We present and discuss our empirical strategy in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 shows
the estimated e ects of equal division on historical andmodern inequality measures. Section
5.6 discusses the e ects of equal division on economic development and well-being - today,
before the industrial revolution and from the onset of industrialization on. Section 5.7 provides
evidence for mechanisms through which equal divisionmight have a ectedmodern outcomes.
Section 5.8 shows robustness checks for our inheritance rule variable and di erent samples
and Section 5.9 concludes.
5.2 Historical background of inheritance rules
Historically, twomain rules of inheritance for farms and agricultural land existed in Germany,
prescribingequal division (’Realteilung’) andunequal divisionof land (’Anerbenrecht’) (Rösener,
2012).3 Under unequal division inheritance, agricultural property is considered indivisible and
has to be passed on to a single heir. Themost common unequal division rule prescribed “primo-
geniture”, thusmaking the oldest son thedesignatedheir. Historically, daughters and last-borns
did not have a claim to theparental land and received little or no compensation inmost unequal
division areas. As a consequence, the non-inheriting children typically became landless and
worked as farmhands on the brother’s farm (Cole andWolf, 1995) or as factory workers (Becker,
1998), unless they married into a landed family. Under equal division inheritance, land holding
is split equally among all children including daughters.4
3 These are also referred to as partible and impartible inheritance, respectively. Variations in inheritance rules
are also present in other parts of Europe. In England for example traditionally non-partible inheritance is
applied (Alston and Schapiro, 1984) while in France (Crouch, 2005) as well as the Netherlands (Alston and
Schapiro, 1984) people split farms equally. Spain applies partible inheritance in the South (Andalusia) and
non-partible inheritance in the other parts (Tur-Prats, 2013).
4 Rouette (2003) stresses that agricultural inheritance rules are not fixed. She points to two changes in the
19th century: The industrialized Ruhr area switched from unequal to equal division while the area around
Paderborn increasingly practiced unequal division. We stick to the maps provided by the sources in the late
19th century.
123
5 Long-Term Consequences of Inequality
In the 19th century, equal division led to the parcellation of arable land (Becker, 1998). The
threat of harming the productivity of agriculture and the existence of farmers puts eliminating
equal division on the political agenda (Rouette, 2003; Eheberg, 1883). The Nazis implemented
such a reform through the ’Reichserbhofgesetz’ (State Hereditary Farm Law) of 1933 which in-
troduces unequal division all over Germany (Rouette, 2003). Röhm (1957) andRöhm (1961) later
finds evidence that equal division rules persisted regionally until the 1950s. Still, inheritance of
farms is locally regulated by di!erent state-specific regulations today.5 The state-specific rules
suspend equal division of the inheritance among a community of heirs as prescribed by the
German Civil Law Code (BGB §§1922). Bavaria, Saarland, Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt,
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, and Berlin follow BGB §2049 and §2312 (Landgüter-
recht) which in general prescribes equal division but regulates that farms are assessed at a
lower value than other property. The aim remains to secure productivity of agriculture.
Since we use geographic variation in the historical prevalence of inheritance rules, the question
of which factors lead to the adoption of a particular inheritance rule in a locality arises naturally.
This question remains debated among historians, who concur that the rules had been in place
since at least the Middle Ages: Two of the first written codices, the Lex Salica of 507 AD and the
Sachsenspiegel of 1220 AD, regulated agricultural inheritance. The Lex Salica prescribed equal
division amongmale o!spring in Frankish lands (South-Western Germany) (Behrend, 1897),
whereas the Sachsenspiegel prescribed a single heir in parts of the North-East (Blanckmeister,
1913).6
5.3 Data
This section provides a detailed description of our data sources and shows summary statistics
of how equal and unequal division counties di!ered. The unit of observation throughout is a
rural county in Germany at di!erent points in time.7 The counties’ locations are indicated by
historical andmodern maps of German counties provided by MPIDR [Max Planck Institute for
5 Hamburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein introduced unequal division
inheritance by the the Höfeordnung (HöfeO from 26 July 1976, BGBl. 1, S. 1933). Baden-Wuerttemberg
applies the Badisches Hofgütergesetz and Württembergisches Anerbengesetz. Hesse follows the Hessische
Landgüterordnung, Rhineland-Palatinate the Rheinland-Pfälzische Höfeordnung, and Bremen the Bremis-
ches Höfegesetz.
6 A hypothesis dating back to at least Weber (1924) is that unequal division was established where local feudal
lords or the state had the power and incentives to prohibit the division of land as it was thought that larger
land plots could be taxedmore easily (Rösener, 2012). Other scholars have suggested that features of the
terrain or the soil were conducive to the adoption of one inheritance rule over the other (Schröder, 1979).
Following Boserup (1965) and Fastenmayer (2009) soil quality in combinationwith crops that support plough
use would give an advantage to unequal division rules.
7 Sample restrictions exclude free cities from our analysis for several reasons. First, agriculture played a
minor role in cities. Second, urbanization triggeredmigration into cities at a large scale and brings people
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Demographic Research] and CGG [Chair for Geodesy andGeoinformatics, University of Rostock]
(2011) and the German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban A airs, and Spatial
Development (BBSR). We link our historical sample, consisting of 900 rural German counties in
1895, either spatially, via o icial county codes, or via county names to our modern sample of
397 counties in 2014.
5.3.1 Inheritance rule
Figure 5.1 shows the spatial distribution of di erent inheritance rules in 19th century Germany.
We distinguish equal division (green) from unequal division areas (blue). Unequal division is
prevalent in amajority of regions. With few exceptions, equal division is found in the southwest
of Germany. Themap is a combinationof various sources in formofmaps and texts from the late
19th century: The first comprehensive overview of the geographic distribution of inheritance
rules in Prussia was created in 1894 when the Prussian government conducted a survey among
judges and county administrators to inquire into the nature and history of inheritance rules
in their jurisdiction (Rouette, 2003). The survey results were later published in Sering (1897).
Around the same time, similar surveys were conducted in the other kingdoms of the German
Empire by Verein für Socialpolitik (1883), Grossherzogliches Ministerium des Inneren (1883),
Miaskowski (1882-84), Fick (1895), and Kra" (1930). Several decades later, the geographers
Hartke and Westermann (1940) created an overviewmap that depicted the local prevalence of
particular inheritance rules based on the results published by Sering (1897) and others. These
surveys allow a very fine-grained categorization of inheritance rules by locality, typically at the
village level.8 In our samples the inheritance rule of each county is classified by the inheritance
rule of the majority of the area of a county.
5.3.2 Data sources
Our main outcome variables stem from the INKAR 2014 data set provided by the BBSR and
from censuses of the Federal Statistical O ice of Germany or its predecessors from the late
19th century on. The INKAR 2014 data includes o icial aggregated information on income,
education, and industry structure on the county level. For finer measures of income, we incor-
porate county-level data on income taxes provided by the German Federal Statistical O ice.
These data provide information on income bins, including themean income and the number of
people within each bin. We use that data to calculate within-county inequality measures. His-
with unequal division origin into areas of equal division and vice versa. Migrants’ behavior influences the
outcome variables of cities and we cannot distinguish if this is driven by people with equal or unequal
division background.
8 We follow the original sources as Hartke and Westermann (1940) published their map under the Nazi regime
and might have been influenced by the propaganda similar to Huppertz (1939). For counties for which
we could not identify the prevalent inheritance rule from the original sources we filled the gaps from the
comprehensive map of Hartke and Westermann (1940).
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torical data on farm sizes and occupations stem from o icial German censuses on agriculture
(Kaiserliches Statisisches Amt, 1912) and censuses on occupations and businesses (Kaiserliches
Statisisches Amt, 1897, 1910) that we digitized. These statistics allow us to calculate average
farm sizes, the share of farms in a specific size category, the population per county and em-
ployment shares in agriculture, manufacturing, and trade and services. Within occupations
we can identify innovative branches in manufacturing as specified in (Streb et al., 2006). We
enrich agricultural information by data on landholding inequality from 1895 provided by Ziblatt
(2008). The distribution of height in Bavarian conscripts in the 19th century serves as individual
data on inequality (Baten, 1999, 2000). Further measures of economic development come from
the census on occupations and businesses from 1925 which allows us to distinguish between
employees and laborers (Fritsch and Wyrwich, 2016). 9 For agricultural productivity before and
a!er 1500 we use data on caloric output of land by Galor and Özak (2016). Another measure
of pre-industrial economic development is population data which we obtain from Bairoch,
Batou, and Chevre (1988) and the Statistical O ice of the German Empire which published the
population of 1375 German towns and cities in 1867, 1871, and 1875 (Kaiserliches Statistisches
Amt, 1877). Additionally, we use data from the iPEHd on Prussia provided by Becker et al. (2012)
to evaluate pre-industrial development. Patent data from Streb et al. (2006) which includes
all valuable patents filed in Germany between 1877 and 1914 serves as a secondmeasure for
innovative activity.10 Table D-1 in the Appendix provides a brief overview of the variables we
use from these data sets.
We use three types of control variables: geographical variables, cultural and institutional
variables, and controls for the location. The geographic control variables come from GIS raster
data depicting current information on soil, climate, elevation, and navigable waterways. We
rely on data from the European Soil Data Base, the free climate data fromWorldClim.org and
navigable waterways from Kunz (2004). The calculation of average elevation of a county is
based on data from (Jarvis, Reuter, Nelson, and Guevara, 2006). Cultural and institutional
control variables come from various sources: The share of protestants in a county stems from
Meyers Grosses Konversationslexikon (1905) and the general law type stems from amap by
Schröder (1870). Hanseatic involvement is inferred fromamapbyHelmolt (1902) as is a dummy
for belonging to the Frankish territory from Shepherd (1911). We include controls for location
in the form of longitude and latitude of the centroid of a county as well as a dummy for the
historical state the county belongs to.
9 We thank Michael Wyrwich for kindly sharing their data.
10 We thank Jochen Streb for kindly sharing his data.
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5.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 5.1 shows summary statistics for equal and unequal division counties. These statistics
assess to what extent the two groups di ered in their control characteristics. Panel A lists the
geographic controls. In equal division areas, the average temperature and elevation are slightly
higher. Unequal division areas have a significantly higher share of sand, silt, and loam in the
soil, while the share of loess, which is favorable for agriculture, does not di er significantly
between the two groups. Panel B shows the summary statistics of the cultural and institutional
control variables. While Frankish territory and Code Napoleon mainly appear in equal division
areas and the Hanseatic League and Prussian Law in unequal division areas, the share of
protestants does not di er significantly between inheritance rules. We conclude that equal
and unequal division areas are not completely balanced but di er in some aspects which is
why we include the geographic and cultural control variables later on in our analyses and
use geographic regression discontinuity models with counties close to the boundary as our
preferred specification.
5.4 Empirical strategy
We apply two empirical strategies to estimate the e ect of equal division on inequality and
economic development. First, we estimate OLS regressions with a rich set of control vari-
ables including flexible controls for the location of the county. Second, we view the location
where unequal division changes to equal division as a boundary and discontinuous jump in
inheritance rules which is determined by longitude and latitude. In this framework we apply
a multidimensional, semi-parametric regression discontinuity (RD) approach similar to Dell
(2010) to identify the e ect of equal division. Our estimation model is:
Ycs = α + γ · Equal Divisionc +X
′
csβ + f(Geographic Locationc) + φs + ǫcs.(5.1)
The outcome Ycs is a specific outcome measure of county c in state s. Equal division is an
indicator variable for equal division inheritance in county c. The coe icient of interest γ mea-
sures the e ect of equal division on the outcome variable Ycs. The matrixXcs contains control
variables for county c. In the OLS specification, the RD polynomial f(Geographic Locationc) is
a linear function of longitude and latitude.
Our regression discontinuity specifications include geographic controls for longitude, latitude,
and distance to the boundary. The main specifications contain these variables as linear terms,
however, our results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to using a quadratic polynomial
instead. The term φs determines the state in which county c is located. Counties of one state
are clustered locally. Therefore, the state dummies divide the border of inheritance rule into
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nine di erent segments.11 For the OLS specification we use the full sample of all rural counties
in Germany in a specific year. For the RD specification we reduce the sample to counties with a
centroid in a 35 km radius of the border as figure 5.2 shows. Standard errors are clustered on
the district level which is one aggregation level above the county level.12 Counties are weighted
by the number of their inhabitants in order to allow a population-related interpretation of our
results.
The RD approach relies on the identification assumption that the characteristics between the
two groups - i.e. across the border - vary smoothly. Usually, this assumption is tested by plotting
that all controls in an RD setting do not change discontinuously at the border. This does not
hold in our case. However, the identification assumption is satisfied if the controls do not
change discontinuously conditional on the other controls. In order to check if this assumption
holds, we test whether predicted inheritance rules (by our controls) di er discontinuously at
the boundary between the two regimes. To test whether counties have selected themselves by
unobserved factors which are positively correlated with the outcome variables into a specific
inheritance rule, we check if long-term development measures di er discontinuously at the
boundary.
Figure 5.3 plots the predicted equal division, based on all control variables, against the distance
of a county to the border of inheritance rule. No jump or discontinuity in the outcome variable
at the boundary can be detected. Moreover, figure 5.3 reveals that the relationship between
controls and inheritance rule in a range of 35 km le! and right of the border can be well approx-
imated with a linear specification. Taken together, this evidence supports the identification
assumption and suggests that, close to boundary, equal and unequal division areas did not
di er discontinuously in the characteristics that determine particular inheritance rules in the
cross-section.
Onemight alsobe concernedabout counties at theborder sorting into equal or unequal division
due to unobserved characteristics which are positively correlated with economic growth and
income today. We check the continuity of county characteristics following Card, Chetty, and
Weber (2007) and plot a measure of predicted long-term development, based on all control
variables, against distance to the border in figures 5.4 and 5.5. If counties sorted into equal
division based on unobserved characteristics, which are positively correlated with income
today, figure 5.4 and 5.5 should reveal a positive discontinuity with respect to GDP per capita
and household income per household member, respectively. The evidence does not support
11 The segments including both inheritance rules are: Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Wuerttemberg, Hessia,
Schwarzburg Rudolstadt, Sachsen Weimar Eisenach, Sachsen Meinigen Gotha, Sachsen Coburg Gotha.
12 There are 51 districts i.e. clusters in 35 km radius to the inheritance rule border.
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such a conclusion. For a measure of predicted GDP per capita, no large positive discontinuity
at the boundary is discernible. For predicted household income, we find an economically small
change at the boundary, with equal division areas having features that are associated with, if
anything, slightly lower long-term GDP per capita levels. Taken together, the results in figures
5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 lend support to a geographic discontinuity strategy.
5.5 Inequality
The first step of our empirical analysis is to assess the relationship between equal division
inheritance and historical measures of inequality and inequality today.
5.5.1 Historical inequality
We start with assessing the relationship between equal division inheritance andmeasures of
landholding inequality within counties in 19th century Germany. Data of the first comprehen-
sive agricultural census for the German Empire in 1895 shows substantially lower inequalities
in the distribution of the production factor land in equal division counties. Landholding Gini
coe icients based on calculations by Ziblatt (2008) are lower and the distribution of farms
sizes is shi!ed to the le!. Table 5.2 presents that counties which featured equal division have a
significantly lower Gini coe icient with a magnitude of about a third of a standard deviation
(SD) in our RD approach. The data allow us to show the percentage of farms in size categories
below 2 hectares, between 2 and 5 hectares, between 5 and 20 hectares, and between 20 and
100 hectares.13 In equal division counties the prevalence of small farms is significantly higher
while there are lower shares of large farms. The e ects are robust to including geographic and
cultural controls (Panel B) and to the restrictions of the RD approach (Panel C). Additionally,
in equal division counties the number of farms per inhabitant are higher (positive coe icient
of equal division, however, not significantly (not shown here). A similar distribution of farm
sizes is already visible in pre-industrial Prussian census data of 1816. Table D-2 in the Appendix
shows that the share of small landholdings was significantly higher in equal sharing counties
while the share of large landholdings was significantly lower.
Historically, agricultural land wasmore equally distributed in equal division counties, as ev-
idenced by a higher number of small and fewer large farms. The snapshot in 1895 does not
reveal whether equal division was still performed at the end of the 19th century. Di erences
might have emerged hundreds of years ago andmay not have faded away by 1895. Table D-3
13 The census also includes a category for farms above 100 hectares. There are no significant di erences
between equal and unequal division counties in the share of farms above 100 ha. It is likely that church land
and feudal estates which existed in both inheritance regimes fall in that category and were not a ected by
inheritance rules.
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shows that this is not the case: a di erence-in-di erences analysis between 1895 and 1907
shows that within 12 years farms in equal division areas became significantly smaller and the
share of small farms increased evenmore.
Overall, the results document two core facts: First, until the end of the 19th century, equal divi-
sion a ected the distribution of land. Second, although people could have sold their inherited
land andmoved to cities or abroad, this was not common practice. A Coasean argument would
suggest that inter vivos land transactions should have concentrated land ownership in equal
division areas if transaction costs were low and if concentrated land ownership were optimal
for agricultural productivity. Yet, the evidence shows persistent di erences in landholding
inequality at the boundary between the two inheritance regimes.
5.5.2 Inequality today
If there are persistent e ects of historical inequality, the most prominent mechanism would be
via inequality itself.14 Then, inequality levels today should also be lower in equal division areas.
Although equal division is negatively correlated with historical measures for inequality, the
significant lower inequality does not persist until today. Table D-4 shows that if at all, equal
division counties have a higher inequality level in income today. This holds particularly for the
Gini coe icient in column 1. Column 2 and 3 show that as well the 10th as the 90th income
percentile is slightly higher in equal division counties. These results suggest that the income
distribution is shi!ed to the right and everybody is better-o while the distribution is close to
the distribution of unequal division counties.
5.6 Economic development
Wenext assess the long-termrelationshipbetweenequaldivision inheritance ruleandmeasures
of economic development today. To ensure that this relationship is not spurious and driven by
other long-term di erences between equal and unequal division counties.
5.6.1 Level of economic development today
We use several measures of development and income in 2014 and show that today’s income
and GDP per capita is, on average, higher in equal division counties than in unequal division
counties. Table 5.3 shows that the correlation between average income and equal division
inheritance is positive, highly statistically significant, and robust across all specifications. The
magnitudes for all incomemeasures are around 45 percent of a SD (except for median income
14 A lower inequality could be transmitted via institutions like local taxes or via culture for example manifested
in civic engagement, opinions towards inequality, local NPOs, etc.
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at about 27 percent). Equal division counties have 6-14 percent higher modern income and
GDP levels.
Other measures of wealth like educational outcomes and industry structure (Table 5.4) provide
a first hint as to why these large di erences in incomemight have emerged. In equal division
counties, the percentage of the population with a college degree is about 50 percent of a SD
higher (Table 5.4 in the Appendix). Simultaneously, the share of peoplewith a vocational degree
is lower, while the share of people without degree does not di er (not shown). Additionally,
equal division counties have higher employment in the trade and service sector andparticularly
in creative industries. There are also more firms present (particularly small firms) in equal
division counties. These di erences suggest that human capital and the industry structure
might contribute to the large income di erences today. In the following we will discuss these
and further potential channels and, in particular, shed light on the importance of industry
structure in dimensions of innovation and structural change.
5.6.2 Development before industrialization
We now explore if equal division counties had advantages in economic development before
industrialization started. The large income gaps between equal and unequal division counties
today might not be driven by a more equal distribution of the production factor land in the
past but by unobserved characteristics which made equal division counties better o ever
since. Asmeasures for pre-industrial wealth and development are rare and hardly available at a
geographically disaggregated level for the whole German territory15, we draw on di erent data
sets and subsamples. Our analysis includes four observable determinants of long-term growth:
First, we discuss agricultural productivity measured directly by potential caloric output per
hectare per year, average farm sizes, and Prussian grain yields. Second, we use population
density as a long-run measure of development. Third, we analyze early economic progress
which is examined by Prussian census data on early industrialization, employment, and wages.
Fourth, we inspect human capital development as covered by Prussian educational censuses.
Agricultural Productivity We test whether equal division counties had more favorable con-
ditions for agriculture that might have contributed to di erent long-term development tra-
jectories. An index of caloric output before the year 1500 per hectare per year constructed by
Galor andÖzak (2016) is the outcome variable in column 1 of table 5.5. Although the coe icient
is positive, it is not robust to the inclusion of controls and vanishes in the RD specification. In
addition to di erences in land, there might be discrepancies between potential productivity
of land and realized output. In column 2 we draw on data on grain yields from Prussia in
15 Germany was split into independent kingdoms and principalities until German unification in 1871.
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1878 which show slightly lower yields in equal division counties, although the di erence is
far from being economically or statistically significant. These results provide evidence for the
hypothesis that agricultural productivity was similar in equal division and unequal division
counties.
PopulationDensity Long-termdatawith direct evidence on levels of economic development
is scarce so we draw on urban population data from 1500 onwards based on (Bairoch et al.,
1988) to assessmeasures of development before the Industrial Revolution in equal and unequal
division areas. We find that the density of urban population developed similarly in equal and
unequal division areas (Figure 5.6). If anything, population density is slightly lower throughout
in equal division areas. A potential objection to the use of urban population data in the context
of our study might be that rural population density could be a better measure for development
in the context of agricultural inheritance rules. As shown in table 5.6, the population density in
Prussia in 1816 was not higher in equal division counties. For the sample of the whole German
territory we show that the density is still not significantly higher in equal division counties by
1895 but we can detect relative increases by 1907. This increase in the population density from
1895 to 1907 is significantly higher in equal division counties than in unequal division counties
which is, however, driven by counties which surround free cities. Excluding these counties from
the sample eliminates statistical significance.
Early Industrialization, Employment, Income, andWages Drawing on Prussian data, we
canassess the relationshipbetween inheritance regimesandmeasuresof early industrialization.
Prussian censuses are available from 1816 on and cover a lot of disaggregated data on historical
counties.16 Although Prussia had only very few equal division counties, table D-6 show that
our main results on inequality also hold in a subsample of (historical) Prussia. Data on the
number of factories, mills, and looms in 1821 aswell as self-employment out of agriculture, and
employment in manufacturing in 1882 shed light on the economic situation of equal division
counties before industrialization started. Income and county taxes in 1878 and daily wages in
1892 show if industrialization had a positive e ect in equal division counties very quickly.
Table 5.7 shows that there are hardly any significant di erences between equal and unequal
division counties in Prussia. If at all, coe icients are negative for the density of factories, mills,
and looms suggesting that adoption of new technologies must have started later than 1821. In
1882, there are also no di erences in the percentage of people who are self-employed (outside
of agriculture) and in the percentage of people working in manufacturing.
16 More information about Prussian census data is given in Becker et al. (2012).
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For income and wages, table 5.8 shows that there are no significant positive e ects of equal
division on various measures of revenues from income and local county taxes. The di erence
in daily wages for males is also very small and insignificant.
Human Capital We rely on Prussian educational censuses which document the number of
schools, students, and literacy rates early on to shed light on the human capital stock and
development in equal and unequal division counties. Table 5.9 reveals that the percentage of
people who could read and write and the percentage of illiterate people were not significantly
di erent between equal and unequal division counties in 1871 when including our controls or
RD approach. There are no di erences between equal and unequal division counties in school
density or pupils in pre-industrial 1816 or at the onset of industrialization in 1886.
Bringing the results on agricultural productivity, population, early industrialization, income,
and education together, reveals that equal division counties did not have more advantageous
starting conditions than unequal division counties before the Industrial Revolution. This allows
us to rule out a broad class of potential confounders that could have contributed to the large
di erences in outcomes we observe in 2014.
5.6.3 Development from industrialization onward
To shed light on the potential pathways through which inheritance rules may have a ected
long-term outcomes, we investigate the industry structure in equal and unequal division areas.
Table 5.10 reveals that in equal division counties agricultural employment was lower, while
employment in manufacturing and in trade and services was slightly higher than in unequal
division counties in 1895 and 1907. Themagnitude of the coe icient is larger formanufacturing
and amounts to about a quarter of a SD. It increased from 1895 to 1907 by 35 percent of a
SD. Simultaneously, the coe icient of equal division for employment in agriculture decreased
almost by the samemagnitude from 1895 to 1907. To get an idea when equal division counties
started o to industrialize quicker than unequal division counties we use Prussian census data
from 1882. Table D-7 shows that there are no significant di erences between the areas in
agriculture and manufacturing in 1882. We interpret these findings as evidence that equal
splitting counties industrialized quicker from the late 19th century on.
5.7 Mechanism: innovation and occupational choice
Why were equal division counties more successful in industrializing and featured better long-
term outcomes? A class of models hypothesizes that a more equal distribution of wealth may
increase long-termgrowth by giving broader parts of the population the opportunity to become
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a skilled worker or entrepreneur see, e.g., Galor and Zeira (1993); Banerjee and Newman (1993);
Ghatak and Nien-Huei Jiang (2002); Galor and Moav (2004). Compared to a situation in which
a large part of the population has essentially no wealth, a more even distribution of wealth
can alleviate credit constraints in parts of the population or provide a bu er to absorb the
potential risks of innovating, investing in human capital, or becoming an entrepreneur, all
of which have favorable consequences for growth. We take this hypothesis to the data and
test the relationship between inheritance rules and occupational choice and innovative activity.
Distinguishing between 163 occupations in manufacturing in 1907, we find that employment in
innovative branches of manufacturing was higher in equal division areas. We follow Streb et al.
(2006) who categorizemetal working, industry ofmachines and instruments, chemical industry,
printing, and photography as innovative branches based on the amount of patents between
1877 and 1914. Table 5.11 shows the e ect of equal division on employment in innovative
manufacturing occupations. The coe icient is almost the same as in table 5.10, which leads
us to the conclusion that the additional employment in manufacturing comes almost entirely
from occupations in innovative branches.
Using patent data of Streb et al. (2006) directly in columns 3 to 5, we find that innovative activity
was higher in equal division counties from 1877 to 1914. The positive correlation holds when
using a dummy variable for having filed a patent in that time, using a log of the total number of
patents17 to include only counties with patenting activity, and when using the log total number
of patents including the counties with no patenting activity as zeros. Themagnitude is quite
large at about a third of a SD. As presented in table 5.12, there are further, suggestive results
that are consistent with an occupational choice mechanism, through which inequality may
have a ected long-term outcomes, even though a lack of precision in our estimates prohibits
a definitive interpretation of these findings. Considering a rough proxy for entrepreneurial
activity, we find that equal division countries have a higher percentage of self-employed people
out of agriculture in 1925. Additionally, there is some weak evidence that the density of middle
schools and the share of middle-school pupils is slightly higher in equal division counties.
These schools were primarily attended by students wo wanted to become an apprentice in a
particular trade. These additional results are not robust across specifications and the e ects are
only imprecisely estimated but the results are broadly consistent with landholding inequality
a ecting longer-term outcomes through occupational choice.
17 Using the log is necessary as there are somecountieswhich are extremoutliers in patenting activity compared
to the other counties. While the 50th percentile of filed patents is 1, the 99th percentile lies at 123 patents
and the maximum is 913 filed patents between 1877 and 1914.
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5.8 Robustness checks
In the following we provide some robustness checks on our indicator for equal division and on
our RD specification.
5.8.1 Inheritance rule
As our main explanatory variable – the equal division indicator – stems from sources from
varying times and quality, we re-estimated the coe icients for our main findings in restricted
samples. First, we restrict the sample to Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, andWuerttemberg, to rely
completely on pre-Nazi area maps and not on the 1940 map of Hartke and Westermann (1940).
As these states were the larger states, they have already had a high quality statistical o ice in
the 19th century. They providedmaps or lists of their territory determining the predominant
inheritance rule there. TableD-8 shows that ourmain results are robust to restricting the sample
to the states with the best sources for inheritance rule. Second, we exclude all counties which
could not be clearly defined as belonging to the equal or unequal division regime. We define
as equal division county a county where the majority of the area is coded as equal division.
In this analysis all counties which are not completely equal sharing or unequal sharing are
dropped. Table D-9 shows that the coe icients go into the same direction, however, as sample
size decreases, the coe icients cannot be estimated that precisely anymore.
5.8.2 RD sample restriction
For the RD specification the sample restriction parameter of a 35-km distance to the border is
set arbitrarily. In the following we play around with the distance radius and show that results
do not change if we restrict the sample to a 20, 50, or 80 km distance to the border. A larger
distance than 80 km would only include more unequal division counties as the maximum
distance to the border in the equal division regime is 80.4 km. Table D-10 shows in panel A the
results for the 20 km distance, in panel B the results for the 50 km distance and in panel C the
results for the 80 km distance. Overall, our results are robust to the border sample restriction.
5.9 Conclusion
A long-lasting and ongoing debate in economics concerns the association between wealth
inequality and economic growth. Increasing wealth inequality in the US and Europe in the past
30 years lends renewed relevance to the resolution of the debate. However, data on inequality
at the local level are rare and exogenous shi!s of inequality scarce which makes it hard to
identify causal e ects. We exploit variation in a historical institution, namely agricultural
inheritance rules, which regulated the distribution of land since the Middle Ages in Germany.
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Agricultural inheritance rules vary between unequal division where land is indivisible and is
passed on to a single heir and equal division of land among all siblings. Our identification
strategy relies on a RD approach with longitude, latitude, and distance to the inheritance-
rule border as running variables. We add a rich set of controls for geographical, cultural,
and institutional characteristics of counties. We find that counties which divided land equally
among siblings had historically lower landholding inequality. Today, countieswhich historically
divided land equally have a higher GDP per capita and higher individual income. We show
that equal division counties did not have better starting conditions before the industrialization
by testing for di erences in agricultural productivity, urban population, population density,
early technological progress, or human capital stock. Instead, we propose the mechanism that
equal division counties started to industrialize quicker in the late 19th century than unequal
division counties focusing on occupations in particularly innovative branches. Additionally, we
find evidence for higher entrepreneurial activity in equal division counties. We conclude that a
more equal distribution of wealth enables people to take up new occupational opportunities
in a changing economy, which ultimately contributed to long-term growth.
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5.10 Figures and tables
Figure 5.1 : Map inheritance rules - equal and unequal division
Notes: Themap shows the distribution of inheritance rules in Germany with its borders of the 19th century. The
map distinguishes two types of inheritance rule: unequal division (dark blue) and equal division (green). The
areas of milder forms of these two types are categorized as unequal division.
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Figure 5.2 : Map of inheritance rules in the 35-km-border sample
Notes: Themap shows the distribution of inheritance rules in Germany with its borders of the 19th century. The
sample is reduced to a 35 km radius around the border of the inheritance rule regimes. This sample restriction is
used in the RD approach. The map distinguishes two types of inheritance rule: unequal division (dark blue) and
equal division (green). The areas of milder forms of these two types are categorized as unequal division.
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Figure 5.3 : Predicted equal division
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Notes: The figure depicts our identification assumption for the RD approach. The y-axis shows predicted equal
division by our control variables. The x-axis shows the distance to the inheritance-rule border (at zero). The
le -hand side of the graph shows the evolution of the predicted equal division in the unequal division area. The
right-hand side shows the evolution in the equal division area. Section 5.4 provides details on the identification
assumption and the prediction of equal division.
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Figure 5.4 : GDP per capita (logs)
3
.2
3
.3
3
.4
3
.5
3
.6
3
.7
p
re
d
ic
te
d
 G
D
P
 p
e
r 
c
a
p
it
a
 (
lo
g
s
)
-40 -20 0 20 40
distance to inheritance border in km
unequal division equal division
Notes: The figure depicts the RD approach we use in a binscatter plot. The outcome variable on the y-axis is GDP
per capita in logs. The x-axis shows the distance to the inheritance-rule border (at zero). The le-hand side of
the graph shows the evolution of GDP per capita in the unequal division area. The right-hand side shows the
evolution in the equal division area. Section 5.3.2 and table D-1 provide details on the data sources.
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Figure 5.5 : Household income per household member (logs)
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Notes: The figure depicts the RD approach we use in a binscatter plot. The outcome variable on the y-axis is
log household income per household member. The x-axis shows the distance to the inheritance-rule border (at
zero). The le -hand side of the graph shows the evolution of household income in the unequal division area. The
right-hand side shows the evolution in the equal division area. Section 5.3.2 and table D-1 provide details on the
data sources.
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Figure 5.6 : Urban population density per 1000 sqkm: 1500-1907
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Notes: The graph shows the evolution of urban population for equal (green) and unequal (blue) division areas
separately from 1500 until 1907. The y-axis shows the logs of the urban population weighted by the area of the
specific inheritance-rule regime in 1000 sqkm. The data stems from Bairoch et al. (1988) and the Statistical O ice
of the German Empire which published the population of 1375 German towns and cities in 1867, 1871, and 1875
(Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, 1877).
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Table 5.1 : Summary statistics
Summary statistics T-test
unequal division equal division di erence se
Geographic Controls
temperature in ◦C mean 8.125 8.820 0.241 0.142*
sd (0.784) (0.903)
precipitation in mm mean 59.769 61.940 -3.594 2.313
sd (12.345) (8.543)
elevation in m mean 249.349 313.408 -45.241 23.185*
sd (223.019) (159.704)
roughness: di erence in elevation mean 3.820 6.347 0.643 0.469
sd (3.172) (3.352)
distance to navigable waterway in km mean 25.840 20.704 -3.930 2.912
sd (21.606) (16.831)
soil characteristics
soil: share of sand mean 0.219 0.012 -0.096 0.033***
sd (0.274) (0.074)
soil: share of loam, sand, silt mean 0.609 0.300 -0.145 0.053***
sd (0.340) (0.269)
soil: share of loess mean 0.098 0.130 -0.014 0.042
sd (0.189) (0.202)
Cultural Controls
Frankish territory in 507 AD mean 0.093 0.473 0.275 0.075***
sd (0.291) (0.500)
protenstants in % mean 65.272 47.368 -8.317 6.709
sd (38.008) (33.602)
Hanseatic league mean 0.404 0.103 -0.249 0.074***
sd (0.491) (0.304)
general law
common law mean 0.449 0.433 -0.100 0.120
sd (0.498) (0.497)
Prussian mean 0.453 0.076 -0.236 0.085***
sd (0.498) (0.265)
Saxonian mean 0.040 0.000
sd (0.196) (0.000)
Code Napoleon mean 0.015 0.371 0.329 0.095***
sd (0.121) (0.484)
Badish mean 0.043 0.121 0.007 0.005
sd (0.203) (0.326)
observations obs 676 224
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for our control variables in rural German counties in 1895. Column 1 gives the mean and
standard deviation of the control variables in unequal division counties while column 2 shows means and standard deviation for equal
division counties. Column 3 and 4 show the di erence between these groups and test if the di erence is equal to zero. The di erence
and the standard errors stem from a regression which includes longitude, latitude, state-fixed e ects, clusters standard errors on the
district (Regierungsbezirk) level and weighs observations by population. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table 5.2 : The eect of equal division on landholding inequality 1895
landholding Gini 1895 % of farms in size category Farm size Number of farms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
linear quadratic <2 2-5 5-20 20-100 in ha per 1000
RD poly. ha inhabitants
Panel A. OLS
equal division -0.0382∗∗ -0.0353∗ 7.280∗∗∗ 11.87∗∗∗ -1.863 -17.89∗∗∗ -1.866∗∗∗ 4.787
(0.0181) (0.0198) (1.346) (1.502) (2.125) (2.168) (0.545) (7.004)
Observations 931 931 930 930 930 929 927 931
Panel B. With controls
equal division -0.0537∗∗∗ -0.0505∗∗∗ 6.835∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗ -3.830∗ -13.36∗∗∗ -1.573∗∗∗ 8.756
(0.0124) (0.0126) (1.019) (1.546) (2.104) (1.691) (0.269) (6.618)
Observations 931 931 930 930 930 929 927 931
Panel C. Distance to border
equal division -0.0459∗∗∗ -0.0500∗∗∗ 5.798∗∗∗ 9.512∗∗∗ -5.046∗∗∗ -10.29∗∗∗ -1.246∗∗∗ 5.874
(0.00939) (0.00986) (1.021) (1.592) (1.683) (1.618) (0.164) (5.750)
Observations 397 397 394 394 394 393 391 397
mean outcome 0.716 0.716 8.242 13.34 33.84 27.08 5.997 127.7
SD outcome 0.123 0.123 7.031 10.69 15.04 16.06 3.318 45.65
Notes: The Gini coeicient stems from Ziblatt (2008), the share of farms in 5 size categories are as stated in ’Statistik des Deutschen Reichs’ Vol. 109. Panel A includes longitude, latitude,
and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to
the border of the inheritance rule. Free cities are excluded. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01
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Table 5.3 : The eect of equal division on incomemeasures 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log household income log taxable income log median income log GDP p.c.
Panel A. OLS
equal splitting 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.0726∗∗∗ 0.0499∗∗ 0.133∗∗
(0.0236) (0.0205) (0.0186) (0.0562)
Observations 397 374 397 397
Panel B. With controls
equal splitting 0.0617∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗ 0.0446∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0103) (0.0379)
Observations 397 374 397 397
Panel C. Distance to border
equal splitting 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0168) (0.00986) (0.0481)
Observations 198 178 198 198
mean outcome 6.719 3.461 7.956 3.447
SD outcome 0.115 0.146 0.162 0.336
Notes: Data on income and GDP per capita stem from the Federal Statistical Oice of Germany and INKAR of 2013/14. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B
includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule.
counties with more than 100.000 inhabitants are excluded. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01
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Table 5.4 : The eect of equal division on education and industry structure 2014
Education Employment Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
College Vocational Agric. Manuf. Trade and Creative Per Size
Degree Degree Services Ind. Pop
Panel A. OLS
equal splitting 3.343∗∗∗ -3.819∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ -4.613∗∗∗ 4.882∗∗∗ 1.266∗∗∗ 0.00127∗ -0.387
(0.734) (0.940) (0.0913) (1.365) (1.381) (0.343) (0.000715) (0.387)
Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 380 380
Panel B. With controls
equal splitting 2.789∗∗∗ -2.759∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗ -2.902∗ 3.300∗ 1.187∗∗∗ 0.00205∗∗∗ -0.907∗∗
(0.696) (0.608) (0.155) (1.608) (1.630) (0.357) (0.000594) (0.401)
Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 380 380
Panel C. Distance to border
equal splitting 2.388∗∗∗ -2.371∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -1.539 1.870 1.088∗∗∗ 0.00195∗∗∗ -0.706∗
(0.729) (0.634) (0.104) (1.970) (1.976) (0.388) (0.000612) (0.385)
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 183 183
mean outcome 11.19 64.51 1.052 32.40 66.55 2.645 0.0261 14.41
SD outcome 4.873 6.396 1.260 10.49 10.66 2.090 0.00355 1.983
Notes: Data on education and industry structure stem from INKAR data of 2013/14. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic
and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. counties withmore than 100.000
inhabitants are excluded. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table 5.5 : The eect of equal division on agricultural productivity
(1) (2)
Mean caloric output Prussia: Grain
pre 1500 yields kg/ha
Panel A. OLS
equal division 68.12∗∗∗ -3.112
(25.39) (7.277)
Observations 935 415
Panel B. With controls
equal division 3.323 -3.392
(16.63) (5.004)
Observations 935 415
Panel C. Distance to border
equal division 10.50 -2.065
(9.863) (4.951)
Observations 396 190
mean outcome 2211.4 74.77
SD outcome 152.1 24.44
Notes: The table uses in column 1 an index of caloric output per hectare per year before the year 1500 as outcome variable which is constructed by Galor and Özak (2016). In column 1
we use the whole sample of the German Empire in 1895. In column 2 grain yields in kilogram per hectare from Prussia in 1878 is the outcome variable. The sample is reduced to the 415
Prussian counties. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C
reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk)
level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table 5.6 : The eect of equal division on population
Population density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prussia 1816 1895 1907 DID
Panel A. OLS
equal division 1.507 63.73 117.5 75.86
(9.257) (88.75) (115.1) (95.07)
equal division x 1907 31.33
(22.75)
Observations 318 937 948 1885
Panel B. With controls
equal division -14.65∗∗ 76.68 131.9∗ 91.42
(6.754) (58.79) (70.90) (58.54)
equal division x 1907 28.08
(21.03)
Observations 318 937 948 1885
Panel C. Distance to border
equal division 2.608 55.48 101.8∗ 56.08
(4.080) (44.05) (51.91) (42.45)
equal division x 1907 47.76∗∗
(20.85)
Observations 95 398 406 804
mean outcome 58.80 169.2 220.5 196.3
SD outcome 35.89 283.9 369.3 332.6
Notes: The tables uses population density as outcomemeasure. In column 1 the sample stems from Prussian counties in 1816. In column 2 and 3 from the whole sample of the German
Empire in 1895 and 1907, respectively. Column 4 shows a DID approach estimating the change in population density in rural German counties between 1895 and 1907. Panel A includes
longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35
kmdistance to the border of the inheritance rule. Regressions areweighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table 5.7 : The eect of equal division on technological progress 1821/82
Technological Progress 1821 Employment 1882
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Factories Mills Looms Self Empl. Manuf.
(per 1000 People) out of Agric.
Panel A. OLS
equal splitting -0.0895 0.105 -5.217∗ -0.143 -1.237
(0.0878) (0.286) (2.926) (0.553) (1.626)
Observations 318 318 318 415 415
Panel B. With controls
equal splitting 0.00689 0.231 -7.419∗ -0.640 0.237
(0.0731) (0.320) (4.044) (0.728) (1.675)
Observations 318 318 318 415 415
Panel C. Distance to border
equal splitting -0.0703∗ -0.207 -0.633 0.0254 0.778
(0.0329) (0.185) (4.690) (0.532) (1.353)
Observations 95 95 95 190 190
mean outcome 0.254 1.111 5.492 5.557 8.227
SD outcome 0.238 0.986 12.83 2.385 5.591
Notes: The tables uses a sample of Prussian counties in 1821 and in 1882 with di erent proxies for technological progress. Column 1 uses factories column 2 mills and column 3 looms
per 1000 people as outcome variable. In column 4 self-employed people out of agriculture as percent of total population is the outcome variable. In column 5 percent of population in
themanufacturing sector is the outcome variable. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed e ects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified
in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered
on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table 5.8 : The eect of equal division on income and wages 1878/95
Income and county taxes 1878 Daily Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Federal Class Tax Federal Income Tax Local County Tax Total County Income Males 1892
(per Capita)
Panel A. OLS
equal splitting -0.141∗ -0.0815 0.0449 -0.420 0.100
(0.0802) (0.129) (0.172) (0.341) (0.0761)
Observations 415 415 415 415 413
Panel B. With controls
equal splitting -0.125∗ 0.0958 0.0885 0.0465 0.0596
(0.0682) (0.110) (0.122) (0.275) (0.0780)
Observations 415 415 415 415 413
Panel C. Distance to border
equal splitting -0.157∗∗∗ 0.0946 0.118 -0.00813 0.0317
(0.0496) (0.116) (0.121) (0.242) (0.0667)
Observations 190 190 190 190 189
mean outcome 1.376 0.624 1.010 2.068 1.487
SD outcome 0.390 0.441 0.792 2.777 0.356
Notes: The table uses various measures of tax income per person in each Prussian county in 1878 as outcome variables (column 1-4). The outcome variables in column 1 and 2 come
close to an income tax while taxes in column 3 and 4 are local community taxes. In column 5 it uses daily wages for males in 1892 in Prussia as outcome variable. Panel A includes
longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35
kmdistance to the border of the inheritance rule. Regressions areweighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table 5.9 : The eect of equal division on education 1886
1871 1816 1886
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percent Able to Percent Schools Pupils Schools Pupils
Read and Write Illiterate (per 1000 People)
Panel A. OLS
equal division -6.103∗∗ 4.564∗∗ 0.0609 -32.82∗∗∗ 0.203 1.808
(2.528) (1.737) (0.227) (9.807) (0.160) (13.04)
Observations 415 415 308 305 415 415
Panel B. With controls
equal division -1.135 -0.102 0.414 -3.967 0.0144 -10.59
(1.824) (1.035) (0.247) (10.55) (0.168) (13.52)
Observations 415 415 308 305 415 415
Panel C. Distance to border
equal division -0.0543 -0.574 0.0395 -4.428 -0.114 -15.70
(1.847) (0.629) (0.111) (8.813) (0.150) (15.63)
Observations 190 190 90 87 190 190
mean outcome 62.57 9.544 1.928 110.7 1.328 169.8
SD outcome 12.03 9.305 0.923 43.72 0.533 43.13
Notes: The table uses data on education levels in Prussia as outcome variables. In column 1 and 2 the data stems from 1871 and shows the percent of the population which is able to
read andwrite. In column 2 the percent of illiterate people is used. Earliestmeasures of education come from the documented number of schools and pupils in Prussian counties in 1816
(column 3 and 4). In 1886 the same measures are documented for Prussia again. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic
and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. Regressions are weighted by
population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table 5.10 : The eect of equal division on sectoral employment 1895 and 1907
Employment 1895 Employment 1907
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agric. Manuf. Trade and Services Agric. Manuf. Trade and Services
Panel A. OLS
equal division -2.489 0.304 0.165 -3.998 1.130 0.277
(2.085) (1.427) (0.174) (2.729) (1.507) (0.214)
Observations 889 889 889 900 900 900
Panel B. With controls
equal division -2.578∗ 1.040 0.220∗ -4.104∗∗ 2.253∗∗ 0.309∗
(1.296) (1.036) (0.130) (1.694) (1.067) (0.184)
Observations 886 886 886 897 897 897
Panel C. Border sample
equal division -2.109∗∗ 1.577∗∗ 0.273∗∗ -3.832∗∗∗ 2.624∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗
(1.001) (0.767) (0.120) (1.308) (0.810) (0.154)
Observations 382 382 382 390 390 390
mean outcome 19.190 14.560 3.428 20.359 16.471 4.208
SD outcome 8.941 6.783 2.174 11.893 7.376 2.721
Notes: Employment in sectors and occupations as stated in ’Statistik des Deutschen Reichs’ Vol. 109 for 1895 and 209 for 1907 as percent of total population in each district. Panel
A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to
counties in 35 kmdistance to the border of the inheritance rule. Free cities are excluded. Regressions areweightedby population. Standard errors clustered ondistrict (Regierungsbezirk)
level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table 5.11 : The eect of equal division onmeasures for innovative occupations
Employment 1907: innovative manufacturing Patents 1877 to 1914
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
in % of
total pop. manuf. pop. Dummy log patents log patents w/ zero
Panel A. OLS
equal division 2.125∗∗ 2.861∗∗ 0.0837 0.646∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗
(0.938) (1.376) (0.0744) (0.231) (0.317)
Observations 900 900 899 499 899
Panel B. With controls
equal division 2.358∗∗∗ 3.179∗∗ 0.138 0.561∗∗ 0.888∗∗
(0.766) (1.398) (0.0837) (0.226) (0.344)
Observations 897 897 899 499 899
Panel C. Border sample
equal division 2.493∗∗∗ 3.083∗∗ 0.105∗ 0.472∗∗ 0.623∗∗
(0.843) (1.509) (0.0582) (0.224) (0.246)
Observations 390 390 390 228 390
mean outcome 6.874 16.807 0.669 1.979 1.994
SD outcome 5.664 8.712 0.471 1.542 1.886
Notes: Unit of observation is a county. The outcome in column 1 is a dummy which is 1 if a patent was filed in county i between 1877 and 1914 and 0 otherwise. The outcome in column
2 is the log of the number of patents filed in county i between 1877 and 1914 turning all 0 to missings. The outcome in column 3 is 0 if no patent was filed in county i between 1877 and
1914 and the log of the number of patents +1 otherwise. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as
specified in summary statistics. Column 3 reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. Free cities are excluded. Regressions are weighted by
population in 1907. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table 5.12 : The eect of equal division onmeasures for innovation and entrepreneurship
Employment 1925: Prussia 1816:
(1) (2) (3)
Self Empl. Middle Schools Middle School Pupils
out of Agric. (per 1000 People)
Panel A. OLS
equal division 0.0656 -0.0113 -0.338
(0.0848) (0.0195) (1.210)
Observations 779 311 311
Panel B. With controls
equal division 0.151 0.0180 1.943∗∗
(0.118) (0.0129) (0.803)
Observations 763 311 311
Panel C. Border sample
equal division 0.309∗ 0.0347∗∗ 1.934
(0.162) (0.0158) (1.450)
Observations 329 90 90
mean outcome 4.415 0.0430 2.305
SD outcome 1.540 0.0804 4.503
Notes: In column 1 the percent of people in self-employment out of agriculture (manufacturing and trade and services) is used as outcome variable for the sample of the whole German
Empire in 1925. In column 2 and 3 the sample is reduced to Prussian counties. The number of middle schools (column 2) and the number of pupils in middle schools (column 3) per
1000 people are used as outcome variables. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in
summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered
on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
154
5 Long-Term Consequences of Inequality
5.11 Appendix D
Figure D-1 : Map inheritance rules in four categories
Notes: Themap shows the distribution of inheritance rules in Germany with its borders of the 19th century. The
map distinguishes four types of inheritance rule: unequal division (dark blue), mild form of unequal division (light
blue), mild form of equal division (yellow), and equal division (green).
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Table D-1 : Overviewmain outcome variables
Outcome mean (sd) min max Explanation Source
income log household 6.719 6.448 7.46 Log of household income Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumforschung,
income 0.115 INKAR Indikatoren und Karten zur Raum- ,
household income 833.531 631.6 1737.281 The average monthly household income und Stadtentwicklung, fromwww.inkar.de
103.02 in Euro in 2013 divided by the average
household size in 2012
log taxable income 3.46 3.107 4.022 Log of average taxable income Federal Statistical O!ice of Germany,
0.146 from https://www.destatis.de
taxable income 32.181 22.352 55.808 Average taxable income Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumforschung,
4.809 in thousand Euro INKAR Indikatoren und Karten zur Raum-
log median 7.956 7.555 8.383 Log of median income und Stadtentwicklung, fromwww.inkar.de
income 0.162
median income 2889.439 1910 4371 Median monthly income
455.414 in Euro in 2013
log GDP p.c 3.447 2.674 4.964 Log of GDP p.c.
0.336
GDP p.c 33.494 14.5 143.1 GDP p.c. in 2013
14.404 in thousand Euro
inequality gini 0.64 0.576 0.808 Calculated with information on the Federal Statistical O!ice of Germany,
measures 0.238 number of individuals in a county in 10 income fromwww.destatis.de
bins and the average taxable income in each bin
log 10th income 0.746 0.622 0.874 Log of 10th income pctile
pctile 0.348
10th income pctile 1.951 0 2.396 Average taxable income in thousand Euro
0.561 of the income bin which includes the
10th percentile of the population
log 90th income 4.255 3.724 4.341 Log of 90th income pctile
pctile 0.087
90th income pctile 70.66 41.42 76.76 Average taxable income in thousand Euro
4.877 of the income bin which includes the
90th pctile of the population
90th-10th pctile 4.719 3.507 5.84 Di!erence between 90th and 10th
income gap 0.317 log income percentile
landholding landholding gini 1895 0.716 0.426 0.948 For more information about Ziblatt (2008)
inequality 0.123 this measure see Ziblatt (2008).
distribution <2 ha 8.242 0.65 41.86 Percentage of farms below 2 ha Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1898)
of farm sizes 7.031 number stated in source
2-5 ha 13.336 0.76 61.71 Percentage of farms between 2-5 ha
10.692 number stated in source
5-20 ha 33.843 3.03 70.54 Percentage of farms between 5-20 ha
15.044 number stated in source
20 -100 ha 27.081 0.3 82.17 Percentage of farms between 20-100 ha
16.055 number stated in source
> 100 ha 17.483 0 80.8 Percentage of farms above 100 ha
19.319 number stated in source
Notes: This table gives an overview of the outcome variables used in table 2, 3, and 4 which are ourmain tables. Column 3 showsmeans and standard deviations in parentheses. Column
4 and 5 show the minimum and the maximum of the variable. Description about how the variables are prepared are listed in column 6 and the sources are stated in column 7. The exact
reference for some of the sources can be found in the bibliography.
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Table D-2 : The eect of equal division on farm sizes in Prussia 1816
(1) (2) (3)
Small Landholdings Medium Landholdings Large Landholdings
(per 1000 People)
Panel A. OLS
equal splitting 26.32∗∗∗ 13.47 -0.291
(7.614) (7.969) (0.264)
Observations 305 305 305
Panel B. With controls
equal splitting 21.33∗∗∗ 7.484 0.0333
(5.706) (5.465) (0.178)
Observations 305 305 305
Panel C. Distance to border
equal splitting 8.472∗ 2.327 0.0550
(4.666) (6.067) (0.166)
Observations 123 123 123
mean outcome 50.10 40.42 1.340
SD outcome 37.12 21.96 1.496
Notes: This table uses the earliest available measure of the distribution of farm sizes of German lands from Prussia in 1816. Column 1 shows the percent of small landholdings per 1000
people. Column 2 the percent of medium landholdings and column 3 the percent of large landholdings per 1000 people. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects.
Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 kmdistance to theborder of the inheritance
rule. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table D-3 : The eect of equal division on change in farm sizes and their distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
average farmsize ha < 2 ha 2-5 ha 5-20 ha 20-100 ha > 100 ha
Panel A. OLS
equal splitting x 1907 -0.288∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗ 0.212 -3.068∗∗∗ 0.869 0.935
(0.105) (0.434) (0.351) (0.538) (0.777) (0.566)
Observations 1870 1873 1873 1873 1871 1739
Panel B. With controls
equal splitting x 1907 -0.279∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗ 0.275 -2.987∗∗∗ 0.716 0.850
(0.103) (0.423) (0.310) (0.524) (0.710) (0.596)
Observations 1870 1873 1873 1873 1871 1739
Panel C. Distance to border
equal splitting x 1907 -0.221∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗ 0.155 -3.112∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗ 0.0294
(0.0959) (0.511) (0.354) (0.665) (0.793) (0.644)
Observations 795 798 798 798 796 715
mean outcome 5.818 8.607 13.60 35.05 26.49 17.46
SD outcome 3.403 7.636 10.95 15.07 16.02 18.68
Notes: Average farm size and shares of farms in 5 size categories as stated in ’Statistik des Deutschen Reichs’ Vol. 109(1895) and Vol. 209(1907). The regressor is the interaction term
of ’equal division’ (compared to ’unequal division’) and year 1907 (compared to 1895). The results show the change in farm sizes between 1895 and 1907. Panel A includes besides
main eects longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to
counties in 35 kmdistance to the border of the inheritance rule. Free cities are excluded. Regressions areweightedby population. Standard errors clustered ondistrict (Regierungsbezirk)
level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table D-4 : The eect of equal division on inequality measures 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini log 10th log 90th 90th − 10th
income pctile income pctile pctile income gap
Panel A. OLS
equal splitting 0.00248 0.000185 0.0146∗∗ 0.0200
(0.00426) (0.00561) (0.00552) (0.0432)
Observations 374 344 374 344
Panel B. With controls
equal splitting 0.00335 0.0105∗ 0.00169 -0.0740
(0.00368) (0.00574) (0.0115) (0.0489)
Observations 374 344 374 344
Panel C. Distance to border
equal splitting 0.00677∗∗ 0.0130∗∗ 0.0153 -0.0793
(0.00318) (0.00566) (0.00972) (0.0492)
Observations 178 151 178 151
mean outcome 0.640 0.746 4.255 4.719
SD outcome 0.0238 0.0348 0.0866 0.317
Notes: Income percentiles calculated from 2014 income tax statistics of the Federal Statistical Oice of Germany. Income bins are available with mean income per bin and number of
people in that bin. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C
reduces the sample to counties in 35 kmdistance to theborder of the inheritance rule. countieswithmore than100.000 inhabitants are excluded. Regressions areweightedbypopulation.
Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table D-5 : The eect of equal division on incomemeasures 2014 - quadratic RD polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log household income log taxable income log median income log GDP p.c.
Panel A. OLS
equal splitting 0.0722∗∗∗ 0.0960∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.0222) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0525)
Observations 397 374 397 397
Panel B. With controls
equal splitting 0.0593∗∗∗ 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0437∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0168) (0.0104) (0.0353)
Observations 397 374 397 397
Panel C. Distance to border
equal splitting 0.0488∗∗ 0.0506∗∗∗ 0.0434∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0159) (0.0123) (0.0539)
Observations 198 178 198 198
mean outcome 6.719 3.461 7.956 3.447
SD outcome 0.115 0.146 0.162 0.336
Notes: Data on income and GDP per capita stem from the Federal Statistical Oice of Germany and INKAR of 2013/14. In comparison to table 5.3 this table includes a quadratic RD
polynomial in all panels. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics.
Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. counties with more than 100.000 inhabitants are excluded. Regressions are weighted by
population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table D-6 : The eect of equal division on landholding inequality 1895 in Prussia
landholding Gini coe. 1895 % farms in size category...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
linear RD polyn. quad. RD polyn. < 2 ha 2-5 ha 5-20 ha 20-100 ha
Panel A. OLS
equal splitting -0.0612∗∗ -0.0562∗ 5.268∗∗∗ 9.776∗∗∗ 1.841 -14.61∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0314) (1.856) (2.065) (2.465) (2.781)
Observations 490 490 488 488 488 488
Panel B. With controls
equal splitting -0.0490∗∗∗ -0.0471∗∗∗ 5.970∗∗∗ 9.381∗∗∗ -2.524 -13.10∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0170) (1.273) (1.573) (2.754) (2.380)
Observations 490 490 488 488 488 488
Panel C. Distance to border
equal splitting -0.0423∗∗∗ -0.0450∗∗∗ 5.169∗∗∗ 8.055∗∗∗ -3.138 -8.303∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0134) (1.289) (1.608) (1.973) (2.486)
Observations 157 157 155 155 155 155
mean outcome 0.770 0.770 7.627 10.45 27.97 29.23
SD outcome 0.0975 0.0975 6.727 8.458 12.56 15.92
Notes: This table shows the results of table 2 for Prussia only. Share of farms in 5 size categories as stated in ’Statistik des Deutschen Reichs’ Vol. 109. Panel A includes longitude, latitude,
and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to
the border of the inheritance rule. Free cities are excluded. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05,
***=p<0.01
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Table D-7 : The eect of equal division on sectoral employment 1882 in Prussia
(1) (2) (3)
Agric. Manuf. Trade and Services
Panel A. OLS
equal division 0.720 -1.481 0.364
(1.872) (1.791) (0.383)
Observations 415 415 415
Panel B. With controls
equal division -0.820 -0.686 0.753∗∗
(1.801) (2.057) (0.346)
Observations 415 415 415
Panel C. Distance to border
equal division -0.765 0.489 0.724∗∗∗
(1.411) (1.578) (0.229)
Observations 190 190 190
mean outcome 20.68 12.40 2.636
SD outcome 6.907 6.584 1.481
Notes: This table uses the percentage of people in the three main economic sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and trade and services as outcome variables. The sample stems from
1882 Prussia. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and state-fixed eects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C
reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk)
level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table D-8 : Robustness check: main findings in Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, and Wuerttemberg
historical outcomes modern outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini 1895 Agric. Manuf. log household income log GDP p.c.
Panel A. OLS
equal division -0.0407∗∗ -4.080 1.233 0.0737∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗
(0.0191) (2.879) (1.551) (0.0264) (0.0660)
Observations 794 808 808 327 327
Panel B. With controls
equal division -0.0575∗∗∗ -3.832∗∗ 2.115∗∗ 0.0730∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.0131) (1.767) (1.044) (0.0199) (0.0410)
Observations 794 808 808 327 327
Panel C. Distance to border
equal division -0.0575∗∗∗ -4.521∗∗∗ 3.059∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.0131) (1.420) (0.748) (0.0189) (0.0481)
Observations 794 355 355 166 166
mean outcome 0.712 23.53 15.14 6.726 3.469
SD outcome 0.129 11.74 6.879 0.120 0.342
Notes: The table reduces the sample to the states of Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, andWuerttemberg. The Gini coe icient stems from Ziblatt (2008), the share of farms is as stated in ’Statistik
des Deutschen Reichs’ Vol. 109. Data on income and GDP per capita stem from the Federal Statistical O ice of Germany and INKAR of 2013/14. Panel A includes longitude, latitude, and
state-fixed e ects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 km distance to the
border of the inheritance rule. Free cities or counties with more than 100.000 inhabitants are excluded. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district
(Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table D-9 : Robustness check: excluding all mixed-inheritance-rule counties
historical outcomes modern outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini 1895 Agric. Manuf. log household income log GDP p.c.
Panel A. OLS
equal division -0.0452 -2.462 -0.239 0.0958∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(0.0313) (4.312) (2.289) (0.0394) (0.0697)
Observations 508 521 521 227 227
Panel B. With controls
equal division -0.0701∗∗ -7.315∗∗∗ 4.160∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.0271) (2.410) (1.606) (0.0637) (0.119)
Observations 508 521 521 227 227
Panel C. Distance to border
equal division -0.0343 -4.565∗ 3.783∗∗ 0.0980 0.0535
(0.0248) (2.643) (1.642) (0.152) (0.255)
Observations 107 112 112 65 65
mean outcome 0.718 19.77 17.24 6.717 3.468
SD outcome 0.123 13.17 7.796 0.122 0.375
Notes: The table reduces the sample to counties with a 100 percent area of unequal or equal division. The Gini coe icient stems from Ziblatt (2008), the share of farms is as stated in
’StatistikdesDeutschenReichs’ Vol. 109. Dataon incomeandGDPper capita stemfromtheFederal StatisticalO iceofGermanyand INKARof2013/14. PanelA includes longitude, latitude,
and state-fixed e ects. Panel B includes additionally geographic and cultural controls as specified in summary statistics. Panel C reduces the sample to counties in 35 kmdistance to the
border of the inheritance rule. Free cities or counties with more than 100.000 inhabitants are excluded. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors clustered on district
(Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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Table D-10 : Robustness check: changing radius around the border for RD specification
historical outcomes modern outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini 1895 Agric. Manuf. log household income log GDP p.c.
Distance to border <=20
equal division -0.0415∗∗∗ -4.111∗∗∗ 2.966∗∗∗ 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.00866) (1.360) (0.910) (0.0189) (0.0509)
Observations 289 292 292 137 137
Panel B. Distance to border <=50
equal division -0.0444∗∗∗ -4.752∗∗∗ 2.954∗∗∗ 0.0776∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.00938) (1.490) (0.870) (0.0176) (0.0435)
Observations 489 499 499 241 241
Panel C. Distance to border <=80
equal division -0.0464∗∗∗ -4.647∗∗∗ 3.280∗∗∗ 0.0691∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.00975) (1.568) (0.936) (0.0163) (0.0394)
Observations 614 629 629 299 299
mean outcome 0.657 19.64 18.33 6.746 3.478
SD outcome 0.119 12.52 6.888 0.120 0.289
Notes: The table shows results for the RD specification with varying distances to the border. The Gini coe icient stems from Ziblatt (2008), the share of farms is as stated in ’Statistik des
Deutschen Reichs’ Vol. 109. Data on income and GDP per capita stem from the Federal Statistical O ice of Germany and INKAR of 2013/14. Panel A reduces the sample to counties in 20
km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. Panel B reduces the sample to counties in 50 km distance to the border of the inheritance rule. Panel C reduces the sample to counties
in 80 kmdistance to the border of the inheritance rule. Free cities or counties withmore than 100.000 inhabitants are excluded. Regressions are weighted by population. Standard errors
clustered on district (Regierungsbezirk) level. * = p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
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